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This thesis studies the potency of place in mobilizing social categories, and its 
implications for both social categories and places. I use the theory of distanciation to 
study associations between caste identity and place. I conducted an ethnographic 
study of a caste-based digital group, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, to understand 
the connections and disconnections between the Thiyya caste and Malabar from the 
perspectives of different sets of actors involved in the identification of caste, namely 
the nation-state and members of this caste-based network. The nation-state knows the 
Thiyya caste in a manner that is disconnected from Malabar, while the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar seek to re-emphasize the identification of this caste through the 
region. Participant observation and in-depth interviews indicate that through 
references to Malabar, the group seeks to establish a Thiyya caste identity that is 
distinct from the Ezhavas, a caste group within which the nation-state subsumes them. 
 
  
I demonstrate that references to Malabar serve to counter the stigma that the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar experience when the spatially abstract categorization of the 
Thiyyas interacts with notions of caste inferiority/superiority. Further, it serves as a 
mobilizational tool through which they hope to negotiate with the nation-state for 
greater access to affirmative action. I also demonstrate that caste identification 
continues to be relevant to the production of place. Place-based identification of the 
Thiyyas influences the manner in which the group envisions the physical boundaries 
of Malabar and how other social groups can belong to this region. Based on this 
analysis, I argue that framework of distanciation should incorporate not only the 
experience of place and social relations, but also how they are known and 
represented.  
 
This dissertation establishes that even though social categories such as caste and place 
are not conventionally understood to be connected to each other, it is important to 
study the associations between them. Although the new media and globalization may 
prompt to us to think that place does not matter anymore, I establish that this caste 
group uses the language of place to organize and mobilize itself on a stronger basis in 
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Chapter 1: Empirical Background and Statement of the Problem 
 
Introduction: Knowing Caste through Place 
 
I spent much of summer 2011 conversing with different middle-class Delhi residents 
about how they used matrimonial websites to secure a caste-specific marriage partner 
for themselves or their children
1
. I was interested in capturing the processes through 
which prospective brides, grooms and their parents negotiated such websites by 
drawing on a combination of both digital and physical resources to deal with the 
uncertainties of using a website to locate a bride or bridegroom from an appropriate 
caste. The intersection of the ways in which caste was identified and its specific 
regional context
2
 was something I had not expected, and yet I periodically 
encountered it in these conversations. For instance, many respondents shared that for 
them the region of origin and caste combined to form non-negotiable parameters of 
the search on these websites.  
 
One of the most exciting connections that emerged in this project was that place 
seemed to form an important variable for knowing caste identity. Sarla, an upper 
caste respondent who was searching for a bride for her son shared that one of the 
                                                 
1
 One of the ways in which caste boundaries are maintained is through strict rules about marriage within a certain 
sub-castes, castes, or a range of caste groups. A family’s caste status will not be maintained if the offspring, 
particularly the daughters, marry someone from a sub-caste or caste that is considered relatively lower in status 
than their own. 
2
 For instance, families had preferences for brides or bridegrooms not only from within the same caste, but also 




ways she identified the caste of the prospective bride was by focusing on the fairness 
of her skin in the photograph and description provided on the website. She explained 
her emphasis on skin color both in terms of caste and region: in the region she hailed 
from, Eastern Uttar Pradesh, fair skin colour was interpreted as proof of birth in a 
higher ranking caste. Consequently, in her choice of a bride for her son, Sarla had to 
consider the community in her region of origin, along with the symbolism through 
which caste identity was understood in that region. 
 
My conversation with Rudrakumar Nair also provided an interesting insight into how 
caste is known through place, and how this knowledge was utilized as a digital 
resource. Like many other young adults in the 1970s, Rudrakumar had left his home 
in this case to migrate more than a thousand miles north to New Delhi, the Indian 
capital. He had spent the rest of his adult life employed as a mid-level government 
servant in this city, where he and his wife had raised their only daughter.  
Do you think that the caste details that people mentioned on the website 
are correct? Or do some people lie about that? 
That also not sure, we can't say. Because some people will do something, we 
don't know what they're writing. Even they may not be able to know. They 
may not be familiar with the actual caste. (I mean) those who are feeding no, 
the information, they (themselves) may not be able to say what is it. “Vaniya 
Nair”!!! What is “Vaniya Nair”? They may be thinking that they are Nair 
also! … “Vilakkitala Nair” - people may think that they are Nair. Actually, 
they are not actual Nair.  
So when a situation like that arises how do you check? 
That you have to check from the neighbourhood only. That is the only 
solution. You have to visit the (neighbourhood in Kerala). Actually whether 
they are Nair family or not. 
But what if this person is settled in Delhi? 
Then I'll tell you… There is the other way of checking - that is Certificates. 
Certificate is the correct information. 





Rudrakumar was using the website to search for a groom for his daughter from his 
own caste, a relatively higher ranking caste called the Nairs. However, identifying a 
groom of appropriate caste status was a challenge for Rudrakumar due to the shifting 
contours of caste boundaries over time. The Nair caste is a large caste group from 
Kerala, which was previously divided into differently ranked sub-castes
3
. The 
Vilakkitala group, which had previously been located on the outer periphery of this 
broad and heterogenous caste group, is now included within the Nairs due to the 
efforts of the Nair caste association (NSS) and the government in the 20
th
 century, 
although this inclusion of the Vilakkitalas was not uniformly accepted within the 
broader Nair caste group (Fuller 1975). While they are categorized as Nairs today, 
Vilakkitalas are also recognized as a group that has been socially disadvantaged 
within the caste system, and so are identified by the Central and state governments as 
Other Backward Classes
4
 (National Commission for Backward Classes 2010b, Kerala 
Public Service Commission 2013). This is in direct contrast to most other Nair sub-
castes, which are categorized as “forward castes”
5
 today. A pressing dilemma for 
Rudrakumar was that on the matrimonial website, Vilakkitala families might identify 
themselves simply as part of the larger caste group, as Nairs. Yet, for his own family, 
which belonged to a relatively higher ranking sub-caste within the Nairs, marriage 
with a Vilakkitala Nair would be anathema.  
 
                                                 
3
 These subcastes did not intermarry among themselves. Towards the middle of the 20th century, in the face of the 
expediency of caste politics, the Nair Service Society (NSS), the representative caste association, made an effort to 
consolidate all these sub-castes into a single cohesive caste, downplaying the difference between sub-castes 
(Fuller 1975). 
4
 Other Backward Classes (OBC) is a term used by the Indian State to identify social groups that have experienced 
disadvantages due to a combination of unfavorable caste status and economic factors.  
5
 This is a term used by the Indian nation-state to refer any group that was relatively privileged within the caste 




Rudrakumar had proposed that to correctly identify the caste status of any prospective 
groom, it is important to trace his family back to the ecology of castes within their 
geographical region of origin, or the “neighbourhood” in their native state of Kerala. 
For Rudrakumar, place held the key to the correct identification of caste, where self-
identification could be corroborated with identification by others.  
 
This conversation was also interesting because it points to another background 
variable - the way the State knows the caste of its citizens. Although, in 
Rudrakumar’s opinion, place held part of the answer, in this case correctly identifying 
the caste of a prospective groom was further complicated by migration to distant 
places such as Delhi and the seeming disconnect from physical places through the 
new media. It was striking that for him, the answer rested on how the government 
identified the groom and his family, through the documentation of caste status in a 
variety of “certificates”. Rudrakumar’s expectation was that place-based caste 
identification would correspond to identification through “the certificate”. 
 
As I studied the caste-based use of matrimonial websites, I dwelt on the manner in 
which caste is known through place. I had started out thinking how some truth about 
caste identity on websites can be ascertained, or verified through a reference to 
places. However, the problem turned out to be more complex. My understanding of 
caste itself had improved- rather than thinking of castes as social groups fixed over 
time, I came to understand them as groups whose boundaries changed all the time, 





This led to a shift in the focus of my enquiry. Rather than searching for some 
essential truth about caste identity though place, I started to think about why it was 
important for groups or individuals to identify caste through place in the first 
instance? I became interested in understanding the shift in this association between 
caste identity and place over time. Might there be situations where place-based ways 
of identifying caste cease to matter for some social agents and institutions, but retain, 
or indeed, even regain significance for others? In thinking about this connection, I 
also mused about Rudrakumar’s other solution - the “certificate”? Where is the 
“certificate”, or identification by the State, located in these associations of caste 
identification and place? Did the manner in which caste was identified through place 
always correspond to identification by the State, or was it used to pose a challenge to 
how the State knows people as members of caste groups? This set of enquiries form 
the basis of this dissertation. 
 
The central problem addressed in this dissertation is how and why are caste 
identification and place linked to each other? Within the literature on caste, the 
connection between identity and place has been acknowledged in a rather brief and 
tangential way. In some contexts, caste identity acknowledged regional origins 
through a reference in the caste name (Pant 1987). It has also been noted that castes 
with the same name can occupy different statuses in different geographic areas 
(Srinivas 1970, Raheja 1988, Appadurai 1986). Further, social distance between 




different castes (Ghurye 1969). Finally, spatial segregation by caste is an important 
reality in both rural (Miller 1954, Béteille 1965) and urban areas (Singh and 
Vithayathil 2012, Dupont 2004, Trivedi 1996, Gandhi 1983). While these studies are 
to be commended for establishing the initial basis for a study of spatiality as linked to 
caste identity, most tend to construct a stable rather than fluid relationship between 
them.  
 
In contrast, this dissertation adopts a process-based view of both caste identity and 
place. Instead of focusing on how a fixed caste identity is connected to a fixed place, 
the focus in this dissertation is on understanding the becoming of both caste identity 
and place through their linkage with each other. In other words, it proceeds from the 
understanding that at specific junctures, the constructs of caste identification and 
place become significant inputs into the collective creation of the other. That is to 
say, this study is about how ideas regarding belongingness to one’s caste are 
collectively constructed through reference to a specific place. Although the 
identification of “our” caste by self is by no means disconnected from the 
identification of “our” caste by individuals and groups from other castes, in this 
dissertation, the focus is on the former rather than the latter. 
 
The course of the Dravidian movement provides an interesting instance of such a 
yoking together of these two constructs. In the 19
th
 century, a combination of ideas in 
European academia, colonial ethnography and colonial administration merged caste 




“superior” blood and the Dravidians of “inferior” blood with the lowest ranking 
castes (Jaffrelot 2003: 151-152). In the next century, these ideas were drawn into one 
of the most famous caste-based agitations, the Dravidian movement. Here, a broad 
panoply of non-Brahmin castes
6
 in Madras Presidency spearheaded a campaign 
against the Brahmins, who in addition to their high-status ranking within the caste 
system, had also dominated privileged positions in academia and employment during 
the British colonial rule. Interestingly, a key assumption within this caste-based 
movement was one where caste was associated with geography. The assumption was 
that the Aryans, considered synonymous with the Brahmins
7
, were northern invaders, 
who had destroyed a once flourishing southern Dravidian civilization of non-Brahmin 
castes (Dirks 1997, Hardgrave 1979).  
 
Within the Dravidian movement, this conflation of caste and region not only served in 
self-identification (as the “us” of a broad caste-based alliance challenging caste 
inequality), it also influenced the manner in which place itself was envisioned. This 
place-based assumption about caste became the basis of a demand for a separate 
Dravida Nadu/Dravidisthan, in conjunction with linguistic divides in India 
(Hardgrave 1979, Manor 2001, Widmalm 2006, Annamalai 2010). Envisioned as a 
separate land for Dravidian castes, Dravida Nadu was to be characterized by caste 
equality and serve as a haven for a Dravidian culture that had suffered under Aryan 
                                                 
6
 As Hardgrave (1979: 35) explains it, the composition of the castes towards which the movement was oriented, 
shifted over time. In its initial stages, in the early 20th century, the movement was oriented primarily towards the 
prosperous middle-ranking, non-Brahmin, agricultural castes (such as the Vellala) under the leadership of EVR 
Naicker. In the following decades, under the leadership of CN Annadurai, the movement explicitly focused on the 
lower-ranking non-Brahmin castes such as the Nadar, Maravar and castes categorized as untouchables. 
7
 As Dirks (1997) explains, the Dravidian movement drew on certain key assumptions based on the European 




hegemony (Barnett 1976: 93). The demand for a separate Dravida Nadu was a 
significant force that provided a strong impetus to the Dravidian movement. At its 
heights, it took the form of a demand for secession from the union of India itself 
(Manor 2001). However, over time, the demand for a separate Dravida Nadu was 
gradually sidelined within the movement, and it was eventually dropped by the mid-
1960s (Hardgrave 1979, Manor 2001, Widmalm 2006).  
 
As illustrated in this historical example, narratives regarding place can emerge as a 
powerful means for constructing the self-identity of caste groups. In addition, caste 
identification itself can play a crucial role in shaping place, both in terms of 
boundaries, as well the right of various social groups to access places. For instance, 
the role played by caste communities in shaping contemporary regional politics, 
specifically in the demand for creation of new states such as Telangana and 
Bundelkhand (Gudavarthy 2012: 61), can also be understood as testament to the 
powerful outcomes of connecting place and caste identification. Gudavarthy (2012: 
61) cites the instance of the contemporary agitation for the creation of a new state of 
Telangana from contemporary Andhra Pradesh. The OBCs have been at the vanguard 
in this agitation, which in its most recent phase, succeeded in bringing the state to a 
standstill on multiple occasions since 2009. Apart from demanding access to 
economic resources, through the agitation for a separate Telangana these castes are 
also agitating for the social recognition of their culture and cultural symbols.  
 
Consequently, there is much to be learned from studying how and why these two 




mentioned instances, the cultural evaluation of the castes in question, and of their 
rituals and practices, play a key role in the connection between these two constructs. 
Further, many of these agitations have also involved a conversation with the State, as 
well as about how it identifies the caste(s) in question. 
 
In this dissertation, the connection of caste identification to place is studied through 
an ethnographic account of a digital caste-based group, which is referred to using the 
pseudonym, Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Through its name and conversations, this 
digital group seeks to associate its collective caste identity, Thiyya, with the region of 
Malabar. The choice of a digital group to study the association between caste 
identification and place might be considered odd. After all, a very small percentage of 
India’s population has access to the new media, and so, a digital group is by no means 
representative of the identity of an entire caste. On the other hand, it is precisely 
because of its non-representativeness that a digital group could be an appropriate 
choice, because it highlights the manner in which a specific self-identification is 
constructed around caste in the context of the various interests and experiences of the 
members of a group, through many contestations within it. Further, as scholars of 
caste such as Béteille (1997) have emphasized, castes are increasingly marked by 
class distinctions within themselves, a consideration that is highlighted through the 
choice of a digital group.  
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into 5 sections. The first section provides an 




identification of castes in the colonial and post-colonial periods, as well as some of 
the implications of such identification. The caste-based use of communication 
technologies, particularly the new media, is discussed in section 3. A description of 
the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar is provided in Section 4. Section 5 contains a 
discussion about the region of Malabar and the Thiyya caste. 
 
Caste as a System 
 
Caste is understood as a system of hierarchical differentiation involving multiple 
social groups, or castes. There is considerable debate regarding the basic organizing 
principle for caste as a system. While some consider the relative purity and pollution 
of the hereditary occupations associated with these social groups as the key [Dumont 
(1966) 1970], others consider inter-caste endogamy as the key (Gupta 2005) to the 
organization of caste. In its current form, inter-caste differentiation is not adequately 
explained by either principle alone.  
 
While much of his analysis has been soundly critiqued, it is possible to start with 
Louis Dumont’s argument that caste is a system where differentiation is based on the 
relative opposition between what is considered pure and what is considered impure 
(castes, activities, food etc). In particular, it explains the textual fourfold division of 
castes, referred to as the varna classification, recorded in Purusa Sukta legend in the 
Rg Veda. As per the legend, the four broad categories of castes are differentially 




Supreme Being, Purusa. The Brahmins, who head the hierarchy, emerged from the 
mouth; the Kshatriyas emerge from his arms; the Vaishyas from his thighs; and the 
Shudras who emerged from the feet were placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
Empirically, there are multiple castes located in each of these four broad varna 
categories. However, in different regions the same caste may be accorded a varying 
rank. In addition, this fourfold division does not exhaust all castes. For instance, the 
castes that experienced untouchability were placed outside this fourfold classification. 
Further, the fourfold division of caste was not uniformly found in all parts of India - 
in some areas one or more of the varnas did not exist. Providing an essentialist 
explanation, [Dumont (1966) 1970] argued that in its essential form, caste was a 
system marked by interdependence between these different caste groups. 
 
It is important to note that Dumont’s analysis primarily relies on Hindu religious 
texts, which may differ considerably from the manner in which castes are organized 
on the ground. It also does not take into account the manner in which different castes 
locate themselves hierarchically, something that Dipankar Gupta (2000) has drawn 
attention to by suggesting that we think of the existence of multiple caste hierarchies. 
Gupta’s field work demonstrates that most castes, even those that are ranked low as 
per the textual hierarchy, often have a different, contradictory view of what the 
hierarchy is and where they are placed on this hierarchy. Apart from its contribution 
to the phenomenological approach to caste (Khare 1984, Searle-Chatterjee and 
Sharma 1994, Gorringe and Rafanell 2007), and the insight into varied forms of 




a certain hierarchy, and placement of castes within it, is achieved. In other words, 
granted that multiple caste hierarchies exist, it is important to consider that not all of 
these hierarchies and placements gain equal legitimacy. This indicates that we need to 
study the complex processes through which legitimation and delegitimation of any 
hierarchical ordering of castes takes place, which in today’s context involve the State 
as well as the mobilization of multiple interest groups within a caste.  
 
A particularly relevant critique of Dumont’s framework is that it appears to envision 
some true, ahistorical form of caste, where political aspects were always secondary to 
the system’s religious aspects. Other scholars (Appadurai 1986, Berreman 1992, 
Inden 1986), particularly historians of caste (Bayly 1999, Dirks 2001), are 
uncomfortable with this interpretation and they have demonstrated the significance of 
political considerations in the organization of and mobility within the caste system. In 
other words, rather than assuming that caste was a system that has remained 
unchanged over the course of time, irrespective of the historical and political 
circumstances, we need to consider that caste as we know it today is the product of 
different mutations, including that of colonial intervention and knowledge production 
(Inden 1986, Pant 1987, Appadurai 1996, Jaiswal 1997, Bayly 1999, Dirks 2001). 
 
In the post-independence context, scholars have suggested the progressive 
weakening, and perhaps even the end, of caste as a system. For instance, MN Srinivas 
(2003) argued that caste as a system of rural economic mode of production, where 




even in rural India. Yet, at the same time he reiterates that such an end does not 
indicate that castes as groups and identities no longer have relevance - indeed they 
continue to be strong. While caste as a system has changed in terms of 
interdependence of caste groups
8
, caste as identity has become significant for 
mobilization to reach different types of political, social and economic resources.  
 
One of the most profound changes in caste as a system was the emergence of 
classificatory schemes developed by governments during the colonial and post-
colonial eras in enumerative projects (like the counting of caste in the Census) and in 
an effort to implement affirmative action schemes. Together, they led to a shift on the 
manner in which caste identity and place were related. In addition to the existence of 
the broader, textual four varna classification, caste identity was known and 
recognized through an intricate connection with the local regional contexts (Srinivas 
1970, Pant 1987, Appadurai 1996, Jaiswal 1997). These contexts were important in 
the day-to-day life of the members of a caste, since physical mobility and governance 
were tied to specific and relatively small geographical units (Miller 1954). 
Identification of caste by the State in colonial and post-colonial periods created 
broader regional contexts (spanning the entire state or nation) in which caste identity 
was known. Further, they also influenced the self-mobilization of castes. Caste 
organizations started to engage in multiple dialogues with the State for recognition 
under varying categories at different times. The following section provides an 
                                                 
8
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introduction to the identification of caste by the State in colonial and post-colonial 
periods, as well as some of its implications in terms of politics and caste-based 
mobilization. 
 
Identification of Caste and the State in the Colonial and Postcolonial Eras 
 
This section provides a background on the identification of caste by the State, as well 
as its relationship to self-identification through mobilization around caste. Sudipto 
Kaviraj (1997) traces contemporary caste mobilization to the governing practices of 
the British colonial state which continued to add a dynamism to politics in India after 
1947. Kaviraj argues that the colonial state initiated a logic of enumeration by first 
counting colonial subjects in terms of social groups such as castes, and then 
predicating social policy on the numerical strength of these groups. He explains that 
while previously social categories such as castes were used to determine who the 
other person was and the rules of interacting with them, following colonial 
administrative practices such as the census, these categories were used to map social 
groups in terms of strength of numbers and location.  
 
Kaviraj also explains that in response to such enumeration, caste groups themselves 
started to mobilize around collective identities. For instance, as historical studies of 
colonial India demonstrate, during colonial censuses, caste associations mobilized 
their members to supply specific responses regarding their own caste and caste status 




Mahtons from Jallandher who petitioned the District Census Officer in 1911 to be 
recorded as Rajputs in the census, Bernard Cohn (1987 : 249) even suggests that the 
formation of caste associations may well have been influenced by an interest in how 
the caste was being enumerated in the census.  
 
Appadurai (1996) argues that while the counting of caste in the census was 
discontinued in 1931
9
, the logic of enumeration continued to influence Indian politics 
even after independence. Caste was an important, if somewhat implicit and 
unacknowledged, element of mobilization in Indian democracy from its early days 
(Kothari and Maru 1965, Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). Caste-based strategies and 
alliances played an influential role in voting behavior. However, the dominant 
discourse in Indian politics remained tied to that of western liberalism in the initial 
decades after independence from British rule in 1947. As Kaviraj (1997: 334) 
explains, in this early period, politicians, who hailed overwhelmingly from the upper 
castes, were likely to represent themselves as liberal individuals focused on 
promoting social justice, rather than members of a particular caste. The assumption 
was that the newly independent nation should focus on a national identity rather than 
on seemingly divisive issues of caste, and that by promoting a broad agenda of social 
justice, problems related to caste would also be automatically addressed (Jaffrelot 
2006: 178-9). However, within a decade of Independence, politicians, particularly 
from the middle-caste and lower-caste groups tried to bring caste oppression and 
interests directly into the dominant discourse (Kaviraj 1997). This shift was prompted 
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by the persistence of caste oppression, as well as the failure of social justice programs 
and the Left-based movements to address issues related to caste (Kothari 1994).   
 
The affirmative action framework in India has also had a key influence in shaping 
contemporary caste relations. Historically, affirmative action policies in India have 
primarily taken the form of the reservation of positions in employment and education 
through the creation of specific quotas for castes indicated under the rather broad 
term of “backward classes”. As noted by Galanter (1978), from its earliest days, the 
term “backward classes” has been used by various governments, both in the colonial 
and post-colonial periods, to indicate a varying collection of castes. In some cases, the 
term was used to refer to all castes other than non-Brahmins. At other times, it was 
used to designate a combination of Shudra castes as castes who experienced by 
untouchability. Finally, it was also used to specifically designate only those castes 
that experienced untouchability, who had previously been referred to as “depressed 
classes”
10
 and today have adopted the self-referential term Dalits. The flexibility in 
the lay interpretation of the term “backward classes” arises partly from the fact that 
all these interpretations were often used coterminously by different governmental 
units at any point in time.  
 
Affirmative action policies were first implemented in India in the late ninenteenth 
century. This was the colonial period, where the administration of India was divided 
between the colonial empire, referred to as British India, and nearly 600 states 
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administered by indigenous rulers, referred to as Princely States. Scholars (Das 2000, 
Jaffrelot 2005) point out that despite the popular assumption that affirmative action  
policies were first initiated in British India, it was in fact Princely States such as 
Mysore, Baroda and Kolhapur that pioneered these initiatives. Taking the case of the 
Princely State of Kolhapur, Jaffrelot (2005) explains that this pioneering impetus 
came from the fact that the ruler of the state, Shahju Maharaj, was from a Shudra 
farming caste. In order to address the disproportionate representation of Brahmins in 
the state’s administrative structure, Shahju Maharaj initiated an affirmative quota 
policy, and half of the vacant seats were reserved for backward classes by 1902. 
Jaffrelot (2005) also notes that it was the southern Princely State of Mysore that 
implemented the most extensive affirmative action policies. The program was started 
in 1920 when Mysore was a princely state, and continued after independence until 
1959, at which point 59 per cent of  civil service jobs were set aside for backward 
classes.  
 
In British India, efforts were made to apply affirmative action policies in education, 
electoral politics, and employment in the civil administration. In 1892, the British 
established special schools for castes that experienced untouchability since they could 
not access other schools due to rejection by parents and teachers. They also 
established scholarships for students from these castes (Jaffrelot 2006). In 1919, the 
British colonial government created caste quotas on seats in the Bombay and Madras 
legislative councils (Jaffrelot 2005).  In 1932, the British colonial administration 




minority communities. This included the creation of a separate electorate for the 
depressed classes, where voters from castes that experienced untouchability would 
elect their own representatives. However, this Award was ultimately rejected by 
mainstream Indian nationalists led by Gandhi in the Poona Pact of 1935 (Das 2000, 
Jaffrelot 2006). Consequently, instead of a separate electorate limited to members of 
depressed classes, a certain number of constituencies were reserved for untouchable 
candidates, where all Hindu voters irrespective of their caste would have to choose 
between different candidates from the depressed classes (Jaffrelot 2006). 
Employment quotas for the depressed classes were instituted by the British in 1934 in 
the civil services, and these were raised from 8.5 % to 14.6% in 1946 (Jaffrelot 2006).  
 
After India gained independence in 1947, affirmative action policies for the erstwhile 
depressed classes (who were now renamed Scheduled Castes) were continued in 
electoral politics, education and employment, and were also extended to tribal 
populations (identified as Scheduled Tribes) (Jaffrelot 2006).  When the Constitution 
of India was drawn up in 1950, specific provisions for affirmative action were drawn 
up for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). At the national level, the 
Constitution has created quotas of 15% and 7.5% for SCs and STs respectively, in 
education and employment in public institutions. These figures are based roughly on 
the proportion of these castes and tribes in the Indian population. Further, at the state 
levels, additional reservations are in place. In electoral politics, at the national 
parliament (Lok Sabha) as well as state legislature, the reservation of certain 




Currently, each voter in a reserved constituency chooses between candidates from the 
relevant caste group. At the state level, the reservation of legislative seats for SCs and 
STs is based on the proportion of their population in each state. The reservation of 
constituencies is rotated on a periodic basis.  
 
While the constitution also mentions a third category, the Other Backward Classes 
(OBC), the criteria for their identification was not linked as clearly to caste or tribe 
status as the other two categories. Dudley-Jenkins (2003) identifies the OBCs as 
referring to economically and socially depressed castes or communities, such as 
castes that are low ranking, but not considered untouchable, and other similarly 
located non-Hindu communities. Reservations for the OBCs were not as clearly 
defined in the Constitution. As compared to affirmative action policies for the SCs 
and STs, they have attracted much more upper-caste resistance (Jaffrelot 2006, 
Deshpande and Yadav 2006).  
 
While many states had long implemented reservation quotas for OBCs, at the central 
level, these reservations were adopted recently and much more contentiously 
(Dudley-Jenkins 2003). Following the constitutional decree, Backward Classes 
Commissions were set up twice. The first commission recommended in 1953 that the 
caste be taken as the criteria for identifying backwardness, and made suggestions for 
quotas accordingly. These recommendations were rejected. The second commission, 
headed by BP Mandal in 1978, bore in mind the legal stipulations specified by the 




must be kept under 50%, and suggested a quota of 27% for OBCs. In the face of 
much violent resentment from the upper-castes, this suggestion was adopted by the 
VP Singh government in 1990. In 1990s, the Supreme Court validated caste as a 
legitimate, and indeed the sole, criterion for determining OBC status. Jaffrelot (2006: 
186) also notes a shift in the Supreme Court’s stance in the Balaji decision in the 
1990s, when it ruled that the 50% ceiling for quotas was no longer applicable. 
Consequently, states began to increase the OBC quota level.  
 
Currently there exists a two-tier system for OBC quotas - at the national level and the 
state level. The list of castes identified as OBCs at the national level is determined by 
the National Backward Classes commission. The national OBC quota is capped at 
27%, and its implementation is subject to an income limitation. Known as the 
“creamy layer limitation”, it stipulates that job and employment reservations cannot 
be availed of by individuals whose annual family income exceeds a certain limit. 
While the initial limit was determined at an annual income of Rs 100,000 
(Gudavarthy 2012), it was modified to Rs 600,000 per annum in June 2013
11
. Many 
states have separate OBC lists, and placement of castes within these lists is 
determined by the respective state backward classes commissions (Dudley-Jenkins 
2003). There are significant differences in the national and state OBC lists. 
Consequently a caste that features on the national OBC list, may not be recognized as 
an OBC in some states, or certain regions of specific states. 
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Since this dissertation focuses on a digital caste-based group, the following section 
provides an introduction to the caste-based use of the new media. 
 
Caste-based use of the New Media 
 
Despite predictions to the contrary
12
, technological innovations ranging from British 
steam to the introduction of communication technologies such as the telegraph and 
the printing press have been utilized by castes, particularly caste associations, to 
organize on a scale beyond their local spatial boundaries and to reach caste members 
who have moved to cities across India. Not surprisingly, the new media is also being 
used extensively with caste-based interests in mind.  
 
By extensive usage, the reference here is to the multiple forms of caste-based usage 
of the new media. It does not imply, however, that all members of all castes have 
universal access to the new media. To begin with, in India, access to the new media is 
constrained through lack of physical infrastructure such as electricity, computers, and 
other telecommunications components. The International Telecommunications Union, 
a UN body that monitors new media usage, estimates that in 2011, only 10.7% of the 
Indian population had Internet access
13
. Although actual data on caste-based usage of 
the new media is likely to include a larger population of users when diasporic Indian 
populations are taken into account, this figure does make it clear that many people 
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who have an interest in caste do not have access to the new media. Since caste and 
class intersect in powerful ways, and this influences access to scarce resources such 
as the new media, it is not unusual to see more representation for higher ranking caste 
groups than lower ranking caste groups in new media usage. Consequently, the forms 
in which caste is manifested digitally cannot, by any means, be understood as 
representative or a mirror image of physical caste relations and caste interests. 
 
Different forms of the new media are being utilized for caste-based representation and 
mobilization, as well as to extend physical caste-based debates. The caste-based use 
of the new media takes both individual and collective forms. Many caste associations 
have created websites as a complement to their physical activities
14
. Websites 
dedicated to particular castes and their histories and practices have also been set up by 
collectivities of people who may not belong to specific physical caste associations, 
often in an effort to connect with others from the same caste who are located across 
large distances
15
. These conversations are continued through webpages (such as for 
instance Wikipedia), as well as multiple blogposts and digital forums. Matrimonial 
websites, both caste-specific sites as well as general matrimonial websites which 
provide caste filters, have also provided an important way in which caste relations 
through marriage can be sustained across large distances. Of late, the new media has 
been used by individuals to connect to a collectivity belonging to the same caste 
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through social networking sites such as Orkut.com, Twitter.com, facebook.com and 
Meerkat.com.  
 
It is only in the past decade that a handful of academic publications have begun to 
engage with the multiple caste-based usages of the new media (Chopra 2006, Sharma 
2008, Thirumal 2008, Langran 2011, Thirumal and Tartakov 2011). While addressing 
a significant lacuna, most of these studies also reflect some of the limitations of the 
initial literature on the new media. For instance, most of these studies create the 
impression of a separate “online” sphere of the Internet, seemingly distinct from 
physical caste activity. Further, they tend to address the new media solely from the 
perspective of the theorist. In the rare instance when the voice of the users is 
included, analysis is focused on a content analysis of the digital text generated. In 
contrast, in this study, data generation is not limited to digital text. In this study, 
attention is focused on the voice of the users through personal interviews which 
provide a richer analysis of their caste-based usage of the new media. Rather than 
limiting itself to studying only what people do online, this study also examines what 
significance people attach to online activities and posts.  However, in this study, there 
are no pretensions about how the representation of the users’ voices is not influenced 
by the perspective of the scholar
16
. The following section provides an introduction to 
the digital group in question. 
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The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar 
 
This dissertation draws from an ethnographic study of a digital group, identified here 
by the pseudonym, Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. The research was undertaken 
between August 2012 and October 2013, through observation of the public 
discussions in the group, combined with in-depth personal interviews with a smaller 
sample of members. This section provides an introduction to the digital platform used 
by the group, and structure and history of the group itself.  
 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was created on an international social networking site, 
which will be identified here through the pseudonym, Meerkat.com. Users of this 
social networking site register by creating a user profile, which enables them to 
establish contact with other registered members. Meerkat.com is very popular with 
new media users within India, and with Indian diaspora located in locations such as 
the Middle East, Australia, Europe and USA
17
. Apart from creating individual 
profiles, Meerkat.com is also designed to provide registered users with the ability to 
create and join digital groups. In any Meerkat.com group, a large number of members 
can engage in multiple public conversations simultaneously. These conversations can 
                                                                                                                                           
(such as participant observation and interviews), the effort has been to focus on certain themes or interpretations 
that might be more significant for the group members themselves. 
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occur through the sharing of different types of documents - group members can 
upload (and discuss) text messages, text documents, photographs and videos, which 
appear on a public digital interface. These uploads are visible to all members of 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar in a fairly chronological order. All members of a 
particular Meerkat.com group can respond to each upload on that group, and, in turn, 
others can respond to any comment made regarding an upload. Just how public these 
conversation are, depends on the privacy-related settings of the digital group. The 
conversations in Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar are visible only to members who are part 
of this particular digital group. Other registered members of Meerkat.com can only 
see the description of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar and a list of the people who have 
joined this particular group. 
 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was created in January 2012 by Murali, a middle-aged 
man who lives in the south Indian city of Kannur.  From the very outset, through the 
common introduction visible to all registered Meerkat.com members, the group has 
described itself as a group of Thiyyas from Malabar who are striving to unite the 
Thiyya caste community. During discussions, the founder and early members shared 
that they were motivated to create this Meerkat.com group because they were looking 
for a forum where they could discuss the uniqueness of the Thiyyas as a caste. In 
particular, they were striving to establish a Thiyya identity that was separate from the 
Ezhavas, a caste that the former is often considered to be synonymous with. They had 
previously encountered considerable resistance to this idea, from other Thiyyas, 




such as on Wikipedia, and similar caste-based groups on social networking sites such 
as Meerkat.com, Orkut.com and facebook.com. Finally, Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar 
was created on Meerkat.com, where the idea was to create a group comprised of 
Thiyyas who would discuss what was unique about this caste, and its future as such a 
unique caste. However, not everyone was equally convinced of the essential 
difference between the Thiyyas and the Ezhavas. Occasionally members, particularly 
new additions, would bring up issues which discussed what Thiyyas and Ezhavas 
shared with each other, which always led to intense and often vicious debates on the 
group. After one such debate on the group in January 2013, the group’s digital 
description was modified to specifically mention that Ezhavas were not welcome in 
this group. 
 
Access to Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar is moderated by a small set of people, referred 
to on the group as the “admins”. With the exception of Murali, the composition of the 
admins has varied over time. During the period that the group was under observation, 
the admins of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar numbered between 3 and 11 people. So 
far all admins have been male
18
, a reflection of the predominantly male composition 
of the group itself. Initially, the admins were primarily people who were physically 
located within India. However, since December 2012, a conscious effort has been 
made to appoint admins from the diaspora. Both the admins and non-admin members 
can add other Meerkat.com users to the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar group. However, 
admins do exercise power over membership of the group. They try to monitor the 
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addition of new members, particularly watching to weed out anyone who they 
consider as an Ezhava or an Ezhava sympathizer. Those registered members of 
Meerkat.com, who want to join Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, but do not have any 
acquaintances in the group, apply for membership, after which they need to be 
approved and added by admins. Further, only admins have the power to remove 
members from the group. While both admins and ordinary members of the group can 
upload text, photographs and videos to the public interface of the group, only the 
former have the power to delete any public thread of conversations visible in the 
digital interface of the group.  
 
At the start of the study, in August 2012, the group consisted of less than 500 
members. Since then, this number has expanded exponentially, fuelled by a sustained 
membership drive undertaken by the admins of the group. They encouraged members 
of the group to add as many Thiyya relatives and acquaintances they knew on 
Meerkat.com to the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. By June 2013, this number had 
climbed to more than 3500 members. While these are large numbers of people, the 
members themselves make a distinction between mere members and “active” 
members on the group.  They bemoan the fact that despite such large numbers, there 
exist only around 100 “active” members, referring to those who contribute regularly 
to the public conversations on the group either by initiating them, or by uploading 





On the one hand, this complaint may be used to understand that some members only 
looked up the conversation on the group at the time that they were added there. This 
rather passive membership may be attributed, in part, to the very manner in which 
members are added to the group. Some members reported that even though they did 
not solicit membership in the group, they found themselves added to it by relatives or 
common acquaintances, and this was communicated to them through an electronic 
notification on Meerkat.com. Although initially they were not very interested in being 
part of the group, they did not want to offend these acquaintances and so did not 
remove themselves from the group. At the same time, such members did not feel a 
compulsion to check on the conversations on the group, or participate in any other 
way. Others only periodically checked the conversation that was happening on the 
group. Indeed, even those labelled “active” members, tended to have periods of 
intense activity in, as well as prolonged absence from, the conversations on the group.  
 
On the other hand, this distinction between mere members and “active” members 
tends to obscure the different ways in which people participate in digital groups. For 
instance, some members did not participate in discussions, but regularly uploaded 
photographs and videos. Further, during the study, it emerged that there were other 
members who although they had not uploaded a single text message or document, 
regularly read the conversation on the group. Similarly other members, who may be 
considered to be not active, participated by adding new members to the group at 





The members of the group are physically located in many different places. Many 
members are located in North Kerala, mostly in urban centres such as Kannur and 
Kozhikode, but also in semi-urban and rural locations. Within India, members are 
also located outside the state of Kerala, in urban centres such as Bangalore, Pune, 
Chennai, Pondicherry and New Delhi. The group also has a significant number of 
diasporic members. Outside India, many members are located in different countries in 
Middle-East Asia, which has been a popular destination for migration from the state 
of Kerala since the 1960s. A smaller number of the diasporic members are located in 
the United States, United Kingdom and Australia.  
 
When the study started in 2012, the admins were either functionaries, registered 
members, or closely associated with a relatively new, physical, caste organization 
called the Thiyya Mahasabha (TMS), based in northern Kerala. During 2013, a 
breakaway group called the Malabar Thiyya Mahasabha (MTMS), centered in 
Kannur, was formed and all of the admins of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were 
either senior functionaries in the MTMS, or were aligned with it. Similarly, most of 
the vocal and influential members in Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were either officially 
affiliated with one or both of these caste associations, or were favorably considering 
joining them. Since both TMS and MTMS were at a relatively early stage of 
formation, these admins and influential members considered the Cyber Thiyyars of 






One of the key means through which the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar identifies being 
a Thiyya is by associating Thiyyaness with the region of Malabar. The final section of 
this chapter describes this region and the caste. 
 
Malabar and the Thiyyas 
 
This section provides an introduction to Malabar, and the Thiyyas as a caste in this 
region. This is a purposive introduction that is aimed to facilitate an understanding of 
themes that are commonly discussed in the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. This section 
includes a discussion of the ritual status of the Thiyyas, their political affiliations, and 
their historical interaction with other social groups in Malabar. In addition, it provides 
details about the varying identification of the Thiyyas in affirmative action policies by 
the state. The introduction to these aspects is accompanied by a brief description 
about how they are approached in the dominant public narrative of the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar.  
 
The term Malabar, as used by members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, refers to 
an erstwhile revenue district located in the Madras Presidency of British India. Prior 
to its conquest by the British, Malabar was already well established on world trading 
routes. By the 1300s, Malabar was an important part of the thriving medieval trade in 
the Indian Ocean, with the port of Calicut serving as a point of intersection for Arab 
and Chinese trade (Das Gupta 1967, Ilias 2007). Later, Calicut and other parts of 




with the Dutch and Portuguese at the start of the colonial era in India (Das Gupta 
1967). From the late 1500s to mid-1700s, administration of the region was divided 
between two indigenous rulers, the Kolathiri Rajas (of Kolathunadu) and Zamorins 
(of Calicut) (Dale 1980: 12), areas that came under the overlordship of Kingdom of 
Mysore during the late 1700s (Das Gupta 1967). Malabar was conquered by the 
British in 1792 through the defeat of the Mysorean ruler, Tipu Sultan. Under the 
British, the district of Malabar was further subdivided into 9 administrative units (or 
taluks) - Chirakkal, Kottayam, Kurumbranad, Wynad, Calicut, Ernad, Walluvanad, 
Palghat, and Ponnani. A map of Malabar from this period (1909) has been included as 
Appendix 5a. 
 
After Indian independence in 1947, Malabar continued to exist as part of the Madras 
Presidency until the linguistic reorganization of states in 1956. As part of this 
reorganization, the Malayalam speaking regions of Malabar, the state of Travancore-
Cochin
19
, and present-day Kasaragod were combined to create the present day state of 
Kerala in South India (Joseph 1997). Thiruvanathapuram, the capital of Travancore-
Cochin, was retained as the capital of the new state and is located at the extreme 
southern end of Kerala. A map of present day Kerala has been included as Appendix 
5b.  
 
In terms of current political geography, Malabar has been reorganized to form the 
northern regions of Kerala. Malabar was reorganized to create 4 whole districts 
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within the present-day Kerala, namely Kannur, Mallappuram, Wayanad, Kozhikode. 
In addition, some parts of Malabar district were included within the current day 
districts of Palakkad and Thrissur. Although the present day district of Kasaragod was 
not part of the British Malabar district, most members of the Cyber Thiyyars of 




The Thiyyas form the largest caste group in Malabar (Miller 1954). When analyzing 
the status of Thiyyas as a caste in Malabar, we can consider three inter-related aspects 
- control over economic resources, ritual status and legislative power in an area. 
Ideally each caste should be considered as a social group that is constantly in 
formation - the component groups of a caste vary in terms of class and power, and the 
social boundaries of a caste are constantly drawn and redrawn in context of time and 
specific events. With this caution in mind, it should be mentioned that what follows is 
a basic introduction to the Thiyyas in Malabar.  
 
The pre-British history of the Thiyyas (prior to 1792) is not very well catalogued in 
written accounts. Some insight can be gained by focusing on the centuries 
immediately preceding British annexation (1600s and 1700s). The caste has been 
mentioned by European travelers who visited Malabar when it was indigenously 
administered by the Kolathiri Rajas and the Zamorins, such as Duarte Barbosa (a 
Portuguese traveler who visited Malabar in the early 1500s) and Francois Pyrard (a 
French traveler who visited Malabar between 1600 and 1611). They observed that the 
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Thiyyas were subject to the rules of pollution in this period. The members of the caste 
were engaged in a variety of occupations such as working in palm groves, quarrying, 
agricultural labour and military service (Logan 1989, Dale 1980, Mailaparambil 
2012). Indeed, Mailaparambil (2012: 20) notes that in Francis Buchanan’s 1799 
survey, conducted immediately after British annexation, it has been observed that the 
Thiyyas had gradually established a strong position in Kolathunadu by the eighteenth 
century. In the discussion that follows, we will focus primarily on the caste status of 
the Thiyyas during the British colonial and post-colonial period. 
 
Around the British colonial era, the ritual caste hierarchy within the region of 
Malabar was roughly as follows: the top tier was comprised of the highest ranking 
Nambuthiri Brahmins, followed by the Nair caste. The middle tier consisted of the 
Muslims and the Thiyyas, who were considered to be a polluting caste. The bottom 
tier consisted of other castes that were considered polluting such as the Cherumas and 
Pulayas, as well as local tribes.  This ritual hierarchy roughly corresponded to the 
hierarchical access to economic resources and power, although regional variations 
existed within Malabar.  
 
The Nambuthiri Brahmins, or the priestly caste, occupied the highest ritual status. 
Large joint families from this caste owned
21
 extensive tracts of land and occupied 
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 Ownership of land in Malabar was complex since land was communally owned and most castes had a certain 
type of claim to it. We can find a succinct explanation in Radhakrishnan (1980: 2095-6) who reports that, “Since 
virtually all groups had an interest in land, all of them, with the exception of the Nambutiris and the artisans, 
qualify themselves to be considered peasants.  While the Nambutiris were the real janmis, the artisans were also 
some sort of janmis, but who depended for their livelihood mostly on their crafts. This large class (page break) of 
peasantry was in turn organised into a hierarchy in which Nayars were at the top, Tiyyas and Muslims in the 




landlord, or jenmi status (Radhakrishnan 1980). The Nambuthiris occupied a much 
higher rank than the Thiyyas, and were not very numerous in north Malabar as 
compared to the southern part of the region (Gough 1952). The ranking of the 
Thiyyas as compared to the Nair warrior caste, who were predominantly landlords 
and upper-level agricultural tenants in the region, is more complicated. The academic 
consensus has been that the Thiyyas occupied a lower rank than the Nairs in terms of 
ritual status (Karat 1973, Dhanagare 1977, Hardgrave Jr 1977, Radhakrishnan 1980 , 
Menon 1994) and that they were governed under the overlordship of Nair 
tharavadus
22
 (Miller 1954, Menon 1994). Others note the existence of a regional 
variation. They have pointed out that in some pockets in Malabar such as the northern 
regions of erstwhile Chirakkal and Kottayam taluks
23
, large Thiyya tharavadus also 
occupied landlord or jenmi status (Menon 1994, Kodoth 2001). Anthropologist 
Adrian Mayer (1952), who observed Malabar around the time of the Indian 
independence, notes that Thiyya jenmis existed in both the north and south of this 
region. At this point, the Thiyyas were important jenmis in the Palghat taluk of South 
Malabar, whereas in North Malabar they were smaller jenmis (Mayer 1952: 96-97).  
 
It is important to note here that a regional variation is also observed in the mode of 
kinship between the Thiyyas of North Malabar and South Malabar, who were 
                                                                                                                                           
serfs.” When the British conquered Malabar they tried to translate this ownership structure into a legal framework 
based on individual ownership as understood in the West, particularly for taxation purposes. Many scholars have 
commented on the turmoil and disenfranchisement created by such a translation and it is considered to be one 
among many factor that led to events such as the Mappilla Rebellion (Karat 1973, Karat 1976, Karat 1977, 
Dhanagare 1977, Hardgrave Jr 1977, Radhakrishnan 1980 , Menon 1994, Kabir 1997) and the rise of communism 
(Karat 1973, Karat 1976, Karat 1977, Radhakrishnan 1980 , Menon 1994, Kabir 1997) in this area. 
22
 Abraham (2006: 149) explains that the Malayalam word Tharavadu was used to refer to a matrilineal joint 
family. In contemporary usage the word is used to refer to a joint family household which is not necessarily 
matrilineal. All Nairs, and a certain section of the Thiyyas, followed matrilineal kinship.  
23
 Chirakkal Taluk refers to a British census town located 7 kilometers from present day Kannur City. The 




separated by the Korapuzha river. Until 1975
24
 Thiyyas in North Malabar were 
characterized by matrilineal kinship, or marumkkathayyam, while those in the South 
of Malabar tended to follow patrilineal kinship, or makkathayyam. For a long time, 
these two groups tended not to intermarry. During the period of observation, the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was dominated by Thiyyas from the Northern part of 
Malabar, particularly those originating from the present-day district of Kannur, in 
terms of numbers of members, admins and influential members. 
 
In terms of ritual status, Thiyyas were considered to be a polluting caste 
(Radhakrishnan 1980, Menon 1994, Abraham 2010). The Thiyyas occupied the 
highest rank among the polluting castes such as the Cherumas and the Pulayas and 
exerted administrative control over them - either as landlords or  as intermediaries in 
areas where a Nair tharavadu was dominant (Miller 1954, Menon 1994). Although 
situated in a position of power over other polluting castes, the Thiyyas themselves 
experienced considerable disadvantages through restrictions regarding untouchability 
and unapproachability (Abraham 2010: 116). One of the ways we can understand this 
is by considering the Thiyyas differential access to two types of places of worship - 
the temple (kshetrams) and shrines (kavus) (Menon 1994: 41 - 61). While the Nairs 
and Nambuthiris could approach and worship at the kshetrams, castes from the 
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 The Marumakkathayam system of inheritance was one in which the female offspring and their sons and 
daughters received one share each in the property. The male offspring received only one share and their sons and 
daughters were not entitled to a share. This system of inheritance was codified by the Madras Marumakkathayam 
Act 1932 (for a discussion of the same refer to Kodoth 2001, Arunima 1996). It was abolished by the Kerala State 
Legislature through The Joint Family System (Abolition) Act of 1975, although it has not completely died out in 




Thiyyas downwards were barred from them
25
. These castes could only worship at 
kavus. While they were not allowed access to the kshetrams, the castes considered to 
be polluting were expected to contribute different types of produce and services for 
the temple festivals. In contrast, in the kavu system of worship, Thiyyas occupied a 
much higher status
26
. For instance, some kavus were aligned to Thiyya tharavadus, 
and Thiyyas often officiated as priests in these shrines
27
 (Menon 1994: 51).  
 
The dominant narrative on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar constructed a complex 
picture about the ritual caste status of the Thiyyas, drawing on the language of caste 
inferiority and superiority, while simultaneously distancing Thiyyas from the 
hierarchical ranking of castes. The ritual status of the caste is a significant topic that is 
referred to constantly in the group’s public narrative. Here the Thiyyas are portrayed 
as a caste which is inherently of superior ritual status, reflecting Gupta's (2000) work 
on multiple hierarchies. The caste history is proclaimed as such: in the days of yore 
Thiyyas used to occupy very high ritual status but had in more recent times been 
placed lower down in the hierarchy. For instance, many conversations traced the 
origins of the Thiyyas as a powerful group from which the highest-ranking Brahmins 
themselves had been created, or as foreigners (from Sri Lanka, Krygyztan or Greece), 
who were later punished for their defiance of Brahmin domination by being marked 
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 Abraham (2010: 126) notes that Thiyyas  trying to worship at kshetrams had to suffer the indignity of having 
the temple offering thrown to them by the Nambuthiri preists who officiated at the temples. 
26
 Menon (1994: 41-61) described the kavus as the basis of a community of worship in Malabar, where caste 
inequality was both reinforced and challenged. On the one hand kavus, which were aligned with specific 
tharavadus, emphasized the interdependence of castes and mutual obligations by expectations of caste-wise 
contributions to kavu festivals. On the other hand, the kavus were also centres where a community of worship of 
castes as equals could be formed. The kavus were characterized by practices such as Thiyya priests, the worship of 
lower caste victims of upper caste authority and the sharing of kavu pilgrimages by all castes.  
27
 Noting the contrast with the lack of access for Thiyyas to kshetrams, Menon (1994: 51) notes that at the 
beginning of the kavu festival, a Thiyya preist would perform a worship ceremony, and it was only after this 




by a comparatively lower ritual status. At the same time, in the public conversation in 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, a certain distancing from caste ranking can be observed. 
For instance, the Thiyyas are often proudly portrayed by some members as a caste 
that was avarna, or a social group that was placed outside the boundaries of caste 
classification in India. In the textual understanding of caste, to be an avarna caste was 
to indicate a status so low that the group was placed outside the boundaries of 
classification. Yet, in the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the understanding of avarna is 
used to challenge classification as a ritually impure caste, and avarna status is 
proudly proclaimed on a periodic basis. 
 
The Thiyyas continued to follow a variety of agrarian occupations during the colonial 
period, although they are most famously associated with the profession of toddy 
tapping
28
, which was assumed to be their hereditary occupation in colonial 
ethnographies (Kodoth 2001). At the start of the British colonization of Malabar, 
many Thiyyas were middle-level agricultural tenants (see Dhanagare 1977, Kabir 
1997, Radhakrishnan 1980). Prakash Karat (1973) observes that over time, in light of 
the British translations of customary land rights in India to fit a legal framework of 
private ownership, many of these Thiyya tenants were further disenfranchised and 
reduced to the level of poor peasants and agricultural wage labourers.  
 
However, particularly between 1900 and 1920, some Thiyyas also gained substantial 
mobility through their interactions with the British (Menon 1994). The Thiyyas were 
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 Toddy, or palm wine, is a popular South Indian alcoholic beverage created from the sap of coconut palms. 
Tapping is a term used to refer to the multiple successive steps involved in extracting the wine, and sometimes the 




among the first to make use of the educational and employment opportunities created 
by the colonial and missionary institutions
29
 in Malabar. A considerable Thiyya elite 
emerged which was engaged in occupations such as tehsildars, sub-judges and deputy 
collectors in the colonial administrative service, and other service professions such as 
the law (Menon 1994, Abraham 2010). This group also included the families and 
offspring resulting from liasons between Thiyya women and British men (Abraham 
2006), although they had been excommunicated from the community for a certain 
period
30
. The Thiyya elite was concentrated in colonial coastal towns such as 
Thalassery, Kozhikode and Kannur
31
 (Abraham 2010). The following table, 
reproduced from Sivanandan (1979), is based on census records from 1921 and 
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 As Menon (1997: 64-65) notes, the Swiss Basel Evangelical Mission established a network of elementary and 
high schools in Malabar and the Thiyyas were among the first to join them. This mission also set up weaving and 
tile factories in Malabar where many Thiyyas were employed. Some Thiyyas converted to Christianity under these 
evangelical missions. A few of them, such as Churikkat Samuel, maintained links with their families and the caste 
community while moving up the occupational hierarchy the mission factories. 
30
 Abraham (2006: 135-6) notes that the attitude of the caste community to these women and their offspring varied 
over time. While they were initially accepted, they were later excommunicated by the caste leadership in the 
context of marriage reform during the late nineteenth century. These Thiyya women and their offspring were 
referred to within the community, through the derogatory term Velavagas (those who took the white path). During 
the 1920s and 1930, this boycott was removed and on these offspring and their families were accepted back into 
the fold of the community. The reason cited was that they chose to remain Hindus and did not convert to 
Christianity even though they could have accessed benefits reserved for Anglo-Indians. Further, the community 
leadership also reasoned that such offspring had, on their own merit, instead achieved success in the Indian Civil 
Services and Indian Economic Services.  
31
 During the British era, these towns bore the Anglicized names of Tellicherry, Calicut and Cannanore 
respectively. Members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar tended to slip back and forth between these Anglicized 
names and the current Malayalam names while talking about these places. The cities of Thalassery/Tellicherry and 
Kannur/Cannanore are located in the present day district of Kannur, and the latter is actually the district capital. 




Table 1: Caste and Occupation (Proportion of Workers in each category of 
occupation)  
 
Malabar 1921 census 
Occupation/Caste Nambuthiri 
Brahmin 




Rentiers 41.2 5.9 - 1.8 - 
Cultivators 9.0 50.4 20.9 33.4 0.5 
Agricultural labourers - 17.2 44.4 23.8 91.2 
Toddy drawing and selling - - 7.0 - - 
Trade and commerce - - - 23.7 - 
Public administration, learned and 
artistic professions 
35.4 18.5 9.3 11.6 - 
Others 14.4 8.0 18.4 5.7 8.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Sivanandan (1979: 476) 
 
Between 1900 and 1920, many Thiyyas also migrated out of Malabar. Since, due to 
their ritual status, they were not allowed to access institutions of higher education 
such as the Zamorin’s Guruvayoorappan College and Brennen College in Malabar 
until 1918, many Thiyyas often headed to the colonial metropolis of Madras during 
this period (Menon 1997: 64).  Malabar in general had a rather high rate of out-
migration (Joseph 1997). The Thiyyas accounted for slightly more than a tenth of the 





This history of migration and employment could also be observed among the 
members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Some members split time between their 
homes abroad and in India. Others were located at the intersection of migration routes 
- they or their parents had returned after working for years in other regions in India or 
in Middle East Asia.  Members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar who were working 
abroad had a complex employment profile ranging from construction crew workers to 
software engineers. Within India, many members were located in Malabar, while 
others were currently located outside Malabar in urban areas. In India, access to the 
new media is heavily restricted by the households’ economic status. Given this 
limitation, it is not surprising that most of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar members 
located in India could be characterized economically as ranging from lower middle 
class to upper middle class. Most of these members were engaged in professional 
services, and were not involved in occupations such as blue collar work or 
agricultural labour.  
 
Political affiliations are taken extremely seriously in Malabar. In this region, Thiyya 
affiliations are split among three political divisions - the Communist Left, the Centrist 
Congress and the Hindu Right. One of the reasons for such a high migration from 
Malabar was the substantial degree of peasant unrest
32
 (Joseph 1997). As a 
consequence of this unrest, Malabar became one of the first regions in India where 
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 This peasant unrest was initially manifested in the form of the Mapilla uprisings from 1836 to 1921 led by the 
Mapilla Muslims, and was later spearheaded by the Thiyyas and the Nairs in its second phase (Radhakrishnan 
1980). Eventually, this momentum played an important part in the formation of the Kerala Communist Party when 
it splintered from the nationalist Congress Party in the Malabar region in 1940 (Karat 1973, Karat 1976, Karat 




Communists were able to establish control and participate in democratic elections. As 
a large caste where many members occupied middle to lower peasant status, or the 
even more vulnerable status of an agricultural labourer, the Thiyyas have traditionally 
formed a strong base for the Communists in Malabar. They continue to do so today as 
well, particularly in the rural areas. For much of the British period, the Thiyyas 
viewed the Congress with suspicion as an upper-caste party. However, some of the 
Thiyya elites started to align with it in beginning with the mid-1930s (Menon 1994). 
From the 1970s onwards, a certain section of Thiyyas has also extended support to 
the Hindu Right through political organizations such as the RSS. Indeed, the violent 
clashes between Thiyyas aligned with the Communist Left and those aligned with the 
Hindu Right, have emerged as one of the more perplexing features of the political 
clashes that have been troubled North Malabar (specifically the district of Kannur) 
since the 1980s (Chaturvedi 2011)
33
. The members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar 
reflected all three affiliations, although the dominant narrative in the group, as 
represented by the admins and influential members, tended to veer more in favour of 
the Hindu Right. 
 
In order to understand how Malabar and Thiyyaness are constructed on the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar, it is important to consider the historical interactions between the 
Thiyyas and other social groups in Malabar. In particular, the Ezhava caste was often 
referred to in conversations on the group as the primary caste Other for Thiyyas. In 
the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, much of the conversation was explicitly focused on 
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 Chaturvedi (2011) observed that the majority of the victims as well as the perpetrators of this violence in 




establishing how the Thiyyas were different from the Ezhavas. To a comparatively 
lesser extent, the Nair caste and religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians 
in Malabar were also constructed in the conversation as groups that posed 
competition to the Thiyyas in terms of state benefits and social status. These are 
groups that have historically been located at a relatively close social distance from the 
Thiyyas in terms of ritual status, as well as economic and political distinctions.  
 
Although the Nairs are considered to have occupied a higher ritual status than the 
Thiyyas in Malabar, these castes were placed in close interaction in terms of 
economic resources and power. At different times and situations the relationship 
varied from competitive to cooperative. Menon (1994) provides a good insight into 
the contentious relationship between the two castes during the British era. Here, most 
Thiyyas occupied a social and economic role that was subservient to the Nairs. The 
Thiyyas were predominantly engaged as middle-level to lower-level peasants, while 
the Nairs were predominantly higher-level to middle-level peasants. Further, during 
this period, the elite of both these castes were experiencing social mobility that was 
previously inaccessible to them, through English education, employment in colonial 
administration and economic prosperity through land ownership and business 
transactions. During the colonial period, the Nairs were mostly associated with the 
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 Menon (1994: 191) argues that between 1900 and 1920 the Thiyya elite was trying to construct a religious 
community of equals consisting solely of the Thiyyas, standing apart from Hinduism. Thus they were wary of the 
Congress as a party of upper caste Hindus. However, by the mid 1930s a younger generation of Thiyyas aligned 




In post-independence India, the relationship continued to evolve in a complex 
fashion. For instance, in his 1954 study, Miller notes that the caste cleavage between 
the Nairs and the Thiyyas could be clearly observed as a class division, where other 
castes were drawn to these two castes as centers of the class. At the same time, the 
Thiyyas and Nairs were also thrown together for work in factories, political 
organizations such as the Congress and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
[CPI(M)], as well as being drawn into a united Hindu formation pitted against the 
Muslims. Today, Nairs and Thiyyas continue to participate in common political 
organizations such as the Congress, the CPI (M) and the RSS.  
 
The dominant narrative on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar portrayed the Thiyyas as 
being of commensurate ritual status with, if not superior to, the Nairs. Instances 
where Nairs tried to establish dominance over Thiyyas on the basis of caste 
superiority were periodically discussed and denounced with much enthusiasm in the 
group.  
  
Interactions between the Thiyyas and Mappilas have shifted from symbiotic religious 
co-existence towards the hardening of polarized religious identities as Hindus and 
Muslims. Dhanagare (1977) explains that Mappila Muslims
35
 of Malabar are a social 
group that emerged from intermarriages between Arab traders who have long 
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 As is the case with the castes discussed here, the Muslims were are not a single coherent group, but rather they 
consisted of many internal subdivisions along caste and economic distinctions. The events surrounding the 
Mapilla uprisings, the British and nationalist response to these uprisings, as well as the pan-Asian pan-Islamic 
Khilafat movement contributed significantly to the creation of a strong Muslim identity in the early twentieth 
century. For an excellent discussion on this see Dhanagare (1977), Hardgrave Jr (1977) and Panikkar (1978). For a 
discussion on contemporary Muslim politics and identity in Malabar see Engineer (1995), Chiriyankandath 




frequented the Malabar coast for trade and women primarily from the Nair and 
Thiyya castes, as well as conversions that provided social mobility to the lower 
ranking caste of the Cherumas among Hindus. The Thiyyas and Mappilas seem to 
have had much in common. Dhanagare (1977) argues that the Thiyyas and Muslims 
occupied similar social status in terms of the ritual and economic hierarchy, 
particularly in South Malabar, where both were pitted in opposition to the dominance 
of Nairs tharavadus
36
.  Further, Menon (1994: 47) points to the existence of a 
symbiotic system of religious practices between Mappilas and Thiyyas, such as for 




However, as Menon (1994: 61-88) explains, this relationship was transformed into 
one of intense rivalry and bitter conflict from 1900s onwards. Conflict between the 
Thiyyas and the Mappilas initially emerged during the decades between 1900 and 
1920, primarily as intense business rivalries in the North Malabar cities of Thalassery 
and Kannur. Revolting against Nair dominance, both Thiyya and Mappila elites were 
attempting to create a sense of a self-contained religious community around 
themselves around 1914-1915. However, at this point the conflict was not constructed 
in the communal sense of Hindu Thiyyas in opposition to Muslim Mappilas, 
primarily due to the fact that it was the elites in both groups who were in conflict with 
each other. Further, the Thiyya elite was challenging their caste status within 
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 Events during the rule of Tipu Sultan, the Mappilas and the Nairs tharavadus led to a conflict over access to 
land. The Nairs had experienced religious persecution during this period and fled to the states of Cochin and 
Travancore. The Mappila Muslims had been forced by Tipu to take over the leases that these Nairs left behind. 
This conflict was exacerbated after the British conquest of Malabar when the Nairs returned and demanded the 
return of the land (Dhanagare 1977). 
37
 Menon (1994: 47) shares that the colonial administrator Edgar Thurston observed the worship of a Nair and his 
Mappila friend Kunhi Rayan in the houses of a large number of Thiyyas in Malabar. Similarly, he also observed 




Hinduism and constructing a religious community among themselves as Thiyyas 
rather than as Hindus. However, Menon (1994: 191) notes that by the 1936 the 
conflict had taken a communal turn, particularly through a younger generation of 
Thiyyas who aligned themselves as Hindus with the Congress through the temple 
entry movement
38
 and were polarized against Mappila Muslims. The communal 
conflict has continued to manifest itself even after Indian independence in 1947.  
 
In the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the public conversation tended not to dwell on the 
Muslims as much as it did on the Ezhavas and Nairs. However, members often 
referred to Muslims during the relatively private in-depth interviews, particularly 
when they referred to how Malabar had changed for the worse.  
 
Ezhava is a caste group that much of the literature considers as being synonymous 
with the Thiyyas, with the assumption that the Thiyyas are the northern counterparts 
of the Ezhava caste who are concentrated in South and Central Kerala (Hardgrave Jr 
1964, Abraham 2010, Nag 1989, Osella and Osella 2000). In contrast to this 
dominant strain, some scholars have noted that the Thiyyas claim a higher caste 
ranking in comparison to the Ezhavas (Thurston 1909, Nossiter 1982, Gopinath 1993, 
Kodoth 2001, Mailaparambil 2012). There are considerably fewer Ezhavas than 
Thiyyas in Malabar, and the former settled there as part of the great migration from 
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 The temple entry movement was a social reform movement against caste untouchability which spanned from 
the 1860s to 1940s (Jeffrey 1976). The movement was heavily influenced by the teaching of Sri Narayana Guru 
and spearheaded by TK Madhavan and Kesava Menon among others. A major defining event in this movement 
was the satyagraha (civil disobedience) of 1924 in Vaikom, South Kerala. In this satyagraha, a Nair, an Ezhava 
and a Pulaya courted arrest by attempting to approach the Siva temple at Vaikom, a mainstream Hindu temple 




Travancore into the eastern highlands in Malabar in first half of the twentieth century 
(Varghese 2006: 238, Kodoth 2006: 9).  
 
The Ezhavas and Thiyyas are also considered as synonymous in the popular 
imagination due to the historical association of the Thiyya elite with the Sri Narayana 
movement. The movement, which was influenced by the Ezhava Hindu reformer Sri 
Narayana Guru and promulgated by the institution of the Sri Narayana Dharma 
Paripalana Yogam (SNDP), stressed achieving caste equality
39
. The Thiyyas appear 
to have had a complex relationship with this movement, partly reflecting internal 
contradictions within the community. In the early 1900s, the Thiyya elites, 
congregated in the form of the Gnanodaya Yogam in Malabar, attempting to create a 
religious community centered exclusively on Thiyyas
40
. The Gnanodaya Yogam 
proposed that exclusive temples be established in north Malabar for the sole use of 
the Thiyyas and considered it prudent to align itself with the Sri Narayana movement, 
which had gained considerable traction in the South of Kerala. Consequently, Sri 
Narayana Guru was invited to lay the foundation for three Thiyya temples in Malabar 
- Jagannath (at Thalassery in 1908), Srikateswara (at Kozhikode city in 1910) and 
Sundereswara (at Kannur city in 1916). These temples were wholly financed through 
donations from prosperous Thiyyas. Influenced by the teachings of Sri Narayana 
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 Menon (1994: 67) explains that the Narayana Guru movement worked to establish a society that did not 
differentiate on the basis of caste. Narayana Guru and SNDP argued for a twofold path to attaining caste equality 
for lower ranking castes such as the Ezhavas. One was to adapt the social and religious practices of upper castes, 
such as worshipping Brahmanical gods. The other was to develop self-esteem through developing economic 
strength. 
40
 Menon (1994) demonstrates that the Thiyya elite rejected the conventional forms of worship which they felt 
reinforced their low ritual status in Hinduism - the mainstream kshetrams denied physical access to Thiyyas while 
demanding economic contributions and the rural kavus incorporated supposedly impure practices such as blood 




Guru, the Gnanodaya Yogam tried, although not without internal opposition, to steer 
all Thiyyas towards worship at these Thiyya temples rather than at kavus and 
mainstream kshetrams. However, in rural areas Thiyyas continued to worship at 
kavus.   
 
Although they were focused on establishing separate temples for themselves, the 
Thiyya elite distanced themselves from the temple entry movement in Kerala, where 
lower ranking castes agitated successfully to gain entry and worship in mainstream 
Hindu temples. Further, Menon (1994) notes that for a considerable period of time, 
castes that ranked lower than the Thiyyas such as the Cherumas and Pulayas, were 
prevented from accessing these Thiyya temples. It was only in 1930s that these 
temples were opened up in the context of support from a younger generation of 
Thiyyas who favoured the Congress led Guruvayoor Satyagraha and its attempts at 
forging a united Hindu identity and rejected the Gnanodaya Yogam’s attempt at 
creating an exclusive Thiyya community located outside Hinduism.  
 
The association between Thiyyas in Malabar and the SNDP itself is also complex, 
and seems to historically have been divided by class. As we can see, in the early half 
of the twentieth century, it is the Thiyya elites in urban areas who aligned themselves 
with the SNDP, which was not reflected as strongly in rural areas. Kodoth (2008: 
270-271) has also observed contemporary disaffection between the SNDP and 
Thiyyas in rural areas in Malabar. For instance, during the course of her fieldwork in 




SNDP, and associated the organization with Ezhavas who had migrated from the 
South. A more detailed discussion regarding the caste status of the Thiyyas vis-à-vis 
the Ezhavas is included in Chapter 4 (Error! Reference source not found.). 
 
The dominant narrative in the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was antagonistic towards 
Ezhavas, and extremely distrustful of the SNDP. The Ezhavas and SNDP were 
portrayed as immediate threats to Thiyya identity and culture as a whole. In an 
attempt to differentiate Thiyyas from Ezhavas, the members associate being Thiyya 
with the region of Malabar. 
 
In the nation-state’s categorization of castes, the status of the Thiyyas has been 
recorded differently in the colonial and post-colonial period. In the British era, 
Thiyyas were considered on par with other non-Brahmins castes such as the Nairs and 
so were not provided caste-based concessions from the state in the Madras Presidency 
(Menon 1994: 66). In the 1960s, under the regime of Chief Minister R Shankar, the 
Thiyyas successfully lobbied to be identified as part of the Other Backward Classes 
(OBC). Today Thiyyas are included in the national OBC list for three states - 
Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Thiyyas are also included in the state OBC list in 
Kerala (National Commission for Backward Classes 2010a
41
, National Commission 
for Backward Classes 2010b, National Commission for Backward Classes 2010c).  
 
In the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the attitude towards affirmative action policies in 
India was primarily hostile. The dominant narrative constructed these policies as 
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unnecessary State handouts, which the Thiyyas should not lose out on nonetheless. 
The attitude towards the Thiyyas categorization within these policies was complex. 
On the one hand, there was much resentment against the popular identification of 
Thiyyas as “backward”, and many conversations were devoted to highlighting that 
this had not been the case under the British. The dominant narrative was that in fact 
the Thiyyas were a “forward” caste which had been rather badly categorized as 
backward either due to misfortune or political expediency. On the other hand, the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were not entirely willing to reject their categorization 
within the OBCs since it also entailed access to economic resources through 
education and employment. The dominant narrative dwelt on constructing a history of 
the Thiyyas as a caste that had controlled much material wealth and power. As per 
this narrative, in the contemporary scenario as well, most Thiyyas did not need 
financial assistance, but the affirmative action policies were required for the 
supposedly small proportion of Thiyyas who had become materially disadvantaged 
over time.  
 
In this chapter the problem of caste identification through place was introduced 
empirically. In the chapter that follows the pertinent literature from the disciplines of 
sociology and social geography are discussed. In light of this review of the literature, 
the problem of caste identification through place is clarified and the major hypothesis 




Chapter 2: Review of Literatures 
 
 
In this dissertation, the central problem is to understand how and why the members of 
the digital group, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, reconnect the caste identity of 
being Thiyya with the region of Malabar. In this chapter the various literatures 
relevant to this problem are reviewed, with the purpose of introducing key terms. 
Further, this chapter establishes the preferred theoretical approach to the study of 
place, identity and caste adopted in the dissertation.  
 
This chapter consists of seven sections. In Section 1, the field of social geography is 
introduced and the critical social constructivist approach to the study of place is 
explained. The second section involves a review of the identity literature, specifically 
the cultural studies approach to studying identity. In the third section, two distinct 
approaches to the study of identity as linked to place are compared, and the concept 
of spatial imaginaries is clarified.  
 
Section 4 includes the analysis of Anthony Giddens’ theory of distanciation, which 
has provided important theoretical tools to understand the linking and de-linking of 
social relations from place. It is argued that this theory would benefit from the 
incorporation of a critical social constructionist approach to the study of place. 
Section 5 reviews the caste literature from the specific lens of place and distanciation. 




Further, the specific empirical questions addressed in the dissertation are outlined. 
The concluding section provides an outline of the dissertation chapters. 
 
Social Geography, Place, Study of Place 
 
Social Geography: Why study Place in Sociology? 
 
In this dissertation spatiality is considered as an important object of sociological 
analysis. This entails following a somewhat marginal theoretical tradition which 
explicitly emphasizes a central role for the study of spatiality in sociology in 
particular and social theory in general.  
 
Within the sociological tradition, Georg Simmel
42
 [(1908)1997] was an early theorist 
who recognized the salience of spatiality, and proposed a “sociology of space”. 
Michel Foucault, a scholar whose work has progressively enriched sociology, also 
periodically concentrated on the analysis of space, after his emphatic call in [(1967) 
1986)] for the return  to the analysis of space in social theory
43
. Indeed, within a few 
years, a French sociologist, Henri Lefebvre, soon emerged as a key figure in the 
contemporary analysis of spatiality. With the publication of his influential work The 
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had exclusively directed much attention to the study of time, a return to spatial analysis was now imperative. This 




Production of Space, Lefebvre [(1974) 1992] demonstrated how the rather artificially 
separated disciplines of sociology and geography could be successfully bridged. The 
resulting hybrid sub-discipline of social geography, owes much to his nuanced 
theoretical approach. Within sociology, Anthony Giddens (1984, 1990, 1991) and 
George Ritzer (2003, 2004) are two influential theorists who have explicitly theorized 
spatiality in recent times. In contrast to its slow progress within the discipline of 
sociology, social geography
44
 has attracted more mainstream attention within the field 
of geography particularly after the humanistic turn influenced by the works of Yi-Fu 
Tuan (1977) and Edward Relph (1976), and the critical (constructivist) orientation 
introduced by David Harvey (1990)
45
, Doreen Massey (1993), Derek Gregory (1989, 
1995, 2000, 2000b) and Gillian Rose (1995). 
 
Some sociological theorists have painstakingly established that spatiality is as valid 
an object of analysis in sociology as any other. For instance, in his exposition of the 
influential theory of structuration, Anthony Giddens (1984: 363-368) made a case for 
the study of spatiality as a central aspect of sociology, arguing that “spatial forms are 
always social forms” (1984: 367). While engaging with the physicality of different 
types of spaces, an equally, if not more, important aspect of enquiry in the above-
mentioned analyses has been to explore the social significance accorded to these 
spaces. A salient precursor for such an analysis would be Georg Simmel’s contention 
that space is an activity of the mind which is sociological because in it sociologists 
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can observe the crystallization of social formations
46
 [Simmel (1908)1997:138]. 
Consequently, from a sociological perspective, all space is what Henri Lefebvre 
[(1974) 1992: 26-27] referred to as social space, which combines an analysis of 
materiality with the ways in which space is experienced, conceived and represented.  
 
In response to Giddens' (1984) lament that sociology has not paid attention to 
spatiality, urban sociologist Peter Saunders (1989) has argued that within empirical 
sociology, as opposed to sociological theory, the study of spatiality has always been 
important, as demonstrated in diverse sub-fields such as globalization, world systems 
analysis, urban sociology, rural sociology, community studies and social psychology. 
Within American sociology, Andrew  Abbott (1997) points out that although 
spatiality received much emphasis in the heyday of the Chicago school, its salience 
slowly petered out. The study of spatiality within sociology is slowly undergoing a 
revival of sorts, as demonstrated by the recent publication of two review essays in the 
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 Simmel described spatial relations as the “documentation” of social formations. He observed that even though 
“space in general is only an activity of the mind … the emphasis on the spatial meanings of things and processes is 
not unjustified. For these actually often take a course that the formal and negative conditions of their spatiality 
stands out especially for reflection, and that in it we possess the clearest documentation of the real forces”  
[(1908)1997:138]. For instance, in establishing the differences in the linkages between social boundaries and 
spatial boundaries, he notes “the incompatible firmness and clarity which the social processes of demarcation 




Connecting Space and Place: From Space to Place and Back? 
 
Within the sociological study of spatiality, place is very much an area of significant 
interest in this dissertation. Specifically, the focus here is the instrumental role of 
place in constructing identity, and the story of their disconnections and re-
connections. As a result, it is important to clarify what place is, particularly by 
discussing how it is connected to space.  
 
A common understanding of space, even within academia, is that it refers to “abstract 
geometries (distance, direction, size, shape, volume) detached from material form and 
cultural interpretation” (Gieryn 2000: 465). In this approach, place is defined, in 
contrast, as a smaller bounded sub-section of space which has been infused by a 
combination of materiality, cultural interpretations and representations. As a result, a 
certain temporal sequence is attributed to space and place - space is what is pre-





However, this distinction between space and place has been critiqued from the 
phenomenological perspective (Tuan 1977, Casey 1996) where the pre-existence of 
space is questioned. The phenomenological perspective, which prioritizes the 
experience of space, argues that all experience of space occurs first in a certain place. 
Consequently, space is what is generated by interactions from, and often within, a 
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 Scholars such as Ritzer (2004) and Aug  (1995) also make a related distinction between place and non-place. In 







. Cresswell (2009:2) traces this understanding back to Plato who 
suggested a dual understanding of place - it is a location in space and an entity within 
space that is continuously “becoming” through experience. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, we need not chalk out definitions of space and place that are mutually 
exclusive to each other. For the current project would suffice for us to move ahead 
from this debate with the understanding that spaces and places are interconnected: 
while places are particular locations in space, space is also generated through 
interactions in place.  
 
Apart from the phenomenological perspective, this dual connection between space 
and place is also significant because, as discussed in the next paragraph, this 
dissertation is influenced by a different approach - critical social geography. This 
approach is also concerned with the becoming, or production of place, but from a 
critical social constructionist approach, which focuses on both experience as well as 
representation of space. In trying to understand place by stressing the connection 
between space and place, this dissertation draws on Massey's (1993: 68) work. She 
recommends this approach since a differential approach, focusing primarily on border 
formation, results in a very narrow and parochial understanding of place itself. She 
specifically raises questions about the salience of boundaries in defining place within 
the contemporary context of time-space compression (Harvey 1990) and distanciation 
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 Yi-Fu Tuan (1977) explains this through an example from the life of the theologian Paul Tillich. As a child 
growing up in a small town, Tillich experienced the place as narrow and constrained, and longed to escape to the 
vast expanse of the Baltic ocean where he and his family would spend their vacation. Relph argues that Tillich’s 





(Giddens 1984). For Massey, while place is a where in space, it need not be 




How to Study Place 
 
Over time, distinct theoretical approaches have been developed to understand and 
study place within social geography. Here, these approaches are presented in a 
roughly chronological order. This is followed by a discussion of the approach adopted 
in this dissertation - the critical social constructionist approach to place  
 
Cresswell (2009) argues that place itself was self-consciously and reflexively 
examined as a concept, only in the 1970s with the humanistic turn in geography. Prior 
to the 1970s, under the influence of logical positivism, while place was still very 
much a part of the lexicon of geography (and other disciplines, including sociology), 
it was used quite uncritically as a medium of explanation. 
 
The humanistic turn, pioneered by the works of  Yi-Fu Tuan (1977) and Edward 
Relph (1976) drew on Heidegger’s phenomenological approach, and argued that 
place has to be studied from the perspective of how the social agent experiences it. As 
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 For a sympathetic approach which similarly interrogates the role of the boundary in understanding place and 
identity within cultural anthropology see Gupta and Ferguson (1992). Although these authors also prioritize 
mobility, they take a slightly different approach and argue that by equating space, identity and difference, 
anthropology has uncritically approached boundaries (often as national boundaries) and neglected the hybridity 
represented by those who reside at boundaries. They also echo Massey's (1993) emphasis on understanding 






 explains it, what needed to be examined was the “essence of place” Relph 
(1976: 29-43). Here they drew on Heidegger’s connection between place and 
existence, who argued that to be-in-the-world was to be located in a particular place 
(Cresswell 2009). As Harvey (1993: 11) notes, in his call for a reinforced focus on 
place, for Heidegger this concept was very much about the experience and retention 
of meaningful roots. Further, by stressing the study of direct experience as a way to 
study place, the phenomenological approach emphasized that place is a way of 
relating to the world. Consequently, within this approach place was understood as 
made (through experience), and plural (through the varying experiences of 
individuals and groups [ Relph 1976]). 
 
However the phenomenological approach to place did not reflect on how power is 
instrumental in its construction and maintenance. Cresswell notes that it was in the 
1980s that a social constructivist turn occurred in the study of place, where 
geographers influenced by Marxism, feminism and post-structuralism started to 
critically evaluate “how power was implicated in the construction, reproduction, and 
contestation of places and their meanings”  (2009: 5).  In terms of a broad influence, 
we can consider the works of Henri Lefebvre to be instrumental in this line of 
studying place in social geography, which stressed how spaces and places are 
produced through a combination of materiality, experience, and representation. In 
particular, the role of representation in the production of place was highlighted in this 
approach. 
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small scale spatial unit -  Relph (1976) successfully demonstrates that places can vary from small scales such as 





As a result, Harvey (1993) argued that places should be examined, first and foremost, 
as social constructs. Harvey (1993: 12) particularly challenged the equation of 
experience of place with idea of authenticity as rootedness in place, by exploring how 
this very idea was often dangerously used to construct idealized versions of the past 
(and present) to exert power over others. Coming from a Marxist tradition, Harvey 
stressed the need to study domination and oppression with regard to social relations in 
places. Yet he also appreciated the significance of the need to study places as 
experienced precisely due to its salience in the social construction of place
51
.  It is not 
insignificant that Harvey resolves this dilemma by reverting to the work of sociologist 
Henri Lefebvre, who adopted a dialectical approach to study the inter-relationship 
between the experience, construction and perception of places, where materiality, 
representation and imagination had to be simultaneously studied to understand place 
and power relations. However, Harvey (1993: 17) also suggested that this combined 
and nuanced approach towards place should also be sensitive to the effect of time-
space distanciation (Giddens 1984, 1990, 1991) and compression.  
 
This dissertation adopts the critical social constructivist approach to the study of 
place and its Lefebvrian emphasis on the “production of space.”  The critical social 
constructivist approach is particularly well suited to studying the connection between 
caste identification and place because it enables an analysis of both as social 
constructs whose meanings and boundaries change over time. In particular this 
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approach facilitates the study of the production of certain meanings about caste 
through the narrative representation, and experience of, place. In challenging the idea 
of the authenticity of place, it enables an analysis of how certain ideas about caste 
identity are legitimized and challenged through constructing its rootedness in a 
particular place. Further, it will enable an analysis of how ideas about caste identity 
are used to construct and shape the narratives regarding place, and potentially, the 
material dimensions of the place itself.  
 
Within this broad approach, the work of Doreen Massey (1993) specifically provides 
an exciting way of thinking about place, particularly her suggestion that places be 
studied relationally. While Massey locates herself squarely within the critical social 
constructivist approach through a power geometry of place, she suggests a more 
nuanced approach by prioritizing the question of mobility in understanding place. She 
critiques the Heideggerian influence on the phenomenological approach to studying 
place, because it assumed that the identity of place was inward-looking - the identity 
of a place (and social agents within it) was to be found within specific boundaries. In 
contrast, Massey calls for a “progressive sense of place”, where place should be 
understood as a locus of social relations (Massey 1993: 64-68).  
what gives a place its specificity is not some long internalized history but the 
fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of relations, 
articulated at a particular locus…Instead then, of thinking of places as areas 
with boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated moments in 
networks of social relations and understandings.  
       Massey (1993:66)  
 
For Massey, place is best understood as a process where many social interactions are 




places, rather they should be studied relationally. In other words, Massey is arguing 
that rather than taking boundaries as natural components of place, we must explore 
how (and why) they are constructed.  Massey stresses that this approach does not 
deny that places have specificity, but it interprets this uniqueness neither as internal 
or natural, but as something that is constantly reproduced through discursive 
articulations. 
 
Digital Production of Place 
 
Academic focus on the new media has re-invigorated these questions regarding space 
and place, and the study of spatiality. Initially, the literature on the new media 
followed an approach of digital dualism (Jurgenson 2012). The new media was 
primarily conceptualized as a separate realm, and its spatiality was rejected by 
highlighting its transcendental characteristics (Rheingold 1993, Cairncross 1997). 
Geographers have contributed much to counter this tendency by reinforcing the 
spatiality of the new media (Dodge and Kitchin 2001). The digital divide literature 
highlighted how the material infrastructure was unevenly distributed in physical 
places (Ebo 1998, Zook 2005). Others have noted the use of spatial metaphors (ex. 
cyberspace, chat room) to conceptualize and articulate “virtual places” (Adams 1997, 
Adams 1998, Graham 1998, Cohen 2007). 
 
Over time, this literature has moved in the direction of an augmented reality approach 




media is used in multiple ways for the production of space. Dodge and Kitchin (2005) 
focus on the material aspects of this production, by noting the manner in which digital 
code influences the material dimensions of space, such as the opening and closing of 
doors through computer technology. Further, the literature has gradually started to 
examine the use of the new media in the production of space in terms of how places 
are experienced and represented. For instance, Valentine and Skelton (2008) explore 
how new media use is informed by the actual and desired offline spatiality of its 
users, and in turn also serves to shape that spatiality. Similarly, de Souza e Silva and 
Sutko (2008: 458) argue that not only are online games inseparably connected to 
offline physical spaces, they also add imaginary layers to urban spaces which 
facilitate a new negotiation and understanding of familiar urban spaces. Such trends 
in the literature have enabled the study of the production of places through various 
digital practices of representation and experience. 
 
Since this study is focused on the analysis of how the representation of self and others 
on the basis of caste is undertaken through place, the following section provides a 










Identity as Cultural Identification 
 
The concept of identity has been approached in different ways within different 
academic domains. In this dissertation the focus is on understanding how and why the 
caste of self is represented through narratives regarding places. Here, rather than 
discussing how an individual alone consciously constructs identity, there is a need to 
discuss how entire groups of people are known collectively through cultural 
representations and how counter representations are constructed. Consequently, this 
study draws on the concept of cultural identity as it is utilized within the field of 
cultural studies.  
  
The concept of cultural identity has been a significant unit of analysis within cultural 
studies from the early days of its inception. In his essay British Cultural Studies and 
Pitfalls of Identity, Paul Gilroy (2001) explores the manner in which the exploration 
of cultural identity, particularly British working class identity, was an important, if 
sometimes implicit, part of foundational works in cultural studies such as The Uses of 
Literacy (Hoggart 1957), The Long Revolution (Williams 1961) and The Making of 
the English Working Class (Thompson 1964). Considering the trajectory of this 




that it provided a common rallying point for the congregation of the diverse 
disciplinary interests within cultural studies  
a tacit intellectual convergence around problems of identity and identification 
was indeed an important catalyst for cultural studies, and by implication, that 
identity’s capacity to synthesize and connect various enquiries into political 
cultures and cultural politics is something that makes it a valuable asset even 
now-  something worth struggling over.  
Paul Gilroy 
(2001: 388)  
 
Stuart Hall (1996) has noted the paradoxical development within cultural studies 
where while increasing scholarly attention was focused on it, the concept itself was 
being critiqued as being a hopelessly modernist endeavour, particularly in its implicit 
equation with a single, true, all-knowing self. He notes that the critique stemmed from 
a variety of disciplines - while the idea of a self-sustaining subject was critiqued 
within philosophy, feminism and cultural criticism raised the question of the 
unconscious processes associated with subjectivity, and post-modernism challenged 
the idea of an invariant and unitary identity (Hall 1996: 1). Despite the severity of the 
critique, like Gilroy, Hall notes that the concept itself still needs to be used. Hall 
prompts us to consider the concept of cultural identity as an idea “under erasure”, 
which cannot be used in its unreconstructed form, but without which key questions 
cannot be conceptualized at all (Hall 1996). 
 
As Barker (2004a, 2004b,  2004c) notes, within cultural studies, the concept of 
identity is approached as a cultural construction, and particularly as entailing 
performative dimensions in accordance with the various discourses which produce an 




cultural identity, particularly the emphasis on its connection with subjectivity and 




 and Butler 
(1993)
54
. This shifts the conceptualisation of cultural identity from who-is-a-person, 
which presumes an individual acting independently outside of history; to what-is-a-
person, which refers to a discursively produced person.  
 
Further, bearing these interpretations in mind, Hall suggests that the deconstructed, 
yet useful, idea of cultural identity should be approached through a processual lens - 
as identification, rather than identity. Rather than imagining cultural identity as a 
position into which individuals are born and stay attached to throughout their life 
course, within cultural studies the emphasis is on studying how cultural identity is 
produced. For Hall, cultural identity is always constituted within representation, 
which involves representations of an imagined past as well as a desired future. 
Though they seem to invoke an origin in the historical past with which they 
continue to correspond, actually identities are about questions of using the 
resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather 
than being: not 'who we are' or 'where we came from', so much as what we 
might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we 
might represent ourselves.  
       Hall (1996: 4, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Hall also cautions us to think of identity as a transient and strategic position, from 
which individuals represent themselves and others. Rather than assuming that an 
individual will be permanently associated with a particular identity, he prompts us to 
think of multiple, sometimes contradictory articulations since identities are 
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 Here Hall refers to Foucault’s work on the production of the subject through various discursive regimes. 
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“multiplate constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, 
discourses, practices and positions.” (Hall 1996: 4)  
 
Further, Hall argues that in this deconstructed form, cultural identity as identification 
can be thought of as an articulation, or a “suturing” (1996:3), between the 
discursive regimes that produced the self and the manner in which the self 
recognises its position. Such a suturing requires a necessary act of imagination, 
where a particular self attaches itself to the structuring discourse through emotional 
investments 
They rise from the narrative isolation of the self but the necessarily 
fictional nature of this process in no way undermines its discursive, 
material or political effectivity, even if the belongingness, the 
‘suturing into the story’ through which identities arise is, partly, in the 
imaginary (as well as a symbolic) and therefore always, partly 
constructed in fantasy, or at least within a phantasmatic field.  
        
 Hall (1996: 4) 
 
In analysing this process of identification, scholars within cultural studies have placed 
tremendous emphasis on the concept of difference (cf Morley and Robins 1995). 
Drawing upon the works of Michel Foucault and Edward Said, a strong emphasis 
here was to show that identities are constructed through processes that involve not 
just a recognition of that which is common. Rather, identification also proceeds 
through the demarcation of that which is not common, or the “constitutive outside”: 
that sameness cannot be constructed without referring to difference (Hall 1996: 4). In 
order to stress the transience of this recognition, Hall draws upon Derrida’s concept 




as well as “to defer” or postpone (Hall 1990: 229). Translating this concept from 
linguistics into cultural studies, Hall argues that the concept of cultural identity does 
not imply a permanent positioning; rather it implies a temporary association of 
meaning. Commenting on identification, Gilroy cautions that the relationship between 
difference and identity is complicated 
Difference should not be confined exclusively to the gaps we imagine 
between whole, stable subjects. One lesson yielded up by the initial approach 
to identity on subjectivity is that difference exists within identities- within 
selves-as well as between them.  
         Gilroy (2001: 386)  
 
Consequently, Gilroy exhorts us to pay attention to the management of the interplay 
between inner and outer differences within a cultural group. He gives the example 
of how within a group that organizes itself through reference to a common cultural 
identity internal differences may be minimized to enhance the difference of the group 
from others outside it. 
 
The cultural studies approach can be characterized as what Karen Cerulo (1997), in 
her review of sociological approaches to the study of identity, classified as a 
macrosociological approach. Cerulo (1997) explains a historical distinction between 
the microsociological approach which focuses on individual identity and more 
macrosociological approaches which focus on collective identity. She observed that 
microsociological perspectives, originating in the works of Cooley and Mead, were 
preoccupied with the individual and offered a sense of individual cognition and 
power, which does not take into account how these individual identities are located 




highlighted that the advantage of the microsociological approach was that it was able 
to study how identity emerges in a complex interplay within particular contexts of 
interaction as well as their attention to how individuals actively engage in choosing 
and selectively manipulating different aspects of their identity in these contexts. 
However, this approach was marred by its assumption that the individual was all-
knowing and all-powerful with respect to his or her identity. This limitation 
contributed to an inadequate focus on how individual identity was influenced by 
power relations, and was constructed through different discourses. On the other hand, 
while the macrosociological attention to collective identity has contributed 
significantly to our understanding that our identity is heavily influenced by its social 
construction and social discourses, hence limiting an individual to choose from 
among a finite range of identity positions, it was not able to pay attention to the 
negotiations of identity which individuals engage in on a continuous basis.   
 
In this study the cultural studies approach is preferred over other microsociological 
approaches to the study of identity because it enables the study of the caste identity as 
a narrative product of an individual’s interaction with cultural constructions about 
social groups that the person is associated with, and the reflexive position that such 
individuals (and groups) adopt in response to these constructions. Cerulo’s critique of 
macrosociological approaches as being short on the analysis of individual agency (in 
terms of choice and simultaneous negotiation of identity) in the construction of 
identity is valid for the study of cultural identity in cultural studies. However, this 




specific identity position that is adopted by a collectivity. More significantly, this 
lacuna can be addressed by incorporating Gilroy’s caution of attending more closely 
to the internal differences within the group during the study of cultural identity. 
 
Identity and Identification through the New Media 
 
The concept of identity has often been invoked to study interaction online, perhaps 
most famously in Sherry Turkle's (1997) work Life on the Screen, which represents 
cyberspace as a space where individuals can try out new and multiple identities. As 
Kennedy (2006) rightly points out in her review, this was a foundational work in the 
literature on identity research online. She notes that much of this literature has taken 
anonymity to be the starting point of the analysis of identity online and encourages a 
move towards the cultural studies model of the study of identity.  
 
While Kennedy’s observation about the bias in the literature is relevant, the problem 
has its origins in the rift within the broader sociological discussion of identity that 
was discussed by Karen Cerulo (1997). This rift is reflected in the literature on 
identity online. On the one hand, studies take a microsociological approach to identity 
online, thereby focusing on anonymity, multiplicity and fragmentation (Kennedy 
2006), particularly utilizing the Goffmanesque approach of the presentation of self
55
. 
On the other hand, scholars have been engaged in an analysis of collective identity 
online which focuses on how social groups use online spaces to reproduce (and 
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sometimes challenge) discursively formed collective identities. While the former 
microsociological approach is better known, perhaps since it complemented the initial 
celebratory vein of the academic approach to the new media which was highly 
focused on individualism and heightened notions of the private, the latter approach 
can be observed in studies of nationalism (Ericksen 2007), diasporas (Axel 2004) and 
identity politics (Chopra 2006) online. This latter approach has been interested in 
studying those people and social groups which have taken to the new media to 
highlight, rather than hide, their identities. As noted at the outset of this section, in 
this dissertation I am interested in identity as cultural identity, and particularly in 
studying it through Hall's (1996) suggestion about the temporary articulations of 
identification. 
 
The following section reviews two distinct theoretical approaches adopted towards 
studying the connection between place and identity. Further, it clarifies the spatial 
imaginaries approach adopted in this dissertation. 
 
Place and Identity: Sense of Place vs Spatial Imaginaries 
 
Based on the epistemological approach towards place and identity, their connection 
has been studied through two broad frames
56
, both of which are multidisciplinary. 
The first frame, which can be categorized as “sense of place”, draws from the 
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phenomenological approach which prioritizes direct experience of a place, and tends 
to focus on the microsociological aspect of identity. The second frame, categorized 
here as “spatial imaginary”, derives from a critical social constructionist 
perspective in social geography.  In this approach both place as well as identity are 
visualized as continuously socially constructed discursive resources (Natter and 
Jones 1997). In this dissertation, the spatial imaginaries approach is adopted to 
study the connection between identity and place. 
 
Sense of Place 
 
This first frame understands the connection between place and identity through the 
ontological approach of how place is experienced. This frame draws primarily from 
the humanistic turn in social geography, particularly the work of Relph (1976). 
However, it has also travelled over to other disciplines. On the one hand, it has 
travelled to the fields of environmental psychology and social psychology, where the 
effort has primarily been to measure it in quantitative terms through the use of scales 
and surveys. On the other hand, it has travelled to social anthropology, where it has 
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 A useful review of the mutli-disciplinary trajectory of the ontological approach involved in “sense of place” can 
be found in Convery, Corsane, and Davis (2012), Graham, Mason, and Newman (2009), Shamai and Ilatov 





The concept of sense of place draws from Relph’s argument about the “essence of 
place” ( Relph 1976: 29- 43). Relph himself cautioned that although places are sensed 
through a wide array of material aspects of place, ritualistic elements, practices, and 
care and concern for our home, it is also important to understand that they are sensed 
in context of other places and other people. Further, he referred to the “drudgery of 
place”  (1976:41) to indicate that places are not always experienced in a positive 
manner.Consequently, when Relph discusses place and identity he is careful to state 
that more than understanding the “identity of a place” (referring to what is distinctive 
about a place), it is important to pay attention to “the identity that a person or a group 
has with that place, in particular whether they are experiencing it as an insider or 
outsider.” (1976: 45). This is an important and helpful insight which draws attention 
to the salience of studying not only the experience of a place, but also that in 
generating a “sense of place” social agents are making sense of their own (individual 
and group) identities.  
 
This experiential insight into place has been selectively adopted within environmental 
psychology and social psychology. In these fields, this concept has been explored 
through a variety of sub-concepts such as place-identity, place-attachment, and place 
dependency, where the emphasis has been on quantitatively measuring a sense of 
place through exploring the different attitudes that people have towards place 
(Convery, Corsane, and Davis 2012, Shamai and Ilatov 2005). Further, through its 
adoption in the self-efficacy literature, there has been an attempt to understand sense 




whether they feel enabled (or disabled) in achieving life goals by that place (Graham, 
Mason, and Newman 2009). Researchers within environmental and social psychology 
have remarked on the difficulties of creating scales to measure sense of place since it 
has been defined very differently in different disciplines (Shamai and Ilatov 2005).  
 
A more sympathetic interpretation of sense of place has travelled to the field of social 
anthropology, which has prioritized the need to explore sense of place through the 
livedness of a place, and so rejected the idea that this can be captured through 
quantitative measures (Geertz 1996). In this field, it is pointed out that measuring a 
sense of place is difficult precisely because it refers to the complex “livedness” of a 
place (Stewart 1996) which can only be studied through thick descriptions of how 
specific groups of people experience place in their daily lives.  
 
Although there are disagreements on approaches to measurement, some 
commonalities do exist between these disciplinary approaches. The attempt in social 
psychology, environmental psychology and social anthropology seems to be to 
understand how people actively make sense of both themselves (or their social 
groups) and the places they occupy through the manner in which they experience that 
place. The connection between place and identity here is understood as some measure 
of a sense of belongingness (or, reflecting Relph’s caution about non-positive 





Dixon and Durrheim (2000) have launched a sympathetic, yet significant, critique of 
the concept of sense of place. Although they are working from within the fields of 
social psychology and environmental psychology, Dixon and Durrheim’s critique is 
also relevant to the manner in which the concept is utilized within social 
anthropology. Adopting a discursive approach to social psychology, they argue that in 
prioritizing the manner in which places are experienced, the concept of sense of place 
overlooks the social construction of place. Consequently, echoing Harvey’s words 
from a decade ago, Dixon and Durrheim (2000: 33) suggest that the focus should be 
placed on how sense of place is a socially constructed symbolic resource which not 
only captures how people experience belonging to places, but also as a “rhetorical 
warrant through which particular social practices and relations are legitimated.” 
 
I would argue that another key limitation of the sense of place literature, as it exists in 
the fields of social anthropology, social psychology and environmental psychology, is 
that its focus on interpreting sense of place primarily in terms of belongingness to a 
place overlooks Relph’s caution that places are often sensed in respect to other people 
and other places. Consequently, following Massey (1993) and Rose (1995)
58
 I would 
argue that there is considerable value in visualizing the connection between identity 
and place as a social construction of belongingness or lack of belongingness to “our” 
place, but also how that is relationally drawn up in conjunction with perceptions of  
other places.  To understand this, let us look at the literature on spatial imaginary 
which prioritizes a more critical interpretivist approach to the connection between 
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 Although Rose and Massey have used the term “sense of place”, I would categorize their work under the frame 




identity and places which owes much to the works of Henri Lefebvre (1974) and 




The term “spatial imaginary” is used here to refer to a frame where both identity and 
place are understood as processes - each drawing upon the other in its construction. 
Consequently, in this frame, identity is approached through the cultural studies 
approach of cultural identification, where place-based narratives are being drawn 
upon to discursively represent the cultural identity of a group. Further, in this frame, 
Lefebvre’s “production of space” (1974) approach is used in understanding place 
with respect to cultural identification.  In other words, apart from materiality and 
experience, the representation of places is considered to be significant in studying 
how places are continuously produced. In this frame, place is being discursively 
produced based on the identification of “us” as opposed to “them”. Further, place is 
being produced because specific representations of inclusion and exclusion are 
generated based on identification. While some definitions of the spatial imaginaries 
consider place internally (Boudreau 2007, Anderson and Taylor 2005, Hage 1996, 
Lipsitz 2007, Crang 2009, Dempsey, Parker, and Krone 2011), the epistemological 
approach of scholars such as Said (1979), Massey (1993), Gregory (1995,  2000a, 
2000b) and Rose (1995) have influenced the approach in this dissertation to consider 





The concept of spatial imaginaries has been previously defined as “mental maps 
representing a space to which people relate with and with which they identify. They 
are collectively shared internal worlds of thoughts and beliefs that structure everyday 
life.” (Boudreau 2007:2596). This is a partial but useful definition - it draws our 
attention to collective visualizations of a particular place in which social groups are 
invested as also how these groups are mobilized to structure the place itself. These 
groups are articulating that this is “their” place
59
 and they have a vision for it, in 
terms of its boundaries and its usage. Boudreau's (2007) definition invokes an 
important relationship between how representation shapes the contours and 
components of the place itself, a common translation of the concept of spatial 
imaginaries within the literature on nationalism (cf Anderson and Taylor 2005, Hage 
1996, Lipsitz 2007) and media studies (Crang 2009). Boudreau’s analysis highlights 
the manner in which such representations mobilize people to translate talk about place 
into action to structure place. Her essay explores how Toronto is used as an object of 
mobilization by different collectives of actors in the context of neo-liberalism. She 
explores how these different groups present and use their idea of the essential identity 
of Toronto. This understanding of spatial imaginary as a collective symbol which is 
used to mobilize others who are similar has also been invoked in the literature on 
transnational movements (cf Dempsey, Parker, and Krone 2011:208). The attractive 
aspect of Boudreau’s definition is that the focus on mobilization of cultural groups 
based on place-based narratives makes it possible to articulate questions related to 
power in how place is produced through issues of inclusion and exclusion.  
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Although this dissertation is interested in Boudreau definition of spatial imaginaries 
as involving collective mobilizations through discourse and the resulting production 
of place, here a broader definition is suggested for spatial imaginaries as a study of 
how do people use spaces (or places) to identify themselves? Boudreau’s analysis has 
some limitations, which can be overcome by a return to pioneering work on 
“imaginative geographies” observed by Edward Said (1979), and the work of social 
geographers who have been much influenced by him such Doreen Massey (1993), 
Derek Gregory (1995,  2000a, 2000b) and Gillian Rose (1995). In his magnum opus 
Orientalism, Edward Said (1979) refers to this concept to explain how ideas about 
Self and Other are constructed through the use of spatial narratives. What is 
particularly useful to this study was Said’s suggestion that this difference is 
constructed by extrapolating the differential characteristics of Our-Land as opposed to 
Their-Land to define the Self and the Other respectively. In other words, in this 
representation, the Self draws from the characteristics of Our Land, which is 
essentially the inverse of the characteristics of Their Land which defines the Other. 
 
The Saidian treatment corrects three major limitations of Boudreau’s envisioning of 
spatial imaginaries. First, while issues of spatial inclusion and exclusion are 
important, Boudreau’s interpretation restricts its attention on the place itself, rather 
than what the social group is communicating through the language of place. In 
contrast, rather than a singular focus on the production of place, where cultural 
identity is assumed to be static, Said reinforces the idea that both place and identity 




dissertation is to examine how the language of space and place is used to construct 
social groups through discourse (Sun 2006), or how social groups counter their 
discursive construction through spatial narratives (Gorman-Murray 2006,  2009).  
 
Second, Said’s approach opens up the possibility to understand places in relational 
terms - identification is undertaken not only based on “us” and “our land”, but also 
“them” and “their land”. Third, in the Saidian approach, identification with places is 
understood not only in positive terms, but also, in a Relphian manner, in negative 
terms. As a result, it becomes possible to explore the process of identification both in 
terms of places that the group identifies with, as well as places that the group does 
not identify with. 
 
Finally, as Rose (1995), drawing upon Said’s work, remarks on the connection 
between identification and place, a focus on representation and discursive 
construction does not indicate that affect and experience of places do not matter. 
Boudreau’s definition follows a single direction in the connection between 
representation and experience of place. Her definition emphasized the analysis of how 
the representation of a particular place ("collective mental maps") by a social group 
influences the manner in which that place is experienced ("how can we change or not 
change the place of Toronto?”). However, the inverse of this relationship is also 
worth exploring - how is it that experiences in a particular place (and its Others) 
influence the manner in which that place is represented? Consequently, the 




multiple ways in which social groups use the language of space to collectively 
identify themselves and how these representations are connected to affect and 
experience in these places. 
 
After clarifying the theoretical approaches to studying place and identity that are 
adopted in this dissertation, it is time to turn to turn to a theoretical format which can 
help shed light on how they are connected and, more significantly, reconnected. 
Anthony Giddens’ theory of distanciation provides a framework to explore the 
manner in which caste identity and place become connected, disconnected and 
reconnected. 
 
Distanciation: Locating Place and Caste Identity 
 
Giddens is one of the few contemporary sociological theorists who have considered 
space and time as central to understanding the organization of social systems as well 
as social change. For Giddens, not only do space and time constitute the background 
in which social life unfolds, they are integral to the fundamental organization of the 
social system, and how power is organized within it. In his analysis of social change 
Giddens (interview with Rantanen 2005: 69) emphasizes the process of time-space 
distanciation, or “re-ordering of time and space in relation to the structuring of social 
relationships and social institutions.” Distanciation refers to the ability of the social 
system to exist beyond the immediate contexts of presence through the restructuring 




manner in which social relations are organized in space and time, distanciation also 
incorporates how time and space themselves are organized to connect presence and 
absence (Giddens 1990: 14).  
 
Since the focus of this dissertation is on caste identity and place, let us look at what 
Giddens has to say about spatiality and distanciation. He suggests that with the 
emphasis on standardization in modernity, both time and space undergo an emptying 
of local referents. With the development of standardized mechanical clocks and 
calendars, “when” is no longer necessarily connected to a “where” (1990:17). Space 
is emptied because it becomes possible to represent it “without reference to a 
privileged locale which forms a distinctive vantage-point” (1990: 19). According to 
Giddens, under conditions of time-space distanciation, it becomes possible to 
generate universal maps to represent space. He argues that in such cartographies, no 
one perspective is privileged in the representation of geography. Space is also 
separated from place. Prior to modernity it was dominated by presence or local 
activity. Because of distanciation, place becomes “phantasmagorical” (1990:19), or is 
increasingly influenced by interactions with absent others, and distant influence.  
 
The story of what happens to place with time-space distanciation is only part of the 
inquiry in this dissertation
60
, and as it happens, the approach preferred here diverges 
considerably from Giddens’ approach to studying place. That said, his analysis on 
what happens to social relations, such as means of identifying caste, as connected or 
not connected to place, is still provocative and relevant to this study. For Giddens, 
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social relations themselves, which were once tied to, or embedded, in place, are 
progressively disembedded from them. Giddens (1991:2) defines disembedding as 
consisting of “mechanisms which prise social relations free from the hold of specific 
locales, recombining them across wide time-space distances.” Giddens specifically 
prioritizes an institutional and phenomenological analysis of disembedding at the 
expense of a cultural analysis. Giddens explains that disembedding occurs through the 
mechanisms of symbolic tokens and expert systems. The symbolic token refers to 
“media of interchange which can be “passed around” without regard to the specific 
characteristics of individuals or groups that handle them at any particular juncture.” 
(Giddens 1990: 22) He offers the example of money as a symbolic token – in his view 
it is a standardized medium of exchange which is unchanged by any individual or 
group that handles it. Further, money does not vary temporally or spatially; in fact its 
use structures, or “binds”, time and space. Expert system refers to how, for mundane 
activities, such as driving a car, people progressively rely on the expertise of 
unknown others, such as the engineers who design it.  
 
Bearing in mind the non-linear movement of social change, Giddens offers a parallel 
concept of re-embedding (1990: 79-80). This refers to the pinning down of 
disembedded social relations to other local conditions of time and place. However, in 
Giddens’ opinion, unlike the seemingly stable trends of disembedding, these re-
connections are relatively ephemeral, and he relegates them as “temporary or partial” 
(1990: 79). Giddens also notes that tools of communication, such as print media, and 




as well as re-embedding. In this dissertation the focus of analysis is the re-embedding 
conducted in Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, who use the digital media to facilitate re-
embedding of caste identity with place. 
 
While I agree that re-embedding needs to be understood as occurring at specific 
temporal junctures, Giddens’ treatment of this process as being relatively temporary 
and of less consequence than disembedding is rejected in this dissertation. Although 
they provide a partial description of some important developments, the terms 
disembedding and re-embedding are misleading to a certain extent. Specifically, we 
need to consider the question that when social relations are disembedded from more 
intimate spatial contexts, what happens to knowledge generated in these older 
contexts? For example when the standard calendar was adopted universally to tell 
time, what happens to older ways of knowing time which are linked to place? They 
do not fade away from everyone’s memory- they often exist simultaneously, although 
perhaps surreptitiously since they have lost the broader legitimacy they occupied 
previously. And, at crucial historical junctures they re-emerge in significance, a 
process which we can categorize as re-embedding. Consequently discussions of 
distanciation must be supplemented by the following questions: for whom are social 
relations and place disembedded and/or re-embedded? 
 
Further, Giddens (1990, 1991) explains the connection between disembedding and re-
embedding primarily through a phenomenological emphasis. He argues that social 




distanciation. As a reaction, Giddens argues, social agents engage in re-embedding 
social relations in older spatial and temporal contexts in order to generate ontological 
security. Giddens conceptualizes the significance of re-embedding, and its 
relationship to disembedding, in a limited manner. This lacuna stems from an analysis 
which does not take into account the cultural evaluations and representations of the 
outcomes of disembedding, and restricts itself to the institutional and 
phenomenological levels.  While there is much value in recognizing the institutional 
nature of disembedding mechanisms and its impact on the experience of individuals 
experiencing it, to adequately analyze the significance and persistence of re-
embedding, it is important to consider how disembedding mechanisms intersect with 
various cultural processes. It is argued in this thesis that cultural evaluations of the 
outcomes of disembedded social relations provide an important driving force for the 
process of their re-embedding in place.  
 
Giddens (1990:1) interrogates modernity
61
 at solely the institutional level, and 
primarily as a discontinuous project
62
 fuelled by distanciation and disembedding. As a 
                                                 
61
 In the Consequences of Modernity, Giddens (1990) attributes the dynamism of modernity to time-space 
distanciation. He further clarifies that he is interested in studying modernity and globalization from the 
institutional perspective rather than the cultural perspective. 
62
 While modernity is often explained in terms of a radical rupture from the pre-modern (Giddens 1990), in this 
dissertation I understand it from a perspective of its continuity, or its entanglements (Therborn 2003), with what is 
categorized as pre-modern. In doing so, I follow a well-established academic tradition of the post-colonial critique 
of modernity ( Fanon 1968, Sarkar 1985, Cohn 1987,  Cohn and Dirks 1988, Sangari and Vaid 1990, García 
Canclini 1989,  Appadurai 1996, Bhabha 2004, Dussel 2000,  Quijano 2000, Quijano 2007) which challenges the 
mutually exclusive categorization of the modern and the pre-modern. Theorization within the post-colonial 
perspective has provided multiple critiques of the linear narrative of modernity as espoused in the West. Scholars 
(Dussel 2000,  Quijano 2000, Quijano 2007, Said 1979) have demonstrated the anticipated and unanticipated 
consequences of the modern construction of the hegemonic Western European subject in relation to whom all 
other people and socialities exist as mere objects of knowledge. They have explored how this assumption has 
actively constructed pre-modern categories as well as assumed their pervasiveness – the Orient itself (Said 1979), 
religious and caste communality (Appadurai 1996, Cohn 1987,  Cohn and Dirks 1988, Kaviraj 1997, Sarkar 1985), 
race (Dussel 2000,  Quijano 2000), and gender relations (Mani 1990, Sangari and Vaid 1990, Sinha 1999). They 
also brought to our attention the various ways in which the modern is itself constructed through the pre-modern, 




result, his own cautions about the non-linear movement in the emptying of space and 
time, and the re-embedding of social relations within them, tend to get obfuscated in 
the literature. Many scholars, particularly in the fields of globalization (Williams and 
McIntyre 2001, Brocklehurst 2003, Robinson 2003) and new media studies (Adams 
1998, Kynaeslahti 2003), have been quick to focus exclusively on the process of 
disembedding while discussing distanciation. For instance, distanciation has 
previously been erroneously interpreted as indicating a situation where space and 
time themselves become progressively irrelevant (Kynaeslahti 2003, Robinson 2003). 
Even those who understand that Giddens is referring to a re-organization of social 
relations in the context of newer combinations of space and time, tend to present their 
arguments as if the older organizations of time, or space, and social relations within 
them cease to matter. For instance, in the globalization literature a common 
interpretation of distanciation is that it causes action or social agents to become 
disconnected from places (Williams and McIntyre 2001, Brocklehurst 2003, 
Robinson 2003). 
 
Fortunately, overcoming the limits of Giddens’ own presentation, in other parts of the 
literature, his theoretical ideas have been applied to foreground continuities through a 
focus on re-embedding (Rodman 1992, Gabbert 2007, Jin and Robey 2008). In 
particular, scholars have drawn attention to the re-embedding of social relations in 
                                                                                                                                           
1979), or through disturbing the linear narrative of Western modernity which only acknowledges a mythical 
Western European pre-modern ancestry while obfuscating the pivotal contributions of major pre-modern cultures 
(Dussel 2000)  as well as of colonized populations (Fanon 1968). From its earliest days, this approach has 
problematized the emancipatory project of modernity by exposing the violence inherent in modernity and its 
complicity with colonial violence (Fanon 1968).As a corrective these scholars urge us to examine the “ambiguous 
double function” (Dussel 2000: 474) of modernity by recognizing both its explicitly rational and implicitly 
irrational (violent) projects. They have also provided important correctives to the euphoria surrounding 
globalization by encouraging an exploration of the hybridity (Bhabha 2004, García Canclini 1989) between the 




place (Rodman 1992, Gabbert 2007). Here, it is especially useful to reflect on 
Rodman’s (1992: 647) ethnographic insights, when she suggests that the re-
embedding of Vanatau identity to a particular place is being undertaken as a counter 
to the time-space distanciation initiated through colonial processes. As such analyses 
demonstrate, the cultural evaluation of the consequences of distanciation and 
disembedding motivate the process of re-embedding, which also significantly takes 
the form of cultural representations. In other words, in addition to studying 
institutional and ontological factors, these studies demonstrate that it is important to 
include epistemological analysis of distanciation, and the processes of disembedding 
and re-embedding. 
 
In this dissertation, this parallel process of re-embedding is foregrounded when 
analyzing the relationship between caste identity and place. In other words, while 
studying how the connection between caste identity and place become weak is 
important to understand the context, in this dissertation the greater focus is on 
studying how, when, why and for whom it becomes important to re-connect them. 
Further, rather than limiting the analysis to the institutional and ontological 
sphere to study disembedding, this dissertation prioritizes an epistemological 
analysis. Consequently, it takes on a more productive enquiry of how disembedded 
social relations interact with prevailing cultural interpretations to generate 
tendencies towards the re-embedding of caste identity in place. In pursuing the 
relationship between disembedding and re-embedding, rather relying on Giddens’ 




dissertation the preference is to incorporate the consideration of what social 
geographer Derek Gregory (1989: 206) refers to as the “structures of signification 
and legitimation”.  
 
In a provocative analysis, social geographer Derek Gregory (1989) presented a spatial 
challenge to Giddens’ theory of structuration by arguing that he does not consider the 
symbolic and normative aspects of space. Giddens defines place or locale as “the use 
of space to provide the settings of interaction” (1984: 119). Gregory argues that 
Giddens’ conception of space demonstrates a limited understanding of space and 
place as mere containers for interaction, or as distances to be overcome. For Gregory, 
such a conceptualization precludes the analysis of the symbolic, particularly the 
normative aspects of space. Speaking from a critical Lefebvreian perspective, 
Gregory argues this definition leaves no room for the “production of space”  
(Lefebvre 1974) which includes a combined analysis of the material, experiential, and 
representational aspects of space. As a consequence, Gregory argues, structures of 
signification and legitimation, referring to projects of representation and knowledge-
generation, are given short shrift in the analysis of time-space distanciation. He makes 
the case that these structures need to be more fully incorporated in this model.  
 
The approach in this dissertation is sympathetic to much of Gregory’s critique, and 
also follows his Lefebvrian and Saidian approach to the study of space. However in 
contrast to his critique, I would argue that while Giddens does consider signification 




symbolic aspects of space and place, his understanding is limited to the experiential 
rather than representational level. Further, the normative aspects are applied unevenly 
in his analysis, particularly in his ideas regarding distanciation and disembedding.  
 
Within Giddens’ own framework, to a certain extent, there is potential to analyze the 
symbolic associations of spatiality. For instance, in defining locale, Giddens (1984: 
118-119, 367) cautions us that apart from its mere physical features, a locale 
necessarily involves the recognition of this physical structure by its users or observers 
as a specific context for certain interactions
63
. For Giddens, these symbolic aspects of 
space in fact are crucial in the way social agents organize and experience sections of 
space for interaction. Similarly, he argues that symbolic aspects such as a “sense of 
place” (Giddens 1984: 367) are important in sustaining ontological security in the 
context of uncertainty and risks generated through distanciation. Rather than arguing 
that the symbolic aspects of space tend to get “occluded” (Gregory 1989: 206), a 
fairer assessment would be that it tends to get overshadowed by Giddens’ focus on 
modernity in terms of a discontinuous event and more importantly his institutional 
analysis of modernity.  
 
The normative aspect of the re-organization of time, space and social relations is also 
an important, yet curiously incomplete, part of Giddens analysis of modernity. In his 
analysis of late modernity and disembedding in works such as The Consequences of 
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 Giddens (1984: 118) explains it in the following way - “It is usually possible to designate locales in terms of 
their physical properties, either as features of the material world, or more commonly, as combinations of those 
features and human artefacts. But it is an error to suppose that locales can be described in those terms alone - the 
same form of error made by behaviourism with regard to the description of human action.  A ‘house’ is grasped as 
such only if the observer recognizes that it is a ‘dwelling’ with a range of other properties specified by the modes 




Modernity (1990) and Modernity and Self-Identity (1991), Giddens’ prior emphasis 
on the connection between power and distanciation
64
 is strangely missing. In 
proposing his theory of structuration, Giddens identifies time and space as being 
constitutive, rather than containers, of social life, precisely because the way they are 
organized can determine the degree of control over social agents and activities 
through the setting of normative standards. Building on Foucalt’s work, Giddens 
(1984: 119-162) remarks extensively on the disciplinary potential of both space and 
time, and how their organization is used to exert disciplinary power over populations. 
In this capacity, Giddens is very much concerned with the normative representation 
of social relations in certain temporal-spatial contexts as ideal
65
. But, when it comes 
to the discussion on modernity and the processes of disembedding and re-embedding, 
this insight on the normative re-organization of time, space and social relations is 
passed over very quickly, or not mentioned at all, since he is eager to represent 




This recognition of the normative aspect of distanciation is significant when we try to 
understand social relations as being disembedded across space and time, particularly 
through symbolic tokens. In his earlier work on structuration, Giddens (1984) 
comments on the storage of information as an important aspect of time-space 
distanciation. Here, the classificatory projects of modern nation-states come to mind. 
Giddens also identifies such storage of information as normative and instrumental in 
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 This connection is quite pronounced in his theory of structuration in The Constitution of Society (1984: 258-
262) 
65
 Consider for instance, Giddens’ observations on the routinization and the farming of space in spaces of 
disciplinary power such as schools.  
66
 However, as Tomlinson (1994) competently demonstrates in his analysis of media and globalization, it is 




the reproduction of structures of domination. Since in this work, Giddens 
observations regarding storage of information, distanciation and power are instructive 
and it is useful to quote him at length:  
…of essential importance to the engendering of power, is the storage of 
authoritative resources. ‘Storage’ is a medium of binding time-space 
involving, on the level of action, the knowledgeable management of a 
projected future and recall of an elapsed past. In oral cultures human memory 
is virtually the sole repository of information storage. However, as we have 
seen, memory (or recall) is to be understood not only in relation to the 
psychological qualities of individual agents but also inhering in the 
recursiveness of institutional reproduction. Storage here already presumes 
modes of time-space control, as well as the phenomenal experience of ‘lived 
time’, and the ‘container’ that stores authoritative resources in the 
community itself. The storage of authoritative and allocative resources may 
be understood as involving the retention and control of information or 
knowledge whereby social relations are perpetuated across time-space.  
Giddens (1984: 261, emphasis mine) 
 
It is rather unfortunate for the analysis of distanciation that this early emphasis on the 
normative aspect of distanciation becomes progressively weaker in Giddens’ (1990, 
1991) later discussions of modernity and disembedding mechanisms, where the latter 
are supposed to quite neutrally fuel the former.  
 
Gregory’s critique raises questions regarding how some representations of space, or 
even of social relations through space, become more powerful than others, and how 
this process is connected to time-space distanciation. By prioritizing questions of 
signification and legitimation, or questions of epistemology, Gregory helpfully 
challenges Giddens’ suggestion that space is emptied due to the development of 
universal printed maps, by creating representations of space where no particular place 




ambitions, Gregory correctly points out that map-making is a discursive project
67
 
rather than a neutral activity, since it involves the imposition of a certain 
“geographical imagination” (1989: 209) based on specific politico-economic ways of 
knowing and representing spaces. The broader lesson for the study of time-space 
distanciation from Gregory’s critique is that we need to go beyond observing 
institutional mechanisms and ontological experiences, and consider how the resulting 
distanciated knowledge is established as the correct way of knowing through 
interactions with cultural representations. This prompts an analysis of re-embedding 
that is sensitive to both the role of place in structures of signification and legitimation, 
as well as how place itself is constructed by drawing on social relations.  
 
From the perspective of this dissertation, let us consider how caste identity undergoes 
time-space distanciation. As will be elaborated in the next section on the review of 
the caste literature, caste identity was progressively disconnected (or to use Giddens’ 
original emphasis, ‘disembedded’) from previous spatial contexts through the 
institutional mechanisms of classificatory projects of the colonial state, the related 
mechanism of the logic of enumeration, and the creation of classificatory categories 
constructed by the colonial and post-colonial states for affirmative action. Together, 
they created a distanciated body of knowledge, a symbolic token as it were, about 
caste identity. It is not the case that this distanciated body no longer has spatial 
contexts. Rather, for identifying caste, new spatial contexts, such as the national or 
                                                 
67
 For instance, let us consider the discursive struggle involved in the manner in which the political boundary of 
India is cartographically represented today. Depending on which place-based perspective is prioritized, the 
northern border may or may not include Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Political maps generated in India would 
include this area within the borders of India, while political maps generated in Pakistan, or its allies such as the 
United States are not likely to include this region. This cartographic representation varies based on privileging of 




state contexts, are created and gain significance and legitimacy. However, we must 
bear in mind that the older spatial contexts of caste identity do not cease to exist, and 
indeed it is their revival in significance that we can study as a case of re-embedding. 
 
For this dissertation, a further line of enquiry which stems from Gregory’s 
observations is to study the cultural processes by which this distanciated knowledge 
enters other frameworks of knowledge about caste. How is the distanciated body of 
knowledge about caste read and represented by drawing on older frameworks of 
knowing caste? As we shall see in the review of the literature on caste, the 
distanciated categorization of caste based on affirmative action is read through the 
older ways of knowing caste, and these caste categories offer a new language for the 
continuance of discrimination.   
 
In addition, Gregory (1989) also indicates the need to analyze counter-representations 
in an analysis of distanciation. Following a critical social constructionist approach, he 
also points out an additional, and very salient, critique about the different ways in 
which different social agents critically “read” or interpret maps which are often 
contradictory to the official representations. What is of importance in this observation 
is that it makes a case for studying an institutional disembedding mechanism by 
placing it at the intersection of multiple cultural processes. This interaction between 
distanciated knowledge about caste identity and cultural representations about the 
inferiority and superiority of caste groups forms a crucial backdrop for the project of 





The disembedded way of identifying caste is legitimated through the State machinery, 
yet the older forms of knowing caste, which are connected to more intimate places, 
also continue to exist simultaneously. At particular historical junctures the older 
forms gain a certain momentum through specific projects of re-embedding. These 
projects of re-embedding establish a mutual connection between caste identity and 
place: caste identity is constructed through reference to place, and the production of 
place draws on caste-identity. 
 
The section that follows provides review of the literature on caste identity and the 




The framework of distanciation is well-suited to analyzing the identification of caste 
from the perspective of the nation-state. This section reviews the literature on caste 
with a view to applying the concepts of distanciation, embedding and disembedding 
to place and caste identification. After reviewing the literature on caste identity and 
identification, the embeddeddness between caste identification and place are 
discussed. Subsequently, the literature is reviewed to discuss the formation of a 
disembedded knowledge about caste from the nation-state’s perspective. One must 
bear in mind, however, that in this section the concept of disembedding is being 




and 5, this framework only provides a partial explanation when the specific case 
under consideration is taken into account. 
 
Studying Caste as Identity and Identification 
 
The hierarchical approach to studying caste has been exemplified by Louis Dumont's 
[(1966)1970] structuralist epic Homo Hierarchus, which explains the caste system as 
a ritual hierarchy in which interdependent castes are ranked based on their relative 
purity and pollution in comparison to each other. Over time, the understanding of 
caste as a single and rigid hierarchy, has been challenged within the academic 
literature, particularly from the postcolonial perspective, and to a lesser extent in 
ethnographic studies (Fuller 1997, Berreman 1992, Gupta 2000, Gupta 2004), which 
noted the inadequacy of an exclusive reliance on the Hindu textual understanding of 
caste. This work indicated that such an understanding did not take into account the 
tremendous variation of castes on the ground
68
 or the temporal mutability of the caste 
system and castes
69
. Further, more recent scholarship has suggested a more fluid 
approach to caste (cf Berreman 1992, Mencher 1992, Khare 1984, Fuller 1997, Gupta 
2000, Gupta 2004) which takes into account how different castes (and members of 
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 The disjuncture of this fourfold varna classification and the castes as they existed on the ground (or jatis), is 
something that scholars were aware of from the time of early colonial studies on caste. For instance, the large 
number of castes categorized as “untouchables” (who  use the self-referential term Dalit to identify themselves) 
were not included in the classification although they were an integral part of society (MN Srinivas 1970). This 
classification also excluded the tribal population of India. 
69
 From the late 1980s onwards, postcolonial scholars have stressed on the contribution of British colonial 
knowledge production to this understanding of caste, arguing that this was used to legitimate the British 




those castes) perceive their own position in the hierarchy
70
. Gupta (2005) in particular 
urges academics to approach caste as cultural identity rather than only as a hierarchy, 
arguing that lay interpretations of the caste system and caste identity are an important 
part of the analysis of caste. In this dissertation, the focus is on caste identification - 
partly the manner in which others draw on hierarchical understandings to identify 
a particular caste, but more significantly the manner in which these identity 




For the purposes of this study on caste identification, Dumont’s concept of 
substantialized castes is of great importance in understanding contemporary collective 
caste identities. Dumont used this term to refer to what he perceived to be a new type 
of relationship between castes in modern India. He argued that while castes were 
traditionally bound together through ritual interdependence based on obligatory 
exchange of services and patronage, over time their relationship had become 
increasingly characterized by competition with each other
72
. He observed that 
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 Berreman (1992: 91) provides a forceful critique of this approach. He argues that analyzing caste through the 
sole perspective of the religious textual interpretation is similar to an analysis of contemporary race relations in the 
US on the basis of only the US Constitution or the Declaration of Independence.  
71
 Although the emphasis in this study is on studying caste identification, it is not as if the hierarchy ceases to 
matter. The hierarchical aspects of caste continue to be important in the organisation of daily life in India. For 
instance, something as basic as the consumption of food is organized according to caste. The common association 
of India with vegetarianism stems from its dominance in the hierarchical aspect of the caste system, in which 
vegetarian food is associated with the purity of higher ranking castes and non-vegetarian food with lower ranking 
castes.   
72
 Dumont defined substantialization as the “transition from a fluid, structural universe in which the emphasis is 
on interdependence and in which there is no privileged level, to firm units, to a universe of impenetrable blocks, 
self-sufficient, essentially identical and in competition with one another, a universe in which caste appears as a 
collective individual (in the sense we have given to this word), as a substance.”  (1966)1970: 222). Some scholars 
rejected the process of substantialization as not being a “characteristic” (Leach 1960) part of caste, and heralded 
such a substitution of competition for interdependence as the death of caste. However, others have argued that 
rather than the destruction of caste, substantialization actually contributes to the strengthening of caste, primarily 
through an emphasis on caste identity (Dirks 2001: 7, Fuller 1997: 12-13, Deliege 1996: 81, 90).  The shift in the 
village economy from an interdependence of castes to economic contractual relations prompted Srinivas (2003) to 
proclaim the death of caste as a system. However, he clarified that substantialization had also led to the growth as 




substantialized castes competed with each other “as collective individuals” [Dumont 
(1966)1970: 222] for access to economic and political resources at local, regional and 
national levels.  
 
Some scholars (Béteille 1997, Parry 2007) have correctly cautioned that the concept 
of substantialization may prompt an analysis that is based on a false assumption of 
internal homogeneity within each caste, and it may inadequately theorize internal 
differentiation based on occupation, education and income within each caste. While 
recognizing this differentiation, in this dissertation, I am more sympathetic to Fuller's 
(1997) more complex characterization of substantialization as an inherently self-
contradictory process, wherein increasing internal differentiation within each caste 
accompanies heightened normative emphasis on the difference between castes.  
 
Further, some of the literature seems to suggest that we take a broader view of 
substantialization which focuses upon the tendency to form competitive groups whose 
composition varies over time, rather than assume that each caste always becomes a 
substantialized entity as a single competitive group. These scholars insist on 
considering the broader political context within which castes operate. Ishii (2007) and 
Fitzgerald (1996) have suggested approaching substantialization as a partial shift, or a 
process. As Ishii (2007) has pointed out, substantialization is best seen as a process 
that is temporally specific and does not follow a unilinear direction. In a study of a 
village in Nepal, Ishiii observed that at certain temporal junctures, a caste was 




the same caste was mobilizing itself to be a part of a broad coalition of castes, where 
that coalition functioned as a substantialized group. Interestingly, Parry (2007: 487) 
has reflected on the need for studying the interaction between the process of 
substantialization of caste groups (a substantialized group comprising all other castes 
in compeitition with former untouchable castes) and the substantialization of religious 
groups (a substantialized group of all Hindus in competition with Muslims).  
 
Following their lead, in this dissertation, I understand substantialization as a process, 
and a partial one at that. It is important to study identification in light of mobilizations 
to create substantialized caste blocs. In different political contexts, which vary over 
time, these caste blocs vary in composition: at one point in time the bloc could be 
limited to one caste, while at another point it could consist of a combination of castes. 
This process also interacts with the formation of religion based on substantialized 
blocs. When studying this process, we need to consider that due to increasing 
differentiation within each caste, it is likely that not all members of a caste understand 
and represent their caste position uniformly (neither at a single moment in time, nor 
unvaryingly over their individual lifetimes). In other words, at any point in time, 
different interest groups within the same caste may adopt different substantialization 
strategies. Consequently, within the same caste, we may observe sections that 
highlight alliances with other similarly placed castes and call for a complex and 
selective erasure of caste boundaries, to sections which seek to highlight differences 
between their caste and all others. Since I wish to avoid the assumption of an illusory 




identification in one caste-based digital group is an indicator of how all members of 
that caste identify themselves. Rather, I am interested in studying the process through 
which this particular online group is engaging in caste identification. Indeed as we 
can observe in the study, even within this one digital group, identification is a 
contested process. 
 
Embeddedness of Caste Identity in Spatial Contexts 
 
In India, space is often read, or understood, from the perspective of collectively 
generated caste-based meanings. Consequently, space becomes significant for 
identifying caste. On the one hand, the structure of and access to space is based on 
caste identity. The maintenance of social distance between castes was often 
implemented through rules about physical distance between members of different 
castes. To take one example, the Namboodiri caste of Kerala stringently enforced 
elaborate rules regarding the amount of spatial distance to be maintained between 
themselves and other castes that they considered to be inferior (Ghurye 1969: 9-10). 
Ensuring the correct distance from the members of other castes in physical space 
continues to be an important means through which relations between different caste 
groups are established and reproduced. This can be most clearly observed through 
studies of residential segregation in India. Ethnographic village studies of the 1950s 
and 1960s in India demonstrate that space within a village was often clearly 
demarcated along caste lines
73
. Similarly, research indicates that urban areas in 
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 For instance, in his study of Sripuram village in Tamil Nadu, Béteille (1965: 25 - 39) notes that the village was 
divided into three well-defined physical segments – the agraharam (brahmin quarter), the kudiana (streets where 




contemporary India continue to be characterized by caste-based residential 
segregation (Singh and Vithayathil 2012, Dupont 2004, Trivedi 1996, Gandhi 1983). 





On the other hand, caste identity is also shaped in reference to its spatial context. 
Castes are identified within specific territorial contexts.  As mentioned earlier, the 
fourfold textual division of caste as varna was not observed in all regions in India 
(Jaiswal 1997:7). Further, caste groups were territorial in nature – not only are 
specific castes found in specific geographic areas of India, caste groups often identify 
themselves (and distinguish themselves from others) through reference to specific 
geographical regions. For instance, Rashmi Pant (1987) observes that caste groups 
have specific caste names within a particular spatial context – for instance, a Brahmin 
is referred to as a Pant in the Kumaon region. She also notes that when members of 
these caste groups migrated within India, they would indicate their region of origin in 
their caste name
75 
as a means of identifying themselves.  
 
Other studies also indicate that although caste was initially perceived by early 
Western observers as a single and homogenous system of stratification, there existed 
                                                                                                                                           
Agraharam was organized as an exclusive space for Brahmins – while entry was denied to all Non-Brahmins 
(including those residing in the village), it was open to Brahmins from all parts of India. Further, even within these 
broad cleavages, residents resided along caste lines. For instance, within the Dalit cheri, members of the 2 main 
Dalit castes resided on separate streets. 
74
 For instance, in 2010, upper caste villagers in a village in the state of Tamil Nadu erected a barbed wire fence 
around public roads to prevent access to Dalit villagers, stating that frequent use of these roads by the latter would 
pollute the sanctity of an adjoining graveyard used by the former group (Shaji 2010). 
75
 To explain this phenomenon Pant (1987:154) provides the following example - “Thus, a Brahman who in 
Kumaon was a Pant, in Benares would refer to himself as a ‘Deshastha Brahman’; while a Joshi Brahman of 
Kumaon could in Benares call himself by his section and geography as Kanoujiya Kurmachali, particularly as the 




tremendous variation in the valuation of different caste groups based on the spatial 
context in which they were located (Srinivas 1970
76
, Appadurai 1996). It is not 
unusual for a caste group to be considered to be of middling rank in one geographic 
area, while it is ranked in a lower category in another area. For instance, Raheja 
(1988: 4) notes that the Gujar caste is accorded higher ritual status in the Upper Doab 
region, as compared to the Gujar caste in other parts of North India where they 
occupy a lower ritual status. While such embeddeddness is relevant, in this 
dissertation, since both caste identity and place are understood in processual terms, 
I am much more interested in exploring when, how and why such connections are 
highlighted, and re-embedded. To understand this we must first reflect on modern 
disembedding mechanisms and their effect on the connection between caste identity 
and place. 
 
Disembedding of Caste Identity from Spatial Contexts 
 
In this section, I examine the time space-distanciation of caste identities due to 
multiple processes. In other words, here I am exploring how caste identity has been 
stretched across spans of space, beyond their local contexts, through modern, 
institutional disembedding mechanisms. Caste identity has been selectively 
disembedded from its local spatial contexts through multiple processes – Orientalist 
attempts at standardization of caste classification; the logic of enumeration; and 
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 As MN Srinivas (1970:67) observed: “it is not only that the hierarchy is nebulous here and there, and that 




classification based on affirmative action policies of the colonial and post-colonial 
state. These processes are described in the paragraphs that follow.   
 
An important institutional disembedding mechanism which abstracted caste from its 
spatial contexts was its encounter with the Orientalist project of classification (Cohn 
1987, Pant 1987, Cohn and Dirks 1988, Appadurai 1996) – a project which was in 
accordance with the modern distinctions regarding subject (the modern colonizers) 
and object (the pre-modern colonized) of knowledge (Dussel 2000,  Quijano 2000, 
Quijano 2007, Said 1979).  As can be observed from the discussion that follows, the 
primary effort here was to squeeze a rather messy, very context-specific and 
extensive system of classification such as caste into its modern variant - a neater 
system of classification, capable of being used and applied without having to take 
spatial and social contexts into account (Pant 1987:151) - a body of knowledge which 
could be handled with ease by anyone
77
. Various post-colonial scholars have 
demonstrated the consequences of the encounter between the very modern 
classificatory and exoticizing colonial gaze and the pre-existing system of knowing 
caste in India. Orientalist knowledge production about the peoples and communities 
that populated the newly conquered colonies
78
 (Dirks 2001, Bayly 1999, Gupta 2004, 
                                                 
77
 This has been identified as a characteristic tendency of the modern nation-state by another great scholar of 
modernity, Zygmunt Bauman (1989). Speaking in the context of the oppression faced by Jewish peoples, he 
identifies racism as a specifically modern phenomenon, which was, among other things, based on a shift in the 
model of the nation state – from a pre-modern “game-keeper”, which acknowledges difference yet does not 
intervene to establish separate boundaries; to a modern “gardener”, which not only is preoccupied with difference 
but intervenes to the maximum possible extent to establish and maintain mutually exclusive boundaries between 
social groups. 
78
 (Bayly 1999: 371-2) posits that existing caste-building tendencies in pre-colonial India were reified by the 
colonial state’s emphasis on ethnographic data collection and classification. She argues that caste boundaries were 
reinforced through the adoption of caste-specific legal codes and administrative practices. Apart from providing a 
direct justification for colonialism, the knowledge of caste, in the form of the caste census, was also essential to 




Quigley 1993, Cohn and Dirks 1988, Pant 1987, Cohn 1987)
 79
 as well as colonial 
practices of governance such as the caste census
80
 contributed to the envisioning of 
caste as a pan-Indian, unitary hierarchy, in contrast to the diversity of castes on the 
ground in their specific spatial contexts
81
. For instance, by examining colonial census 
records, Pant (1987: 152) demonstrates that colonial administrators acted on the need 
to standardize what appeared to them to be a baffling range of castes through 
strategies such as the removal of secondary additions to the caste name which 
indicated their locality or profession, thus rolling into a single unit very different 
castes, which had previously been embedded in distinct spatial contexts.  
 
Another distinct, but very closely related, institutional mechanism through which 
caste was disembedded from its spatial contexts, is what Sudipto Kaviraj (1997: 328) 
refers to as the “logic of enumeration”. This mechanism was introduced by the 
modern states’ project of “knowing” its population through counting bodies. In 
comparison to previously fluid communities, individuals and communities must be 
                                                                                                                                           
practices where classificatory “pigeon-holes” (Pant 1987:154) imposed a considerable degree of rigidity on a 
much more fluid system that existed on the ground. Pant notes that the British effort at classification itself led to 
changes within the caste system, since colonial officials often dealt with the confusing array of castes through 
standardization (for instance, lumping together castes which had similar names, but very different ritual status and 
occupations) and recording only castes that constituted proportionately large sections of the population. 
79
 For instance, these scholars argue that, to a significant degree, British knowledge production about their 
colonial subjects through administrative literature and the lay Western imagination contributed to the hegemonic 
position of Brahmins in India, a position which had not been accepted uniformly and unequivocally on the ground 
in different geographical areas in India. The colonial understanding of caste not only assumed that there was a 
single unambiguous interpretation of the varna system, but also that Sanskrit scholars (from the Brahmin caste) 
were the only authentic source of knowledge on caste (Quigley 1993: 16). For instance, (Gupta 2004: xii) notes 
the reliance of British colonizers on the Brahminical view of caste as the correct interpretation of culture and 
custom, (ex in Sir Henry Maine’s drawing up of legal codifications) . (Bayly 1999: 371) notes that this literature 
contributed to the expansion and reification of the pollution barrier (the idea that physical contact with lower 
ranking castes would make members of the higher ranking castes impure – something that was taken for granted in 
academic works such as Homo Heirarchus) by the end of the 19th century. 
80
 The colonial census had the unintended effect of providing a route for upward mobility, and it was utilized by 
many castes to petition for a change in status categorization (Srinivas 1970: 18).  
81
 Appadurai (1996:127) refers to this as a situation where “human groups (castes) are treated to a considerable 





counted and mapped (specific enumerated bodies fill particular spaces) into distinct 
and mutually exclusive categories. In the colonies, this logic was also translated in 
very specific ways, particularly through the colonial caste census. In the Orientalist 
gaze, where assumptions of biological racial differences between the colonizer and 
colonized were taken for granted, the basic unit of political activity was assumed to 
be the religious or caste community (as opposed to the individual in the West). 
Consequently, as Appadurai (1996) demonstrates, the enumerative logic, or the power 
of statistics, was particularly strong in the colonial state’s imagination because of a 
justificatory function – the numerical size of communities was utilized as an 
important tool for the formulation of policy in colonial India. As both Kaviraj and 
Appadurai point out, in response to the colonial state’s gaze, this logic was adapted 
by caste communities themselves (Appadurai 1996, Kaviraj 1997). Consequently, the 
gaze bequeathed a specific type of political agency to caste communities – they 
started to think of and mobilize themselves around the idea of enumerated (how many 
of us are there?) and mapped (how far are we spread?) entities, abstracted from local 
spatial contexts. 
 
A third institutional mechanism through which caste is disembedded from place and 
re-embedded in national and state level contexts is that of the affirmative action 
policies of the nation state. It is not that pan-Indian contexts for caste identities had 
not been constructed earlier (through the Hindu textual interpretation of caste and its 
Orientalist classification by colonial regimes), or that these ways of knowing caste are 




will become clear through the analysis in this chapter, it is not as if these older 
contexts of caste disappear. However, through the logic of enumeration (how does the 
modern nation-state know its subjects by creating social groups as the focus of social 
policy, and consequently how do the subjects know themselves and others), this way 
of knowing caste and these spatial contexts of caste have become increasingly 
legitimized. More importantly, this distanciated body of knowledge intersects with 
these older cultural interpretations based on the previous pan-Indian understandings 
of caste, such as the textual four fold classification enumerated in Hindu religious 
texts.  
 
As explained in the introductory chapter, affirmative action in India has primarily 
taken the form of reservations or quotas. Currently, affirmative action policies in 
India are focused on three broad categories - the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled 
Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) - for whom special access 
provisions have been instituted in education, government employment and electoral 
politics. The term “backwards” may also be used refer to a combination of all three 
identificatory categories
82
, although it is more likely to be used to refer to the first two 
categories. Those who completely fall outside the purview of these policies are 
frequently identified as the “forwards”, again both by the state as well as in general 
parlance.  
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 (Galanter 1978b) provides an excellent history of the term “backward” and how at different points in time it has 
been used to refer to a varying list of castes, both in the official discourse of the state, as well as popular discourse. 
Froystad (2010) has also made interesting observations about the shifting contexts of conversation where 




Interacting with each other, these three institutional processes – 1. Orientalist caste 
classification 2. logic of enumeration 3. categorization based on affirmative action - 
also significantly influenced the political imaginary (Dirks 2001: 236, Appadurai 
1996) of the nationalist discourse as well as post-independence democratic politics. 
As Appadurai (1996) notes, although the caste census was discontinued after 1931, it 
had given root to “the idea of politics as the contest of essentialized and enumerated 
communities” (Appadurai 1996: 131), which continues in contemporary Indian 
politics.  
 
Further, these institutional mechanisms create a distanciated body of knowledge 
about caste. This body of knowledge was a symbolic token, an institutional 
disembedding mechanism that  (Giddens 1990:22) defines as “media of interchange 
which can be “passed around” without regard to the specific characteristics of 
individuals or groups that handle them at any particular juncture.” This distanciated 
body of knowledge standardizes knowledge about castes which is frozen with respect 
to space-time – it appears to be invariant regardless of spatial or temporal contexts. 
This body of knowledge is also invariant according to who handles it – the state, the 
caste members themselves, different caste groups, although they do engage in efforts 
to change this classification.  
 
Some scholars such as (deZwart 2000: 35) have argued that the affirmative action 
policies of the post-colonial state have reinforced the caste system in post-




Shah (1993) and Alam (1999) who have demonstrated that a claim for political, social 
and economic resources based on substantiated caste identities does not imply a 
reinforcement of the entire caste system, particularly when it can become the basis for 
challenging caste-based inequalities. Dudley-Jenkins (2003) has also provided an 
interesting analysis of caste identification based on the affirmative action policies of 
the state, where she seeks to answer the question as to whether these policies have 
ended up reinforcing the very differences they were meant to address. She 
demonstrates a dual movement - while caste differences are reinforced, in some cases 
these distanciated caste categories are also consciously embraced in an effort to 
challenge prevailing caste inequalities by some of the most disenfranchised caste and 
tribal groups. While I am sympathetic to much of Dudley-Jenkins observations, in 
this thesis I draw on Aloysius (2011) response to her work: any consideration of state-
based identification through these categories must also observe prevailing older and 
newer cultural discourses which legitimate caste inequality. 
 
In other words, it is important to consider how this symbolic token (distanciated body 
of institutional knowledge about caste) interacts with prevailing and new cultural 
interpretations which legitimate caste inequality through caste-based stigma. In recent 
years, scholars have started to observe that classificatory terms based on affirmative 
action policies, such as forwards, backwards, SC, ST and OBC are read through the 
lens of superiority and inferiority and result in a coded, yet stigmatizing, discourse 
(Still 2013, Gudavarthy 2012, Froystad 2010, Jodhka and Newman 2007, Vasavi 




this discourse draws on older language of caste and draws upon the perceptions of 
purity of blood and natural intelligence as being inherently distributed unequally 
based on biological differences between castes (Still 2013, Gudavarthy 2012, 
Froystad 2010, Vasavi 2006, Mitra Channa 2005). However, as Jodhka and Newman 
(2007) have pointed out, this stigmatizing discourse also incorporates more recent 
understandings of caste drawing on neo-liberal global logic which portrays 
affirmative action as promoting inefficiency and those who are classified in 
distanciated categories such as SC, ST, OBC and the blanket term “backward” as 
inherently lacking merit. The interaction between the institutional mechanisms - 
classification of colonial and post-colonial state and enumeration - and their 
cultural interpretations creates, at specific temporal junctures, the impetus for the 
re-embedding of caste identity with place. 
 
Hypothesis and Empirical Questions 
 
Hypothesis and sub-hypothesis 
 
This dissertation extends Giddens’ major hypothesis regarding distanciation to the 





In the context of heightened time-space distanciation, ways of identifying caste 
become disembedded from places they were intimately tied to, and can only be 
partially and temporarily re-embedded in these places.  
 
Due to various processes associated with time-space distanciation (classification and 
logic of enumeration) caste relations of identification, are disembedded, or “lifted out 
of local contexts of interaction” and reorganized “across indefinite spans of time-
space”. Clearly, such disembedding creates new spatial contexts in which caste 
relations and caste groups are known (or identified), and Giddens’s analysis has 
contributed significantly to our understanding of time-space relations as constitutive 
of power. However, although he dwells briefly on re-embedding, the (experiential 
rather than representational) production of space, and some structures of signification 
and legitimation, these aspects often tend to get overshadowed in Giddens’ 
discussions of analysis of time-space distanciation.  
 
The argument here is that through the interaction of institutional mechanisms and 
cultural processes, disembedding mechanisms provide the impetus for a re-
embedding of caste relations within the older spatial contexts of interaction. Further, 
the very concepts of disembedding and re-embedding need to be understood as shifts 
in the legitimacy of multiple narratives whereby social relations are known through 
place. To do so, I study how and why members of a caste-based online group (The 




Malabar. In this process, these members are simultaneously constructing Thiyya 
identity as well as the place of Malabar itself.  
 
For convenience, I break the major hypothesis into two sub-hypotheses that guide this 
study: 
i. Identification of caste is no longer based on representation and 
experience of place, and is only temporarily and partially re-embedded in 
place:  
 
This sub-hypothesis enables testing whether the creation of disembedded caste 
categories necessarily involves the lack of significance of older and more intimate 
spatial contexts for representing caste identity. How is caste identified in situations 
where cultural evaluations about the inherent superiority/ inferiority of caste groups 
interact with the symbolic token of a distanciated body of knowledge about caste that 
privileges newer spatial contexts? How does this interaction provide a driving force 
for the re-embedding caste identity in places, or in other words, for the identification 
of caste through reference to older spatial contexts? Such an identification of caste 
relies not just on the experience of place as argued by Giddens, but also on the 







ii. The production of place, through discursive representation, is no longer 
based on caste identification:   
 
This sub-hypothesis tests whether caste identity continues to influence the discursive 
production of place. Giddens has not adequately pursued the connection between the 
symbolic aspects of place and power in terms of representation of social groups. 
Through this sub-hypothesis, the aim is to test whether caste identification can 
influence place. More specifically, to what extent can such identification influence 
the manner in which the physical boundaries of place are conceived? Further, how 
does the identification of caste influence the manner in which membership in place - 




In order to establish that place is not uncoupled from caste identification, their mutual 
influence on each other is studied in this dissertation. Older ways of knowing place 
continue to be significant for caste identification. Consequently, this dissertation 
involves a study of how members of the group re-embed their caste identity in place, 
using narratives about place (Malabar and its “Others”) to re-construct their Thiyya 
caste identity in light of disembedding. Similarly, caste identification continues to be 
a significant influence on the manner in which meaning is assigned to a place, 
contributing to the production of place. Caste identification influences the manner in 




Malabar is shaped. The group members represent a close connection between what 
happens to the place of Malabar and what happens to the Thiyyas. More significantly, 
disembedding processes and caste identification also influence the manner in which 
group members envision that the place of Malabar should be shaped and who should 
be included or excluded from this place.  
 
Drawing from the two sub-hypotheses, the following empirical questions will be 
focused on in the dissertation: 
a. How do members of this online group identify their caste based on how they 
understand and experience Malabar (and its “Others”)? 
b. Discursive Production of place: How do members of this online group 
envision the area of Malabar, based on their caste identification?  
These empirical questions will be addressed separately in the two analytical chapters 
(Ch 4, 5) of the dissertation. 
 
Outline of Remaining Chapters 
 
Data and Methodology: In this chapter the methodology used in the dissertation is 
discussed, specifically the ethnographic approach to studying spatial imaginaries. It 
also includes a discussion of peculiarities of online ethnography, which has utilized to 
study this digital group.   
The Spatial Imaginaries of Identifying Caste: Distanciation and Re-embedding 




involves a study of how members of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar experience time-
space distanciation, specifically the disembedding of caste identity from place. An 
immediate impetus for the formation of this online group is anxiety generated around 
caste identification by the nation-state (identification as Ezhavas). In this context, the 
Ezhava caste is constructed as a significant caste Other by many members of Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar. Next, this chapter includes an analysis of how, in the context of 
these disembedding mechanisms, members re-embed Thiyya identity with the place 
of Malabar. They identify Thiyya through a complex mixture of positive and negative 
associations with the region of Malabar and its geographical “Other”, South Kerala. 
In doing so, members of the group draw on their differential experiences as Thiyyas, 
within Malabar as well as places outside of Malabar. The social and cultural capital 
which mediates their experience of Malabar very often does not translate well when 
they experience places outside Malabar. 
The Spatial Imaginaries of Place: Reconstructing Boundaries and Belongingness of 
Malabar: In this chapter focus is placed on the second empirical question. It includes 
an analysis of how caste-based identification plays a significant role in the production 
of the place of Malabar, and how caste based mobilization has the potential to 
influence the shaping of the physical place of Malabar itself. The members of the 
group are invested in events within the physical place of Malabar, particularly since 
they experience a conflation of the disadvantages of caste as well as regional location. 
Many members argue that a key means to addressing challenges faced by Thiyyas is 
through a greater policy focus on the area of Malabar itself. Here we can observe a 




to produce the place of Malabar. More significantly, as a reaction to the distanciated 
caste identities, some members envision drawing boundaries to membership within 
Malabar as a means to maintain the group boundary of the Thiyyas themselves. 
Anxiety over caste identification by the nation-state (identification as Ezhavas) 
prompts these members to make a case against what they perceive to be the 
colonization of Malabar land. In the light of this way of being identified by the 
nation-state, it becomes important for these group members that physical regional 
separation be maintained between the Thiyyas and their caste Others (Ezhavas). 
Conclusion: Here the preceding chapters are tied together and summarized. It 
includes a reflection on the implications of this dissertation for Giddens’s theory of 
time-space distanciation. Specifically, an argument is made for a renewed focus on 
re-embedding, production of space, and attention to the structures of signification and 
legitimation through a study of the interaction between institutional mechanisms and 
cultural representations. The implications of this dissertation for the study of caste 
online and offline will also be discussed. 
 




Chapter 3: Research Design: Studying Spatial Imaginaries 
through Ethnography 
 
In this dissertation, Giddens’ hypothesis regarding distanciation is extended to the 
study of caste identity and place. Specifically the study tests that in the context of 
heightened time-space distanciation, ways of identifying caste become disembedded 
from places they were intimately tied to, and can only be partially and temporarily re-
embedded in these places. 
 
In other words, the focus is on studying the process of re-connecting, or re-
embedding, caste identity and place, in the aftermath of their disconnection, or 
disembedding, from each other. In studying this problem, it is crucial that we consider 
how, why and for whom it becomes important to re-connect caste identity and place.  
 
In the previous chapter, I clarified that the focus of the investigation bears primarily 
on the representation of caste identity and place, although the experience of caste in 
place is not completely outside the pale of the problem. A process-based view of both 
caste identity and place are adopted here: the focus in this dissertation is on 
understanding the becoming of both caste identity and place through their 
imaginative linkage with each other. The attempt is to study how and why caste 
identity and place are imaginatively and collectively produced through reference to 





In other words, the dissertation is trying to capture the spatial imaginaries of caste 
identification. The project examines two specific research problems:  
a. how and why is the identification of caste imaginatively constructed through 
references to  the representation (and experience) of place? 
b. how and why is place imaginatively constructed through a reference to caste 
identification? 
 
This chapter provides details regarding the research design of the study, and 
comprises of three sections. Section 1 contains a discussion regarding the 
methodology used for the study. Section 2 offers an elaboration of the processes of 
data collection and data analysis. In the final Section, an introduction to the study 
participants is provided. 
 
Methodology: Ethnographic Approach to an online group 
 
Studies of spatial imaginaries, or the mutual articulation of space and identity, have 
conventionally relied on discourse analysis as a method (cf Anderson and Taylor 
2005, Bailly 1993, Boudreau 2007, Cameron 2008,  Crang 2009, Dempsey et al. 
2011, Eperjesi 2004, Gregory 2000a, Gregory 2000b, Hage 1996, Larner 1998, 
Lipsitz 2007, Said 1979, Whatmore and Thorne 1998). In contrast, in this project, the 
methodology of ethnography is adopted to study the spatial imaginaries of caste 
identification. Here, the collective imaginative construction of caste identity and place 





As a methodology, ethnography is particularly well suited to the study of spatial 
imaginaries since the aim is to generate what Creswell (1998: 60-61) refers to as a  
“holistic, cultural portrait of a social group”. As Creswell explains, ethnography 
employs a combination of different methods including participant observation, in-
depth interviews, and collecting narrative myths and documents. In this methodology, 
the priority is on understanding the meanings that a social group attributes to its 
language, behavior and social interactions. Through the use of ethnography, therefore, 
we can study what the spatial imaginaries of the chosen group are, how they are 
generated through collective representations, and their significance for the group and 
its members. Baszanger and Dodier (1997) identify the study of representations and 
their utilization in social interaction to be a crucial feature of contemporary 
ethnographies: 
Beyond any methodical planning of observations, the fieldworker must 
remain open in order to discover the elements making up the markers and the 
tools that people mobilize in their interactions with others and, more 
generally, with the world. By markers, we mean representations of the world, 
or normative expectations, but also the linguistic and para-linguistic 
resources that are displayed in contact with the environment… 
     Baszanger and Dodier (1997: 9) 
 
Therefore, an ethnography provides a good methodology to study not only the ‘what’ 
of a spatial imaginary, but also the ‘how’, or the process through which it is 
constructed on a group as part of mundane interactions. Through the attention to the 
meanings members attribute to these representations, ethnography also facilitates an 





Indeed ethnography is a methodology that is particularly effective in understanding 
the ‘why’ or the significance of spatial imaginaries for the people who either create 
them or are subjected to them. Another characteristic feature of ethnography is the 
expectation that the researcher will describe the representations and connect them to a 
variety of contexts. This involves juxtaposing the group’s spatial imaginaries against 
the historical and cultural background in which they occur (Creswell 1998: 60-61, 
Baszanger and Dodier 1997: 10). In addition, an attention to contexts in ethnography 
is also understood, especially where representations are concerned, as a recognition of 
the audience(s) towards whom they are directed (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 
126). 
 
It has even been argued that representations and imaginative constructions are now 
central to the business of ethnography. Appadurai (1996: 31) observes that in a global 
and modernizing world, imagination has gained an unprecedented salience in social 
life. He identifies the imagination as a social practice in contemporary times, 
something that emerges from the combination of media outputs (the image), imagined 
communities (the imagined) and collective aspirations (the imaginary). In this 
context, Appadurai (1996: 54-64) argues that ethnography itself has to change: 
“complex, partly imagined lives” now make for primary material in ethnographies. In 
evaluating this formulation of the imagination as a social practice, Mankekar (2008: 
153) reminds us of the need to consider that such imagination is not unfettered. 




and what is imagined is shaped by structural locations, which in turn affect the limits 
and form of imagination.  
 
Emergence is an important characteristic in ethnography as a methodology 
(Baszanger and Dodier 1997, Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, Boellstorff et al. 
2012) . For instance, Baszanger and Dodier (1997: 9) discuss the question of 
emergence with respect to the data collection procedures in ethnography, and 
characterize the “in situ” nature of this methodology. They argue that the 
ethnographer has to display a remarkable openness to new data.  Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1995) outline how ethnography is marked by emergence at almost all 
stages of the research, starting from the choice of research problems and settings at 
the research design stage, to the iterative and continuous process of data analysis.  
 
Although it is often assumed that no priori theoretical preparation is undertaken 
before an ethnography, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 25) argue that in fact this 
methodology is not incompatible with theory testing or development. Indeed they 
argue that ethnographies can start with a chosen theoretical framework that will be 
developed during the course of the study, and even some form of research questions 
may be developed before the researcher enters the field. At the same time, they note 
that the approach to the theoretical framework and the research questions tend to be 





In the case of the current study as well, the theoretical framework of time-space 
distanciation was explored prior the commencement of fieldwork. The relationship 
between caste identity and place through a focus on the theoretical framework of 
distanciation was a key concern for this project even in the pre-fieldwork stage. 
However, the approach to the distanciation framework and the research questions 
themselves were modified once fieldwork started. Once different groups started to be 
followed on Meerkat.com, it was observed that often competing groups from the 
same or aligned castes would make a variety of place-based claims about their caste 
identity. For instance, some Thiyya groups on Meerkat.com claimed that their origin 
in Malabar was what set them apart from the Ezhavas of the South. On the other 
hand, many Ezhava groups and groups which consisted of both Ezhavas and Thiyyas 
claimed that the north-south origin was merely a superficial one, and that it was 
essentially the same caste that was known by different names across the state of 
Kerala. In light of the multiplicity of narratives encountered on Meerkat.com, the 
focus of this study shifted from an examination of the embedding and disembedding 
of caste identity from place. In other words, the question of whether or not the 
Thiyyas of Malabar were in fact distinct from the Ezhavas of the South gradually 
ceased to be important. Instead, the project became focused on studying the narrative 
constructions of place and caste (as identification). Consequently, the project focused 
more on how the Thiyyas were being represented through reference to Malabar on a 
specific Meerkat.com group, and why it was important to the members that Thiyyas 





Baszanger and Dodier (1997: 12- 13) note that over time an important shift has 
occurred in the manner in which researchers are expected to approach the various 
forms of data generated during an ethnography. Conventionally ethnographers were 
expected to act as “mirrors” of the social worlds they were studying. By gaining 
empathetic access to way in which the group or people under observation viewed 
their world, the ethnographer was expected to ‘infiltrate the expressional universe of 
the other’ (James Clifford cited in Baszanger and Dodier 1997: 12).  
 
In recent times, however, post-structural and post-modern approaches to ethnography 
have posed a challenge to this assumption of the ethnographer as a straightforward 
mirror who simply reflects the viewpoint of the other through an empathetic 
relationship with them. In contrast, these recent developments have characterized 
ethnography as a necessarily interpretative and representational act, where the 
ethnographer is an active part of the data that is generated rather than simply an 
empathetic and supposedly neutral conduit for the voices of those who are studied. 
Further, even to generate valid interpretations of data, ethnographers need to maintain 
what Baszanger and Dodier (1997: 12) refer to as “the right distance” between their 
feelings and the perspectives of study participants.  
The observer establishes a sort of parallel between what s/he feels and what 
the people observed feel, or the phases they pass through. S/he uses a form of 
introspection to reveal how s/he develops new attitudes or borrows new roles 
and what that ‘does for him/her’. In this way, s/he has fleeting insights into 
the possible functions or meanings for the people observed, which s/he then 
tries to verify in the field, at which point s/he either recognizes their validity 
or rejects them. 





Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 124-126) resolve the problem by suggesting that 
the ethnographer often strikes a balance between ‘information’ and ‘perspective’, two 
legitimate and equally important ways of approaching the accounts of study 
participants. They argue that data is never invalid, rather it is the interpretations of 
data that can be valid or invalid. They suggest that as per the ‘information’ approach, 
data generated by the participants themselves, through accounts or narratives or 
myths, continue to be an important resource for the ethnographer. At the same time, 
they should not be accepted at face value by the ethnographer, any more than other 
sources of data would be. Consequently, it is important to balance it with the 
‘perspective’ approach to data where we use the data to learn more about the 
viewpoint of those participants who generate it.  
the two ways of reading accounts - what we might call ‘information’ and 
‘perspective’ analyses, respectively - are complementary. The same account 
can be analyzed from both angles, though in asking questions of informants 
we may have one or another concern predominantly in mind.  
Separating the question of the truth or falsity of people’s beliefs from the 
analysis of those beliefs as social phenomena allows us to treat participant’s 
knowledge as both resource and topic, and to do so in a principled way. 
    Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 126) 
 
In this study the attempt at all levels of the research including data collection, analysis 
and representation has been to strike a balance between these perspectives. For 
instance, study participants often argued that the Thiyyas were an affluent caste, both 
in online discussions and personal interviews. Yet, the fact that many Thiyyas also 
worked in menial and low paying jobs was also referenced in a separate set of 
discussions, particularly when the question of affirmative action policies were being 
discussed. Trying to achieve a balance between ‘information’ and ‘perspective’, this 




and influential especially in the urban areas of Malabar and in the diaspora, it did not 
imply that other Thiyyas were not poor. The analysis did not conclude here and these 
statements were also pursued in order to examine why it was important for the group 
members that Thiyyas be perceived as an affluent caste. As Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1995: 222-223) have pointed out, the study respondents in an ethnography 
definitely engage in impression management. However, rather than discarding the 
data as invalid due to the effort at impression management, the researcher considers 
this exercise itself as a source of data. 
 
This section provided an introduction to the metholodological approach adopted in 
the study. The following section contains a discussion of the research design and data 
collection procedures. 
 
Research Design: Data Collection and Analysis 
 
This section contains an elaboration of the manner in which the research study was 
undertaken. The approach to sampling and access to the field are discussed. It also 
contains a description of the data collection process itself. The section is concluded 







Research Setting and the Ethnographic Case: Sampling, Entry and Access 
 
In discussing ethnographic research design, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 40-42) 
make a very pertinent distinction between the research setting in which the data 
collection occurs and the case that is being studied. They note that although the term 
‘studying a setting’ is commonly used, it is a misleading representation 
In producing descriptions we always rely on criteria of selection and 
inference. There is an important sense then, in which even in the most 
descriptively oriented study the case investigated is not isomorphic with the 
setting in which it takes place. A setting is a named context in which 
phenomena occur that might be studied from any number of angles; a case is 
those phenomena seen from one particular angle. Some features of the setting 
will be given no attention at all, and even those phenomena that are the major 
focus will be looked at in a way that by no means exhausts their 
characteristics. 
    Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 41) 
 
In this study, the primary research setting was an online caste-based group named the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar which convened on Meerkat.com, a social networking 
site. The case itself, or the specific ‘angle’ through which this research setting was 
studied, can be identified as the spatial imaginaries that were produced on this 
particular online group. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 42) also point out that a 
case may not be limited to the boundaries of a particular setting. The online group has 
been deliberately identified as a “primary” research setting since members of the 
group interacted with each other and with the researcher outside the Cyber Thiyyars 
of Malabar. Apart from studying the representations on the group itself, this case was 
studied through a prolonged visit to meet members and admins in Malabar. Further, it 
was also supplemented by non-Meerkat conversations with members and admins who 





The choice of setting and case were partly influenced by the theoretical questions at 
hand, and it was to that extent a strategic one
83
. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 42-
43) observe that where the project seeks to contribute to theory development, the 
strategic choice of case and setting are important. Since the aim of the study was to 
understand how caste identification and place are linked to or re-emebedded in each 
other, I did not study a caste group which was representative of all caste groups in 
general. I chose to study a setting and case that was atypical or ‘extreme’  (Flyvbjerg 
2006) because it could provide richer information about how this association between 
caste identification and place is undertaken. Flyvbjerg (2006: 230) identifies as 
‘extreme’ those cases and settings which are unusual, either because they are 
‘problematic or especially good in a more closely defined sense’. As Flyvbjerg (2006: 
229) explains, in contrast to representative cases, an ‘extreme’ case can provide more 
and richer information because the focus of analysis shifts to studying the basic 
mechanisms of re-embedding of caste identities in place in greater detail. Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar was chosen because it was actively and explicitly engaged in 
caste identification through place. 
 
Even then, the choice of an online group may appear to be a puzzling one. It was not 
useful to merely choose a representative or typical research setting and case which 
would primarily catalogue the features common to all such associations between caste 
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 Scholars differ on whether theoretical sampling can be the basis for setting and case choice in ethnography. 
Some, such as Walford (2007) are not entirely convinced that settings and cases can be chosen on the basis of 
apriori theoretical considerations. Walford (2007)) for instance suggests that settings and cases should be chosen 
on the basis of some inherent characteristic that is unique or interesting. On the other hand, scholars such as 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995) do not think that settings and case choice should necessarily be devoid of 




identification and place, or even count the frequency of such associations. To a 
certain extent the choice of an online group - the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar - was 
deliberate since it helped highlight that castes are internally striated by economic, 
political and other interests. It is but to be expected that the form of the re-embedding 
of place and caste identity will vary due to different historic factors and social 
experiences of the members of specific and different groups within each caste. In this 
context, an online group was chosen precisely because it cannot be assumed to be a 
representative example. Rather the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar is a very peculiar 
social entity, where people are mobilizing themselves around a common caste identity 
which is under construction. The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar is, in this sense, very 
much a community of practice (Baym 2000: 21), where members engage in the shared 
practice of identity construction. The choice was also influenced by Appadurai’s 
admonition that the “ethnoscapes” of group identity “are no longer tightly 
territorialized” (1996: 48). In this way the study of an online group made the analysis 
richer: it enabled the consideration of not only how being Thiyya and being Malabari 
are co-constructed inside Malabar, but also how this process is undertaken by people 
living within as well as outside Malabar. Despite their disparate physical locations, 
the members of this group of Thiyyas were attempting to locate Thiyyaness in 
Malabar.  
 
Having noted this, it must be mentioned that as is the case with any other 
ethnography, the choice of setting and case were also influenced by pragmatic 




38) refer to as ‘casing the joint’. In this exercise, a variety of cases and settings are 
considered in order to determine factors such as suitability, the feasibility of carrying 
out research in that setting and whether access may be available. In this study as well, 
various caste-based groups on Meerkat.com were observed covertly and overtly to 
determine the fit between these settings and the research project itself. As mentioned 
in the previous section, such casing also led to the development and refinement of the 
research problem itself, since it provided exposure to the multiplicity of ways in 
which spatial narratives about caste are used for identification. 
 
I joined the social networking site Meerkat.com in 2007. Since 2011, I had been a 
“lurker” (Sanders 2005) on multiple caste-based groups on Meerkat.com. In this role, 
I was essentially a non-participating member of these groups, who observed 
interaction on these caste-based groups unobtrusively. Although by virtue of my 
membership I would have been able to gain IRB permission to analyze the content 
generated on these groups, bearing in mind the ethical concern of “informed consent” 
(Sharf 1999) as also the establishment of rapport for in-depth interviews, I formally 
requested permission from the moderators of some of these caste-based groups.  
 
Since the textual conversations on these online caste groups were often conducted in 
a mix of English and specific Indian regional languages, I decided to narrow in on 
caste groups conversing in Malayalam, the language of the state of Kerala from where 
my parents had migrated. I contacted the moderators of 5 different groups from the 




would gain entry into at least one group. Some of these groups belonged to the same 
or allied castes, while others belonged to different castes. For each group I sent in a 
customized introductory letter which outlined my basic research questions, how I 
would go about the data collection, how I would maintain privacy for the members of 
the group, and the value of the research for the group. 
 
The field of caste groups that existed on Meerkat.com was complex. Further the 
strategy of simultaneously contacting multiple groups was a risky maneuver, and I 
went about it very selectively. On the one hand, since they belonged to different 
castes most of these groups view each other suspiciously and monitor each other 
(sometimes even those that belong to the same caste) due to conflicting political 
ambitions and methods. On the other hand, some of these Meerkat.com groups were 
allied with one another. As a result, publicly failing to gain entry into one 
Meerkat.com caste group meant that I might well be rejected by other allied 
Meerkat.com caste groups.  
 
Through my experience interacting with the various caste groups on Meerkat.com, I 
learned that entry into the research setting is not the same as gaining access. 
Harrington (2003: 599) makes an important distinction between gaining entry and 
gaining access. She argues that unlike the former, gaining access specifically refers to 
the ability to acquire information. Shaffir and Stebbins (1991) further clarify access 
as the ability to negotiate for information. I learnt this lesson through my experience 




Thiyyars of Malabar. The admin on the MahaThiyyars group had initially granted 
access to the group allowing me to enter the group and also access to information 
through observing group activities and interacting with group members. However, 
soon after I was provided this access, the negotiation process went awry and my 
membership in the group was revoked arbitrarily while I was in the process of 
clarifying the project through “public”
84
 discussions on that group. However, during 
the course of my unsuccessful experience on MahaThiyyars some of the admins and 
members of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar became familiar with my project. 
Consequently, this event facilitated a robust entry discussion and the acceptance of 
my project on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. 
 
Initially, gaining access to the caste-based groups on Meerkat.com depended 
primarily on the ability to negotiate with the admins, who functioned as “formal 
gatekeepers” (Reeves 2010). Although I pushed for and engaged in a public 
conversation at the outset of the study to generate informed consent in these different 
caste groups on Meerkat.com, access eventually depended on my ability to convince 
the admins and ensure that I did not displease these powerful gatekeepers. In 
conventional ethnographies, gatekeepers may problematically provide or revoke 
access to field sites without the consent of other participants (Gajjala 2002, O’Reilly 
2009). This was also very much the case with caste groups on Meerkat.com: while 
access (or the lack of access) by the admins was crucial it did not indicate the consent 
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accessible for any member of Meerkat who was not a member of the digital group, or to people who were not 
registered on Meerkat.com. These conversations can be contrasted with the more private nature of one-on-one 




(or lack of consent) from the members of the group. During later conversations with 
those admins and members of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar who had also been a part of 
MahaThiyyars, it emerged that many people on that group had been extremely 
interested in my project and had been left non-plussed by my sudden lack of response 
to their questions. 
 
In some ways even as I initiated the first contact with admins, they were evaluating 
different aspects of who I was to consider my request for access. My own subject 
positions played a complex role in my ability to contact and access different groups. I 
found that I had to engage in a presentation of self which simultaneously emphasized 
my status as an insider as well as an outsider to the group (Chaturvedi 2011). My 
ethnic and religious background as a Syrian Christian from South Kerala was 
problematic in some of these groups because of historically strained relationship 
between these castes and this ethnic group. However, in the case of the Meerkat.com 
group which finally agreed to be part of this study, this ethnicity actually served to be 
advantageous for entry. The admins of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were far more 
concerned about me being a spy for someone from the Hindu Ezhava caste. 
Consequently they were more likely to trust someone who was a Christian, and a 
diasporic Malayalee. 
 
I also found that I had to engage in active presentation of self to not only gain access, 
but also maintain it. Harrington (2003) and Dhand (2007) have discussed how the 




For instance, I had to convince the admins of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar that I was 
not Hindu, but rather that I was a Christian, after which I was provided access to the 
group. My identity as a scholar and student from the United States provided an 
enormous amount of symbolic capital in this endeavor.  
 
Harrington (2003: 609) notes that ethnographers gain access to the extent that they 
can either demonstrate that they share a certain valued social identity with the 
participants or are seen as enhancing that identity through that research. Many of the 
admins and members of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar that I spoke to expressed 
happiness that a student from a university so far away from India was interested in 
their caste and its rituals. Anticipating this as a source of capital, I had stressed on this 
part of my identity during each attempt to contact Meerkat.com groups. In the case of 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, I had also scanned a copy of my university identity card 
to establish the authenticity of my identity as a student in the United States. Shaffir 
and Stebbins (1991) also note that access is an interactive process which necessarily 
involves negotiation for information, and it must be repeated through the course of 
the study with many different participants. For instance, in this study I had to 
negotiate not only during entry into the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar but also during 
each set of interviews I conducted.  
 
Initially, the primary formal gatekeeper Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was Murali, the 
founder-member of the group. In order to establish rapport, on my request, first 




immediately followed that post up by a post reiterating my research questions and 
encouraging members to ask me any questions they desired, with my photo id 
attached to that post. I also put up the 4 documents I had sent to the moderators on the 
“files” section of this Meerkat.com group, as one of the steps to generate informed 
consent in the group. These documents were placed in this section throughout the 
duration of the participant observation, so that new and old members could go access 
them as they wished. Further, I periodically reminded people I was doing this project 
by posting reminders on the group to read the documents and encouraging people to 
address any questions they had about my project. 
 
Murali also facilitated my introduction by posting a “Yowzza!!!” symbol on each post 
I made and reply I gave – this was an important symbolic act since it communicated 
to the rest of the members he appreciated my post and that I had been checked out. 
During the initial two weeks, I gradually answered questions raised by the admins and 
members about the project. I had hoped that this act of inciting discussion regarding 
my project on the relatively public discussion board, rather than through the more 
private means of exchanging messages, would help disseminate news about my 
presence and make it easier for me to interact with members at a later stage. 
 
Like access, generating informed consent was a continuous process through various 
stages of the study. Apart from sharing details about my project at the outset of my 
entry into the group, I also reiterated the study objectives during successive 




used occasions when members would describe or refer to my project as an event for 
periodically generating informed consent on the group as a whole by clarifying and 
reiterating the research goals.  
 
Procedures of Data Collection and Analysis 
 
This dissertation involves the study of an online group. Consequently, it can be 
characterized within the category of netnography (Kozinets 1998, Kozinets 2006), 
which is defined as an “ethnography conducted on the Internet; a qualitative 
interpretive research methodology that adapts traditional, in-person ethnographic 
research techniques of anthropology to the study of the online cultures and 
communities formed through computer-mediated communications” (Kozinets 2006 : 
193). The term virtual ethnography (Hine 2000) is also used to refer to such studies. 
Although these ethnographies involve the study of cultures or communities enabled 
by computer mediated communications, over time scholars have become reluctant to 
characterize themselves as virtual ethnographers (Boellstorff et al. 2012). In part, 
such reluctance stems from the tendency to erroneously interpret terms such as 
netnography or virtual ethnography as studies that lack any offline interaction. To that 
extent, these terms should be applied cautiously to this study since online interaction 
and participation was combined with a significant amount of offline interaction with 





In this study, data was collected through interactions both within the online forum in 
Meerkat.com, as well as through interactions outside of Meerkat.com. While the 
“net” in netnography might imply that all interaction is limited to online encounters, it 
has been observed by other scholars (Hine 2005) that a combination of both online 
and offline participative and interactional mechanisms is desirable in this approach. 
From the perspective of the researcher utilizing this mix of interactions generates two 
key advantages- it facilitates rapport with the respondents from settings that are 
otherwise difficult to access (Sanders 2005) and enables a richer analysis of the 
respondents themselves (Mackay 2005). Consequently, I lived in the region of 
Malabar during the month of November 2013. Since the founding admin and many 
members I had been in touch with hailed from the district of Kannur, I lived in 
Kannur City. During this visit, I lived in the historic area of Talap, which co-
incidentally was a Thiyya stronghold. Apart from this I also travelled to other cities in 
Malabar (Kozhikode, Thalassery), Kerala (Thiruvananthapuram, Cochin), India (New 
Delhi) to meet with members and admins. In addition, I also interacted with members 
and admins through text chats and video and telephone conversations.  
 
The interaction which occurred outside the parameters of Meerkat.com was crucial in 
developing rapport with group members and admins - they could connect a face to the 
posts and documents I had uploaded on Meerkat.com. These interactions also enabled 
me to get a better sense of who these people were, and to situate what they said and 
did on the group in the context of their everyday lives. Further, my stay in Malabar in 




offline interconnections of friendship and kinship existed between people hailing 
from the district of Kannur on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. This interconnection is 
consistent with the observations made by Wellman and Gulia (1999), who noted that 
very often there exists some degree of correspondence between people’s online and 
offline ties.  
 
This study involved two primary procedures of data collection. First, I undertook 
participant observation on the online forum in Meerkat.com, where I observed and 
participated in various public conversations as they occurred on Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar between August 2012 and October 2013. While the frequency of my own 
posts was most intense between the period August 2012 - January 2013, I continued 
to observe the group until October 2013. Second, I conducted in-depth interviews 
with key members of the group outside of Meerkat.com by means of face-to-face, 
telephonic and video chat conversations. In-depth personal interviews were conducted 
in two rounds - between October 2012- March 2013 and July 2013 - August 2013.  
 
The combination of these procedures, and the time lag involved in the participant 
observation and the successive rounds of interviews were deliberately designed to 
improve validity of study. Creswell (1998: 211) identifies the collection and 
comparison of information from different phases of fieldwork and from different 
temporal cycles in the setting as an important source of validity. In the current study, 
it also facilitated a narrowing of the focus in data collection. For instance, at the point 




extremely popular on the group. However, within 6 months, this theory was being 
questioned on the group and Thiyyaness was being formulated differently where the 
Kyrgyztan narrative was increasingly melded within the Malabari origin narrative. 
The combination of data collection procedures and the time lag incorporated into the 
research design made it possible to capture both the significance of the Kyrgyztan 
theory of origin and the shift in the spatial narrative itself.   
 
Boellstorff et al. (2012: 4) also raise the point that terms such as virtual ethnography, 
online ethnography and digital ethnography are merely conversational rather than 
strictly academic. They argue that ethnography does not fundamentally change when 
applied to the study of online interaction to justify the adoption of separate terms such 
as netnography, online ethnography, digital ethnography or virtual ethnography. 
Boellstorff et al. (2012) argue that ethnography in its conventional understanding as a 
methodology is well-suited to studying online interactions, although some specific 
features need more attention than if the setting was based in a bounded location such 
as a village or a city.   
 
The emphasis on textuality is one such specific feature that becomes significant in the 
context of the present study, partly due to the research questions and partly due to the 
primary research setting itself. In this study, the textual approach towards the online 
group was influenced by the research questions at hand, since the aim was to 
understand the manner in which caste identity and place were represented through 




were the focus of the study. Since this was a group was enabled by computer-
mediated communication, much of the “talk” between the geographically dispersed 
members and admins took the form of textual conversations on Meerkat.com. These 
textual conversations provided important insights into the spatial imaginaries of 
members. Consequently, attention to textuality has larger significance in this study 
than in other ethnographies, although this should not imply that the actions of the 
members and admins of the group were considered to be irrelevant. Of course, apart 
from the textual conversations between group members, a variety of documents and 
images were also shared on the group. I also explored the documents and pictures 
uploaded by the members of the group, and the discussion generated around these 
documents. I was aware of the intertexuality of the digital texts (Mitra and Cohen 
1999: 182) on this site – often newspaper articles, other digital texts and hyperlinks- 
containing significant spatial references were uploaded and discussed on Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar. 
 
In this study, both types of textual products were approached through the 
conventional perspective towards the ethnographic study of texts. In this perspective, 
the focus is not restricted to the context of the text, but also includes the 
circumstances of its production and circulation (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 
173, Titscher et al. 2000, Atkinson and Coffey 1997). Although textual analysis 
seems to be located at the fringes of conventional ethnographic research, Atkinson 




of the manner in which many contemporary groups and organizations are 
progressively representing themselves collectively through a variety of texts. 
 
In ethnographic research, data collection follows the “funnel” structure (Hammersley 
and Atkinson 1995: 206). In this structure, the research initially focuses on broad 
research questions which narrow down to more specifically formulated problems over 
time. A concurrent shift is likely to occur with the data collection focus as well. The 
current study also followed this funnel structure. At the outset of participant 
observation and interviews, since the problem was defined more broadly, data were 
collected regarding multiple spatial themes of caste origin about places such as 
Malabar, Kygyztan, Sri Lanka and Greece. However, as time progressed it became 
clear that caste narratives regarding Malabar were the most enduring in the group. 
This led to a narrowing of the research question. It also led to a concentration on 
different narratives about Malabar in terms of data collection.  
 
In this study I explored the spatial imaginaries on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar by 
focusing specifically on origin narratives on the group. Consequently, from the early 
stages itself, the focus was on the above mentioned places in both participant 
observation as well as during interviews. Apart from these places, members also 
talked about other places, particularly referring to Kerala. However, in this study I did 
not explicitly focus on Kerala since the group did not apply an origin narrative. 
Although at the outset this lack of focus on Kerala might seem like a disadvantage, it 




throughout the study. In fact, by not focusing on Kerala as a unitary spatial entity, but 
rather as something that encompasses both Malabar and South Kerala, places which 
were widely divergent form the perspective of group members, this study presents a 
more detailed, albeit indirect, portrait of the group’s spatial imaginary of Kerala itself. 
 
i. Participant observation 
 
I started data collection for the study through participant observation of the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar. I had started my observations in mid-August 2012, even as I 
was negotiating entry to the group and describing the project to members. I was 
added on to the group by Murali, with whom I had gained an acquaintance on 
MahaThiyyars. 
 
Although I joined the group in August 2012, I was able to access a partial transcript 
of the public discussions since its inception in January 2012. This insight into the 
history of the group was an advantage stemming from the textual nature of online 
ethnography, which may not be available in a conventional ethnography. I refer to 
this transcript as a partial one since like most digital texts in Meerkat.com it was open 
to modification over time. To begin with admins may have deleted some public posts 
before I joined the group. Further, members may have themselves modified 
conversation threads and posts uploaded by them. Finally, some posts may have been 





Silva (2002) argues that a major question that is raised about ethnography of online 
interaction is whether observation in the ethnographic sense is possible.  She refers to 
Baym (2000) who argued that unlike conventional ethnographies, here the researcher 
is present in the setting for a limited amount of time, and may often not have 
information about the lives of the subjects. Baym resolves the problem in two ways: 
by conceptualizing online groups as communities of practice who are engaged in 
some common projects, and by adopting discourse analysis as an important 
theoretical tool. In other words, researchers can observe the projects that members of 
the groups participate in as a collectivity, and the manner in which they participate in 
them. This form of observation of course, highlights people who participate in visible 
ways. This can be addressed if we take an expanded view of the participation of 
members, not only in terms of engaging in conversations, but also taking into account 
other forms such as uploading pictures, or sharing of non-linguistic symbols. For 
instance, in the current study I noted not only the public conversations on the group, 
but also how other members participated in alternate ways, such as those who only 
added photographs, or only added new members to the group. These members were 
then also included within the pool of interview respondents. 
 
Within this approach however, it is also difficult to observe dissent or those who 
refuse to participate. Here, Baym's suggestion of paying attention to the form of 
discourse on groups may be helpful. Attention to talk, or textual participation, is an 
important aspect of participant observation in ethnographies of online worlds or 




stopped from talking can also address problems of participant observation online. 
Consequently I paid attention to those people whose posts had not been well received 
on the group, and what it is about the posts that had caused displeasure. Here it also 
helped that I had combined participant observation with ethnographic interviews. In a 
similar vein, Mitra and Cohen (1999) use the metaphor of “voice” to study online 
interaction and suggest the adoption of a critical textual analysis approach towards 
studying interaction online. They identify three components of a critical textual 
analysis of text produced online – what is said, what is its impact and what does it say 
about the communities that consume and produce that text. 
 
On the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, my involvement veered towards observation more 
than participation. The distinction between participation and observation is, to a 
certain extent, one that is artificially created. After all, even when a researcher 
participates in the research setting, he or she is participating to a specific desired end, 
which is to gain access to information. In this sense, participation always entails 
observation. 
 
It would then be better to clarify that by participation, I refer to activity that was 
publicly visible to all members on the group, such as public posts that I had initiated 
or my responses to other’s posts. Due to my own insider-outsider status and the 
extreme suspicion that existed on most caste groups on Meerkat.com, I asked very 
basic questions through such public posts on Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. I started my 




important aspects of being Thiyya, or how they themselves would like to represent 
Thiyyas. I did so by soliciting and observing how they explained things about the 
Thiyya caste to a relative outsider like me. I noted what aspects of being Thiyya they 
emphasized upon. Through these posts, I was also trying to understand some of the 
key concerns about Thiyyas on the group. Further, I also tried to gain some insights 
into the visible spatial narratives on the group, such as the way in which members had 
previously connected Thiyyas to Malabar, Kyrzgytan, Sri Lanka and Greece in their 
posts.   
 
As a non-Thiyya, my primary identity on the group was understood to be that of a 
researcher. In this capacity, I also specifically participated on the group by sharing 
academic literature on the Thiyya caste. Through this form of participation, 
particularly through the manner in which members responded to the literature, I 
started to understand how members and admins on the group wanted Thiyyas to be 
represented, and also why it was important that they be represented in particular 
ways. For instance, the main criteria of evaluation of such texts, was whether, 
according to the members, the author(s) had noted that Thiyyas and Ezhavas were 
different castes. The members would sometimes thank me for the literature I had 
shared and refer to specific passages which may note the status difference between 
the two castes. Through this interaction, I started to understand that the distinction 
between Thiyyas and Ezhavas was important for these members at least in part due to 




instances where the same members may argue that status differences in caste were not 
important to them. 
 
The extent to which I participated publicly in group discussions varied over time. For 
instance, at the time of my introduction and in its immediate aftermath, my 
participation on the group was much more intense. However, once I started to 
conduct in-depth interviews, I emphasized more on observation rather than 
participation in Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. To a certain extent, this decision was 
influenced by practical considerations - when I was travelling in India to conduct 
interviews I found it difficult to access the online forum of Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar due to lack of electricity and internet connectivity.  
 
More significantly, I also varied the mix between participation and observation on the 
group based on what I considered to be the particular requirements for information at 
different points in time. For instance, during my introduction, and for a while 
afterwards, I was trying to achieve various objectives which necessitated a more 
intense degree of participation.  Towards this end, I either uploaded posts regularly on 
the group, or shared academic literature. Apart from trying to access attitudes to caste 
and place on the group, during this period, I was also trying to understand the 
structure of interactions of the group. Consequently, I noted the different ways 
through which people participated in the group, who was allowed to speak and what 
was allowed to be spoken. In other words, I was developing a feel for some of the 




public participation on the group, I was also, of course, engaged in the continuous 
generation of informed consent and access (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991). Through 
these interactions, I wanted myself to be visible to the members, so that I could 
interact with them in more private conversations.  
 
However, after I had had a chance to observe the pattern of interaction to my posts for 
a couple of months, I realized that public posts on the group were not a particularly 
rich source of information. Through public interactions what I had access to were the 
dominant narratives on the group. Moreover, I observed that some admins and 
members were able to steer the conversation away from those who were less reticent 
or those who held more subversive views. As a result, after the initial months I 
stressed far more on observation of the group, and my participation was mostly, but 
not exclusively, restricted to one-on-one interactions with people on the group.  
 
Through public participation and observation, I was engaged in what Hammersley 
and Atkinson (1995:45) refer to “sampling within the case”. In particular, I paid 
attention to “talk” about origin narratives on the group, and what people said about 
these places of origin. By observing how and what people discussed on the group, and 
the documents and images they shared on the group, I recorded what the members 
said about different places of origin in their posts. For instance, in what the context 
did they discuss Malabar or Greece or Kyrgyzstan or Sri Lanka? Or what kind of 
pictures or news articles were they sharing on the group? In this manner, I was able to 




was able to record things such as how the members on the group represent the 
Thiyyas as a caste, how they represent the interactions between Thiyyas, and other 
castes. This included their references to the Ezhavas who were particularly vilified on 
the group. Apart from that, I also followed how other castes such as the Nairs and 
Brahmins were referred to on the group, because even though the focus was on the 
Ezhavas, it was clear that these conventionally higher ranking groups were certainly 
part of the frame of reference. Finally, I also followed the manner in which the group 
referred to other religious minorities, since it was clear from posts on the group that 
Muslims and Christians were considered to be competitors to the Thiyyas. In this 
manner, even though I had not originally included it within the research design, I 
started to pay attention to the emergent theme of the manner in which the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar were constructing a complex identity as Hindus in both Malabar 
and Kerala. 
 
In the ethnographic approach, texts, whether as documents or as more mundane 
conversations, are never considered to be just “transparent representations” (Atkinson 
and Coffey 1997: 47).  Consequently data collection focuses on production (who 
created the text, why was the text created) of the texts as well as their circulation and 
reception (who reads them, for what purpose) (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 173, 
Titscher et al. 2000, Atkinson and Coffey 1997). Further, in the ethnographic 
approach, the analysis of context is an integral component of text analysis (Titscher et 





Initially, participant observation enabled me to understand some of the ways in which 
the group connected caste with place, and why this connection was being made. For 
instance, at the time that I was engaged in intensely publicly participating in group 
conversations, the group was vigorously discussing the theory that Thiyyas originated 
from Kyrgyztan. Consequently, I was able to access the collective spatial imaginaries 
on the group, narratives about the caste which were acceptable for public discussion. 
As a method of data collection, participant observation primarily gave me insight into 
the production of the text of the group. In other words, I got some sense of who said 
what about Thiyyas or Malabar. This method was of limited significance when it 
came to understanding why these posts were put up. Similarly, it provided limited 
understanding about the circulation of the text, or how these posts were received by 
others on the group. It was necessary to combine participant observation with 
interviews in order to get a deeper understanding of the production and circulation of 
texts, as well as their context. 
 
Through participant observation, I was also making other choices for sampling within 
the case. I was paying attention to what type and form of discussion were welcomed 
on the group and how deviation from the dominant representation of Thiyyas was 
dealt with on the group. This facilitated sampling for interviews and more covert one-







ii. In-depth interviews:  
 
For data collection, in addition to participant observation this study relied extensively 
on ethnographic interviews. I conducted in-depth interviews with members and 
admins of the group outside of Meerkat.com by means of face-to-face, telephonic and 
video chat conversations. In-depth personal interviews were conducted in two rounds 
- between October 2012- March 2013 and July 2013 - August 2013. I was 
simultaneously undertaking participant observation between August 2012 and 
October 2013.  
 
Although in the conventional understanding, an ethnography is associated heavily 
with participant observation, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 131) encourage the 
use of interviews as a data collection procedure wherever it is viable. They see 
interviews as an important method through which the ethnographic researcher can 
generate data which may otherwise be difficult to access. Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1995: 130-132) insist that participant observation and ethnographic interviews 
supplement each other in important ways. The researcher’s experience as an observer 
can affect how he or she interprets what people say in interviews. At the same time, 
what one hears in interviews can affect what is observed in the field.   
 
In this project, ethnographic interviewing facilitated a deeper understanding of what 
was being observed in the primary research setting. In particular, during the 




about caste and place on Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Miller and Glassner (1997: 100) 
argue that one of the strengths of non-positivistic interviews is that it provides access 
to the meanings that people associate with their experiences and social worlds. I used 
the interviews to understand the ‘why’ of the posts and documents shared on the 
group. To begin with, interviews gave me an opportunity to explore what meaning 
was attributed to the posts by those who shared them on the group. For instance, 
when I observed that Siddharth had uploaded a post on “colonization” of land in 
Malabar, at the outset it seemed as if he was concerned about the ownership of land in 
Malabar. In a private interview he also explained what motivated him to upload the 
post on the group. It became clear that rather than ownership of land per se, he was 
using the language of “colonization” to refer to communicate his anxiety about the 
progressive influence of the SNDP and Ezhava migrants in Malabar. 
 
Apart from this, the interviews also enabled me to understand the circulation of the 
texts. In other words, I was able to understand the variety of ways in which the posts 
and documents were received by those who read them. The interviews were 
invaluable in capturing the ways in which people responded to posts, particularly 
their subversive readings which would not have been welcomed on the group. For 
instance, Shantanu had uploaded a post comparing the inherent selfishness of Ezhavas 
stemming from the selfish culture of South Kerala with the sacrificing nature of the 
Thiyyas which he argued stemmed from the sacrifice culture of Malabar. When 
Shantanu had uploaded this post, it had been met mostly with positive encouragement 




differed from it in various ways and yet were reluctant to record their objection to it 
publicly on the group. I was able to gain an understanding of such readings through 
ethnographic interviews. 
 
Within ethnography, participant observation and interviews are not always 
understood as complementary procedures. Participant observation has its roots in 
naturalism, while interviewing is often perceived to be a more artificial interaction 
outside of the research setting. However, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 140) 
argue that the very “artificiality” of the interview can be used to clarify aspects of the 
research setting. Further, Miller and Glassner (1997: 103) observe that during 
interviews researchers can start to develop an understanding of the ‘anxiety, 
ambivalence, and uncertainty that lie behind the respondents’ conformity’. 
Consequently, by observing how respondents act during an interview outside of the 
setting, the researcher can gain a better understanding of the setting and their behavior 
in it.   
 
For instance, during my interviews with Suvinay, an admin on Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar, he shared his anxiety and frustration that by using terms such as “inferior” 
to describe “Ezhavas”, some people on the group were engaging in discriminatory 
behavior. He shared that although he had tried to stop people from engaging in this 
form of discourse, he had been unsuccessful and had become restrained in his own 
participation in the group for a while. Although he was an admin, Suvinay was 




which was somewhat distinct from the dominant mode of discussion on the group.  
Through this interview I was able to better understand Suvinay’s perspective as well 
as the group itself.  
 
In conducting the interviews I combined both the ‘information’ and ‘perspective’ 
approaches suggested by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 124-126). At the same 
time, in deciding my approach to the interview respondents I was influenced by 
Holstein and Gubrium (1997:117) suggestion that rather than viewing the respondent 
as a passive vessel of information researchers should try to discover the “subject 
behind the respondent”. They argue that the respondent-subjects are, in 
communicating their experiences to the researcher, are also simultaneously creating 
it. Further, I operated on the understanding that since each interview is an 
interactional event, the respondents will not replicate answers to the same questions 
on different occasions (Holstein and Gubrium 1997: 117). I was also aware that both 
the interviewee and interviewer are acknowledged as participants in the process of 
meaning making, and a different listener may get a different response, not in the least 
due to who the interviewer is in terms of gender, class (Miller and Glassner 1997: 
101) and in this case, caste and regional origin. 
 
Similar to participant observation, ethnographic interviewing also involves “sampling 
within the case” Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:45).  For the interviews I had to 





In sampling for people, I used a combination of both ‘member identified categories’ 
(folk categories) and ‘observer identified categories’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1995:50) in sampling for people. For instance, in my sample of thirty five people, I 
wanted to include both admins and members which are member identified categories. 
As mentioned earlier, not only did I interview people who participated actively in 
public discussions on the group, but also those who would be considered to be “not 
active” because they participated in alternate ways such as through sharing 
photographs or adding members to the group.  
 
Apart from this, I also employed my own categories for respondent sampling. For 
instance, I tried to interview those who resided in urban areas, diaspora members, as 
well as people who resided in more rural areas. I also wanted to make this sample 
“representative”. Apart from hearing from those who represented the dominant voices 
on the group, such as the admins and members aligned with the Malabar Thiyya 
Mahasabha (MTMS), I wanted to talk to people who held contrary attitudes. I was 
able to locate such members by observing the pattern of conversation on the group. I 
observed that every once in a while people would post photographs or texts which 
generated tremendous opposition on the group. For instance, in January 2013 one 
such dispute arose when a female member uploaded a public post complaining that 
the group was engaging in discriminatory remarks against Ezhavas. She was 
immediately chastised by the admins and some other members, and temporarily 
removed from the group before being re-instated. Meanwhile, some others, who had 




commenting or through the “Yowzza!!!” symbol. Although the original post was 
actually deleted from the group, I was able to include some of these oppositional 
voices in my study. Finally, I also tried to include a wide range of political 
affiliations. In the sample, I included those who supported the MTMS, and those who 
were ambivalent towards it. Apart from including the voices of those who opposed 
the SNDP, I also interviewed those who were not entirely averse to SNDP. I also 
interviewed members who identified themselves through a pro-Dalit approach. 
Further, I included those who identified themselves as supporting the Congress, the 
Hindu Right as well as the CPI(M).  
 
The selection of who to talk to was not an easy one and I learned to be careful about 
mentioning the composition of the interview sample with others. For one thing, some 
of the formal gatekeepers, such as some admins on the group, were initially under the 
impression that they could use the interviews as a way to spy on others on the group. I 
maneuvered myself out of these situations by pleading (successfully and truthfully) 
that my hands were tied by ethical considerations imposed by the University IRB. In 
some cases, such as in the instance of the dispute mentioned above, I would lie about 
being in contact with these “errant” members. I wanted to include their perspectives 
in the study, but did not want to violate their confidentiality. More importantly, I also 
wanted to avoid giving these powerful gatekeepers the impression that I was plotting 
against the group itself. Some gatekeepers also specifically tried to influence 
respondent selection by either suggesting that I interview a particular person, or by 




Malabar. However, as Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:133) note it is important for 
the researcher to retain leeway in choosing informants. I was fairly successful in 
doing so, unless the people I wished to speak with opted themselves not to grant me 
an interview.  
 
In ethnographic interviews, sampling within the case also involves choosing what to 
discuss in the interview. In the interviews I encouraged members to discuss how they 
perceived their caste and the different theories of origin. Apart from this, as 
mentioned earlier, in interviews I also referred to specific events or referred to posts 
that I had encountered during participant observation as discussion topics. In this 
manner, there was a very important iterative process as regards to participant 
observation and interviews since I continuously drew on the conversations on the 
group to structure interviews.  
 
In the interviews, the questions were intended to trigger discussions (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995: 151-2, Holstein and Gubrium 1997: 12-123) about caste, place and 
the relationship that members may draw between them. In this sense they tended to be 
mostly directed, although non-directed questions were also employed. I also tried to 
strike a balance between generating some structure and keeping the format of the 
conversation open to the exploration of new themes and sub-themes. Although the 
questions varied on different occasions and did not follow a fixed sequence, I did 
enter each conversation with a list of topics I wanted to cover (Hammersley and 





The interviews were conducted in three languages - English, Malayalam and Hindi - 
based on the preference of the respondents. The interviews were mostly conducted on 
a one-to-one basis. However, in some cases members preferred to have other people 
present during interviews. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:133) observe that while 
the presence of others may actually encourage discussion in some cases, it may create 
distractions in other cases. For instance, when I went to visit Harish in his Kannur 
home, he asked Murali to escort me to the house. Once we reached there, Harish 
wanted Murali to be part of the interview as well. The interview provided richer data 
since the interaction between the two admins created a good dynamic. I also 
supplemented this interview with others where I was able to talk to Harish on a one-
on-one basis. However, in the case of Samrat, I conducted the interview at his 
Thiruvanathapuram home where he lived with his ageing mother. In this interview, 
the presence of Samrat’s mother served more as a distraction particularly when we 
would discuss events in the group. Since Samrat’s mother was not part of the group, 
and felt excluded, she would steer the conversation away from those topics. 
 
I conducted two rounds of interviews as part of this study. One of the motivating 
factors was that I wanted to observe changes over time Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1995:136), both in terms of group composition as well as events and discussions. 
Conducting two rounds of interviews allowed me to include references to a set of 
events and topics that had come up over a period of time on the group. Further, it also 




new members who were heavily involved in discussions on the group.  With most 
respondents, I conducted interviews at least twice. In the case of some respondents, 
such as Suriya, I actually conducted 4-5 interviews due to a variety of factors. In the 
first interview, Suriya was extremely wary of me and due to lack of rapport his 
responses barely went beyond “yes” or “no”. However he gave me permission to visit 
him a few more times. On those occasions the dynamic improved after I engaged in 
some self-disclosure and discussed my own concerns against caste discrimination 
which were broadly complementary to his pro-Dalit perspective. As noted by 
(Harrington 2003: 598), in ethnographic research, the researcher gains access through 
different presentations of self with different people. For instance, I would not have 
engaged in such a pro-Dalit presentation of self with other members of the group 
since they were antagonistic towards it. In most interviews, I tried to present myself 
as a “researcher” who was neither too closely aligned with the mainstream opinions 
on the group nor with any particular minority opinions (Miller and Glassner 1997: 
103) 
 
iii. Data analysis:  
 
Due to the emergent nature of ethnographic research, the analysis of data is neither a 
distinct stage nor something that only occurs at the very end of the research process. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 205) observe that in ethnography the analysis of 
data is conducted continuously: it starts from the pre-fieldwork stage, continues 




to the process of writing articles and books. Consequently, I have outlined pertinent 
issues regarding data analysis in all of the preceding sections in this chapter. 
 
Fieldnotes and analytic memos are important tools in the formal analysis of data in 
ethnography. As I was engaged in the process of participant observation, I took notes 
about what I was observing and what I thought was occurring on the Cyber Thiyyars 
of Malabar. Transcription of interviews was also an important part of the analytical 
process and although tedious it turned out to be useful that I personally transcribed all 
the interviews. Transcription not only helped me listen to each respondents’ narrative, 
but also helped me focus on thematic patterns I could observe in these conversations. 
In addition, I also drew up analytic memos periodically, where I tried to sketch out 
themes and ideas based on the review of my fieldnotes and interview transcripts. 
Since I conducted interviews over two phases, I was able to go back and check some 
of analytic ideas such as the distinction between “OBC” and “backward” as having 
different semantic values for the respondents. This sort of analytic checking and 
testing are consistent with what Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 206) refer to as the 
“funnel” structure of ethnographic research.  
 
I drew on the interview transcripts, documents circulated on Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar and my analytic memos to code for “analytic categories” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995: 208). I used both “member identified categories” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995: 50, 211), such as the category of “Ezhavanization” as used by the 




(ibid) which were based on my analysis as well as the literature I had reviewed, such 
as the category of “substantialization”. 
 
I formally coded for categories in three successive rounds. Initially I coded the texts 
to develop basic categories. In the first two stages, I was using the data to “think 
with” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 210), considering how it would relate based 
on my common-sense knowledge as well as the theoretical basis of the study. Apart 
for checking for interesting patterns, I was also analyzing obvious contradictions 
among different sets of respondents as well as among contexts (for instance, what was 
said in public versus what was said in private). In these successive rounds of coding, 
new categories were also generated, and I had to go back to the data and code for 
these new categories. By the second round of coding, I tried to ensure that all the data 
was coded in terms of the list of categories I had drawn up. In the next round, I went 
through a process of picking and choosing from this large body of categories, since 
not all of them were relevant to the particular research questions at hand.  
 
Subsequently, I tried to sharpen and improve the focus of these categories by 
comparing them with other categories. Through this I was able to generate sub-
categories. Further, this comparison also helped me to think through the relationship 
between these categories. Although this process of sifting and comparison seems to 
be similar to Glaser and Strauss’ constant comparative method, Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1995: 214) note that it is not quite as induction-reliant. A list of the 





Introduction to Interview Respondents 
 
This final section consists of a brief introduction to 35 people on Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar who participated in the study through in-depth personal interviews. Apart 
from these members and admins, I also interacted with others on a less in-depth basis. 
Their details are not included in this table. One member who had previously granted a 
series of extended interviews chose not to be a part of the study at a later point. 
Details regarding this member are not included in this table. 
 
Table 2- Descriptive Summary of Respondents 
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Chapter 4: The Spatial Imaginaries of Identifying Caste: Time-
Space Distanciation and Re-embedding Thiyya Identity in 
Malabar 
 
This chapter includes an examination of the manner in which Thiyya caste identity is 
re-embedded in the region of Malabar on the digital group, the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar. In studying the form and motivations for re-embedding, I argue that the 
distanciation of caste identity, or its disembedding and re-embedding from places, 
needs to be studied not only in terms of the experience of place, but also in terms of 
its representation through places. It is demonstrated that the concepts of 
disembedding and re-embedding can be understood through the perspective of 
representation, by analyzing the form in which Thiyya identity is articulated through 
reference to the region of Malabar. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 describes the emergence of a 
disembedded form of identification of the Thiyyas, specifically as it is constructed by 
the state government of Kerala. Through such an identification, the representation of 
Thiyyaness in terms of the region of Malabar is delegitimized. Instead, a different 
representation, wherein the Thiyyas are subsumed under the Ezhava caste, and where 





Section 2 demonstrates the manner in which the digital group, Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar, engages in a re-embedding of Thiyya identity in the region of Malabar. This 
section consists of the analysis of the identification of caste on the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar by exploring the spatial imaginaries of the group, as well as its members. 
Specifically, this section provides an analysis of how the group and its members 
discursively construct Thiyya identity by connecting it to the region of Malabar. The 
significance of the establishment and naming of the group is discussed in the first 
part. Next, the manner in which Thiyyaness is constructed through imaginative 
geographies on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar is examined. Here, being Thiyya is 
constructed in explicit opposition to being Ezhava by associating the former caste 
with Malabar and the latter caste with South Kerala. Finally, the analysis ends with 
the consideration of how Thiyyaness is represented through a positive association 
with the perceived defining characteristics of Malabar and through a negative 
association with the perceived defining characteristics of South Kerala.  
 
Section 3 outlines the manner in which the disembedded identification of caste itself 
influences the re-embedding of Thiyya identity with the region of Malabar. The 
analysis starts with a consideration of how the project of re-embedding is motivated 
by a response to the prejudice generated by how people from other castes identify the 
Thiyyas, through cultural evaluations of the disembedded category of “backward”. 
Next, the immediate impetus for the re-embedding of Thiyya identity in Malabar is 




the nation-state identifies them as part of the disembedded category of Other 
Backward Classes (OBC), and the material outcomes of such identification. 
 
The symbolic token of knowing caste: The emergence of a disembedded Thiyya 
identity separate from Malabar 
 
The Thiyyas of Malabar and the Ezhavas of South Kerala have long been constructed 
as synonymous or equivalent castes in the academic literature as well as in the 
popular imagination in Kerala. Although the Thiyyas and Ezhavas have been known 
to observe status differences between them with the former claiming a higher caste 
ranking (Thurston 1909, Nossiter 1982, Gopinath 1993, Kodoth 2001, Mailaparambil 
2012), much of the literature understands them to be the same caste that goes by 
different names in different regions (Hardgrave Jr 1964, Abraham 2010, Nag 1989, 
Osella and Osella 2000).  
 
The colonial administrator Edgar Thurston (1909: 36-39) notes that although status 
differences were observed between the Thiyyas and Ezhavas
85
, an equation among 
these castes seems to have been enforced by higher ranking castes in the recording of 
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 Thurston (1909: 40) makes the following observations regarding the display of caste differences through the 
exchange of food between Thiyyas and Ezhavas: “An Izhuvan will eat rice cooked by a Tiyan, but a Tiyan will not 
eat rice cooked by an Izhuvan — a circumstance pointing to the inferiority of the Izhuvan. A Nayar, as well as a 
Tiyan, will partake of almost any form of food or drink, which is prepared even by a Mappilla (Malabar 
Muhammadan), who is deemed inferior to both. But the line is drawn at rice, which must be prepared by one of 
equal caste or class, or by a superior. An Izhuvan, partaking of rice at a Tiyan's house, must eat it in a verandah; he 
cannot do so in the house, as that would be defilement to the Tiyan. Not only must the Izhuvan eat the rice in the 
verandah, but he must wash the plates, and clean up the place where he has eaten. Again, an Izhuvan could have 




land deeds. On the other hand, Kodoth (2001) argues that despite the observance of 
status differences, it was the colonial and post-colonial administrators who 
categorized both castes as being of equivalent rank. She argues that this equation was 
based on the assumption that the Thiyyas and the Ezhavas share the same so-called 
hereditary occupation of toddy tapping. As indicated in Chapter 1, scholars have 
noted that in Malabar, the Thiyyas have actually been engaged in a variety of other 
occupations such as quarrying, agricultural labour, port labour and military service 
atleast since the 1500s (Dale 1980, Mailaparambil 2012). 
 
To a certain extent, the place-embedded construction of the Thiyyas and Ezhavas was 
likely to have been strengthened during the colonial period since these regions were 
administered by different regimes. At the very least, Thiyyas and Ezhavas 
experienced differential levels of social mobility under these regimes. Malabar, the 
region where the Thiyyas are concentrated, was administered directly under the 
Madras Presidency by the British colonial regime. Historians such as Gopinath (1993) 
and Mailaparambil (2012) observe that during the colonial period, Thiyyas in 
Malabar claimed a non-polluting status because they occupied an economically and 
ritually higher status than the Ezhavas in South Kerala. Under the British regime, the 
Thiyyas achieved considerable mobility and were not accorded the benefits of 
affirmative action (Menon 1994). This regional disparity has also been noted by 
others  
Under British administration the Tiyyas of the North did not suffer the 
disadvantages of their counterparts in Travancore in seeking admission to 
education or government service. Further, social and economic disadvantages 
did not run along caste lines to quite the same extent as in the South. 





In contrast, southern Kerala, where the Ezhavas are concentrated, was administered in 
the form of two distinct princely states - Travancore and Cochin. In these regions, the 
Ezhavas were accorded the benefits of affirmative action from 1935 onwards, through 
their classification as a “backward” caste (Osella and Osella 2000: 211).  
 
In the popular imagination itself, the Thiyyas have been understood as aligned with 
the Ezhavas at least since the early decades of the 20
th
 century. In 1906, the Thiyya 
elite in Malabar aligned themselves with Sri Narayana Guru and invited him to 
establish three temples in Malabar. Menon (1994) notes that although elite Thiyyas in 
the urban centres of Thalassery and Kannur were fairly well aligned with these 
temples, Thiyyas in the rural areas were not as well incorporated within this new 
system of worship. It has also been observed that although aligned with Sri Narayana 
Guru, the Thiyyas were reluctant allies and late entrants in the temple entry reform 
movement initiated by him (Nossiter 1982, Menon 1994). Today the Thiyyas are 
broadly considered as aligned with the Ezhava caste under the aegis of the Sri 
Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDP). This popular identification of the 
Thiyyas as part of the Ezhava caste also seems to have been cemented by the 
accordance of affirmative action benefits to the former in decade of the 1960s. It was 
in this decade, during the R Shankar regime in Kerala (1962-1964), that the Thiyyas 
were identified by the state government as an OBC caste. The Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar themselves acknowledge this historical alliance between the Thiyyas and 




exchange for voting R Shankar, an Ezhava leader from South Kerala, into power from 
Kannur. 
 
In the post-colonial period, both castes have been included in the same disembedded 
category - the OBCs. In the popular imagination, the Thiyyas and Ezhavas have also 
been included in the disembedded category of “backward”, a term which at its 
broadest level of usage is used to refer to all castes that are beneficiaries of the 
affirmative action program in India (Galanter 1978a). As will be explained later, more 
than denoting any specific administrative category, in common parlance the term 
“backward” is significant for an implied association with caste inferiority. 
 
Today, the national government list of OBCs makes a distinction between the 
Ezhavas and Thiyyas in Kerala (National Commission for Backward Classes 2010b), 
included as Appendix 1a). Significantly however, over the past decade, the state 
government of Kerala has started to record the Thiyyas as a sub-caste of the Ezhavas 
in the state OBC list (Kerala Public Service Commission 2013, included as Appendix 
2). The disconnect between caste identity and region through such a recording in the 
state list has legitimated a disembedded body of knowledge regarding the Thiyyas in 
Kerala. The project of re-embedding of Thiyya identity in the Malabar on the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar needs to be understood in this context. The manner in which the 






The Spatial Imaginaries of being Thiyya: Representing Thiyyaness through Malabar  
 
This section contains an analysis of the spatial imaginary through which the Thiyya 
caste is identified on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. A spatial imaginary refers to 
how people use spaces (or places) to identify themselves. The framework of “spatial 
imaginary” involves a process-based understanding of both caste identity and place. It 
is assumed that each draws upon the other in its construction. Here the study of place 
is understood to be relational:  identification is analyzed both in terms of places that 
the group identifies with as well as places it does not identify with. While the focus in 
spatial imaginaries is concentrated on representation, affect and the experience of 
places are also taken into account. 
 
The formation and naming of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar: Malabar as Origin 
 
The dominant spatial imaginary on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, reflected in its 
very name, was that authentic Thiyyas hailed from the region of Malabar
86
. As I 
negotiated entry into the group with the founder-admin, Murali, I began to understand 
just how significant this particular name was and the deliberation with which it had 
been chosen. During our initial chat conversations on Meerkat.com, Murali had 
painstakingly explained that he chose the name Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar because 
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 Although the name Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar has been used as a pseudonym to preserve the privacy of the 





he wished to signify that this digital group was open for Thiyyas everywhere, but who 
by the very fact of being a Thiyya would have to had to originate from the region of 
Malabar in the course of either their individual or family history. Further, the bond 
between caste and region was woven into the group’s membership structure itself. As 
part of the cursory verification of potential members, the admins tried to check not 
only their family name and surname, but significantly they also checked their 
physical location (were they located in/ migrated from Malabar?), and the regional 
spread of their social networks (were they linked to any familiar Thiyya families in 
Malabar?).  
 
The association of Thiyyaness with Malabar was a crucial component of the group’s 
desire to establish a Thiyya identity that was completely distinct from the Ezhavas, a 
caste they were often subsumed under in popular narratives. However, the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar, bitterly and vocally contested this popular identification. 
Indeed, in narrating the circumstances under which they had come to establish the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the admins shared that they had felt the need to create 
this digital group precisely because they had found it an uphill task to separate the 
Thiyya identity from that of the Ezhavas in most off-line discussions, as well as in 
other digital forums. Even on the group, periodically, some new entrants would 
question the separation of the Thiyya identity from that of Ezhavas, and reiterate the 
disembedded narrative. The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar addressed such events 




also not unusual for such posts to be deleted and for the errant member to be removed 
from the group. 
 
The popularity of the broader disembedded narrative, as well as the relative novelty 
of the counter-narrative that re-embeds a distinct Thiyya identity in Malabar, can be 
observed in the manner in which Cedric reminisces about his initial reaction to the 
online group:  
What were some of your expectations from the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar when you joined the group? 
No, I do not have any expectations. But it was more because of a curiosity to 
find out why people had formed a “Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar” group. Why 
“Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar”?! Because you have Thiyyas from all over the 
state and then you have them all over the world! So, I was curious to find out 
about why Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar? And then I found out that people 
were starting to create an identity that there are Thiyyas in central Kerala, 
there are Thiyyas in South Kerala, but the Thiyyas in Malabar are more 
unique. 
(Cedric, member, late 40s, educational consultant, Hyderabad) 
 
In this excerpt, it is important to note that through the phrase “you have Thiyyas from 
all over the state”, Cedric himself is sympathetic to the popular disembedded manner 
of identifying the Thiyya caste as an interchangeable synonym for the Ezhava caste. 
Cedric’s surprise and confusion had been echoed by a small and considerably less 
vocal subsection on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar who recollected during one-on-
one interviews that since childhood they (and their parents) had considered the 
Thiyya and Ezhava to be fairly synonymous. Such reflections were usually privately 
narrated to me. They were rarely articulated publicly on the group since they were 





Some respondents from North Malabar acknowledged that the Thiyyas have been 
equated with the Ezhavas in other parts of Kerala for a while. Yet, they would often 
follow this up with the clarification that Thiyyas within Malabar, particularly the 
older generations, expressed disdain for such an equation and stressed a distinct 
Thiyya identity that was rooted in Malabar. Others, while they were sympathetic 
towards such a re-embedding, acknowledged that the resurgence of this association 
between caste identity and place was something that was relatively recent. On the 
whole, the ongoing re-embedding of Thiyyaness in Malabar clearly resonated with 
large section of the members of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. For instance, Renjith, a 
member of a prominent Thiyya family from Mahe, explains:  
Why is the group called "Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar"? Why not just call 
it thiyyas? 
That is because thiyya groups are mainly in North Malabar from Calicut to 
Kannur side. These people (on Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar) are now telling 
it is not related the Ezhava groups. Usually, all over it is considered that 
Ezhava and Thiyya is same. But now they are telling that it is different. And I 
also think that there is a lot of difference between the Ezhavas and Thiyyas. 
 (Renjith, member, late 40s, ayurvedic doctor, Middle-East Asia) 
 
These seemingly contradictory instances narrated by Cedric (“Thiyyas all over the 
state”) and Renjith (“thiyya groups are mainly in North Malabar”) should draw our 
attention to the time-specific contestation involved in the identification of caste. 
Moreover, this suggests that in understanding disembedding and re-embedding of 
caste identities from/in places, it is important to consider the delegitmacy and 
legitimacy of different ways of knowing caste at these specific junctures of time. This 
approach is important in understanding both the disembedding of Thiyya identity 
from Malabar, as observed in its subversion under the Ezhavas, and the re-embedding 




specific reconstruction on Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. The reflections of these 
members indicate that both ways of representing Thiyyaness - as disembedded from 
Malabar and as embedded in Malabar - have coexisted simultaneously even among 
the Thiyyas themselves.  These reflections provide an insight into the ongoing 
struggle for the construction of a Thiyya identity - at certain time periods one 
representation may be delegitimized in favour of the other representation. 
 
On the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the region of Malabar is considered to be the 
source of origin of the Thiyyas. Some members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar 
presented an inextricable connection between being a Thiyya and belonging to 
Malabar. They felt it was impossible to conceive of Thiyyaness without situating the 
community in the context of Malabar.  For instance, Shashi, a Bangalore based 
member explains how he considers Thiyyaness to have emerged in interaction with 
Malabar:  
On the group there was a poll conducted which asked where Thiyyas are 
from. Four options were given-Kyrgyzstan, Greece, Sri Lanka and 
Malabar? 
(Interrupts the question) No, no. Because what I did was when I wrote that 
particular point down, I said that once you reach Malabar, you became a 
Thiyya. That particular option was something that was not there, it is 
something that I made. Yeah, because see when you left Kyrgyzstan, you 
were never a Thiyya. That is the most strangest of thoughts that you can ever 
have. I mean these are vain and vanity thoughts that runs on because of your 
stupidity, you know. This is all your vanity which is talking “Thiyyas came 
from Kyrgyzstan"! You were never a Thiyya when you left Kyrgyzstan! You 
were a Kyrgyzstani then and you migrated and through many years of being 
in Malabar and eating the fish from the Arabian Sea, you became a Thiyya! 
So it's not as if you left there as a Thiyya. 
So you're saying that for Thiyyas to have become Thiyyas, it was their 
peculiar interaction with being situated in Malabar? 
Yeah, absolutely. Because what you are … you are a Thiyya because you 
come from North Malabar. Because that is why there is a certain distinction 
of why you are a Thiyya and the way you are as a Thiyya. That is because of 
the cultural evolution that has happened from being in that location, having a 




French and so on and so forth. Which is evolved and which is why it has 
made a distinguished identity for yourself. 
(Shashi, member, early 40s, Logistics, Bangalore) 
 
In this excerpt, Shashi is reacting to a recent theory of origin that had been attracting 
considerable attention on the group, which stated that the Thiyyas initially originated 
in Kyrgyzstan and migrated to Malabar. This theory was attributed to research 





Although his research was unpublished at the time of data collection, Dr Shyamalan’s 
ideas were tremendously influential on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. In the period 
that immediately preceded the formation of the group, Dr Shyamalan had conducted a 
series of presentations in Kerala, and had received much media attention in the state. 
His findings were enthusiastically discussed on the group, where they were 
represented as proof that the Thiyyas and Ezhavas originated from different 
geographical origins. Interestingly, much of this conversation drew on the idea that 
the Kyrgyzstan link established the Thiyyas as being of Aryan origin, which was 
interpreted as proof of having a high caste status
88
. By referring to the Kyrgyztan 
theory, the Ezhavas were conversely represented as originating in Sri Lanka, which 
was then interpreted as proof of their Dravidian origin, and hence of a relatively 
lower caste status. On the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the Kyrgyztan theory was 
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 By analyzing the samples of his own blood along with his mother’s blood, Dr Shyamalan had proposed that the 
roots of the Thiyyas can be traced back to the Tian mountains of Kyrgyztan. Dr Shyamalan’s popularity on the 
group can also be attributed to the fact he belonged to an old and prominent Thiyya family from Mahe. Further, on 
the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, both Dr Shyamalan and his son (the Hollywood director - M Night Shyamalan), 
were championed as famous Thiyyas who had achieved considerable success in their fields of work.   
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 On the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the Kyrgyztan theory of origin was also superimposed by members onto an 
older theory of origin which suggested that they had originated from the island of Crete in Greece. This theory, 





further used to counter an older origin theory which posited that both the Thiyyas and 
Ezhavas had both originated in Sri Lanka.  
 
Although different members expressed differing levels of skepticism or faith towards 
the Kyrgyztan theory (or other centres of origin such as Crete and Sri Lanka), they 
were more confident about the connection between Malabar and the Thiyyas. Further, 
as the excerpt from Shashi’s interview indicates, a belief in centres of origin such as 
Kyrgyztan, Crete or Greece was incorporated into belonging to Malabar. In the 
preceding excerpt, Shashi responds to the debate about centres of origin by arguing 
that for him, Malabar has had a much more foundational relationship to the formation 
of Thiyyas as a social group than a place like Kyzrgyzstan which was distant not only 
in space but also in historical influence.  
 
It is important to note that in the reconstruction of Thiyya identity on the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar, not only is the caste associated with Malabar in terms of origin, 
but it is also tied to authenticity of caste. In the following excerpt, Rakesh, an admin 
from Kannur explains the connection he perceives between the Thiyyas and Malabar:  
Can you explain it a little? What is this connection? 
I told you, thiyyas originated from Malabar only. Originally thiyyas are in 
Malabar only, no other place. Malabar means Kasarkod, Kannur, 
Mallappuram, Wayanad, Palakkad and then part of Thrissur district. From 
there they went to other districts and other states and all over the world for 
employment and all that. And the customs and all the original customs of the 
thiyyas are being performed in Malabar only. And for marriage purposes and 
all, and death and other ceremonies, the original thiyya culture and all that is 
even now carried out in Malabar. 





Here, apart from representing Malabar as the source of origin of the Thiyyas, Rakesh 
also attributes an additional significance to the region. For Rakesh, Malabar is an area 
that can establish the distinctiveness of Thiyya culture, since it is only in this region 
where Thiyya culture is practiced in its “original” form. 
 
Imaginative Geography: Identifying Thiyyas/Malabar in opposition to 
Ezhava/South Kerala 
 
The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar constructed Thiyya identity as distinct from Ezhavas 
in other ways as well. An influential narrative on the group also constructed the 
difference between Thiyyas and Ezhavas through a projection of the assumed 
characteristics of the different geographical areas they were associated with. In other 
words, this was the group’s narrative of what Said (1979) has conceptualized as an 
“imaginative geography”, where ideas about Self and Other are constructed through 
the use of spatial narratives. The concept is particularly useful since it demonstrates 
how this difference is constructed by extrapolating the differential characteristics of 
Our-Land as opposed to Their-Land to define the Self and the Other respectively. In 
such representations, the Self draws from the characteristics of Our Land, which is 
essentially the inverse of the characteristics of Their Land which defines the Other. 
Said points to the arbitrariness of these narrative associations. The conceptual 
boundaries of the lands, both of the Self and the Other, are often not clearly 
demarcated. More significantly, what the Other thinks of such place-based 
projections, or whether or not the Other acknowledges them, is immaterial in an 





The imaginative geography on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar distinguished between 
the Thiyyas and Ezhavas by projecting the characteristics that the group associated 
with Malabar and South Kerala respectively. This narrative drew on an older, popular 
construction of the difference between the people of Malabar (as trusting) and South 
Kerala (as calculative), and used it to define the difference between the Thiyyas and 
the Ezhavas.  
 
In the group this construction could be most clearly observed in multiple posts by 
Shantanu. Apart from his authoritative capacity as admin, Shantanu was also well 
respected on Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar because he represented himself as someone 
dedicated to the research of Thiyya history. Such posts by Shantanu were often 
encouraged by other admins, and more importantly were not openly challenged on the 
group. For instance, in the following post on Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar we can 
observe how Shantanu draws on an imaginative geography to distinguish between the 
Ezhavas and the Thiyyas in an oppositional manner. This post is also important 
because we can observe that it has been accorded further legitimacy on the group 
through the approval of Murali the founder-member in the form of a “Yowzza!!!” 
symbol. 
Shantanu This is because of Malabar culture is based on Sacrifice not based 
on Seek or suck. Thiyas utmost higher level practice was Chekava (Shikava) 
or peak level of thiyya. When tow Thiyyas attempt Ankam one Thiyya will 
survive and another will die so the survive Thiyyan will become chekavan, 
believing who survive in an Angam the truth is with his side so Angam is for 
prove truth that means Thiyya is ready for die for truth. The truth which 
cannot recognise by dharma shastram Angam was practiced. So a Chekavan 
means who ready for die for truth. Whatever it is still thiyyas are ready for di, 




stand on their belief. But can’t see this type sacrifice culture with any other 
community earlier Nambiar and Nair had this culture but they were trained 
under Thiyya Kalari so they were brave warriors but after stop Kalari 
training can’t see braveness in sacrifice their life for anything. So Malabar 
have culture based on Thiyya sacrifice culture but in South Ezavas have utter 
seek culture which just opposite to Malabar 
Yowzza!!! Murali 
(Shantanu, admin, mid-20s, IT professional, Dubai, posted 16 May 2012) 
 
As can be observed in Shantanu’s post, the imaginative geography on the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar took the following form: 
The Thiyyas belong to Malabar. Malabar as a region has a culture of athmarthatha, or 
selflessness. Consequently, the Thiyyas have a selfless nature. What sets the Ezhavas 
apart from us is that they belong to South Kerala. South Kerala as a region has a 
selfish culture. Consequently, the Ezhavas have a selfish nature. 
 
Not only was this a familiar narrative on the group, it also repeatedly surfaced as a 
theme during the initial interviews with members and admins in Kannur. As a result, 
this narrative construction was included as part of all the individual interviews, in 
order to gauge how the different members of the group read this narrative. This 
narrative resonated with a third of the interview respondents. Considering that this 
pool of respondents included both people who disagreed with the dominant narrative 
on the group as well as important admins and members, such resonance indicates that 
this was not an insubstantial narrative. In particular, this narrative resonated strongly 
with most of the admins who exerted considerable control over the group. For 
instance, as the following excerpt indicates, Murali reiterates the narrative 





So what characteristics do Thiyyas have? 
I told you no- Illam, kulam, kavu, kalari. They are all always having that 
trustfulness in them. They have courage. They are sincere. They have all that 
hospitality. They doesn't care of themselves-they work for others. So you 
take my example. Even if I am busy, I like to take you and show you 
different places. But if you take southern people, they never do. They only 
take their part. Others like Ezhavas do not look at anybody else’s suffering. 
Thiyyas even though… You see in the recent killings, everybody who was 
killed and who murdered are Thiyyas. They know that they will be hanged or 
legally punished, still they're not bothered. For somebody else they're doing 
this. We're very sincere in these things. They are courageous. They are 
sincere. You can trust a Thiyya. See I have been to many parts of the world. 
So wherever I find, I believe my Kannur people- Thiyyas- very much. And 
after going around all the world, I hate these South Ezhavas. We can't trust 
them. The next morning they will be like how can I take that tea from the 
other part. They will be thinking that how can I thief (steal tea from others)? 
Because we will be mingling with those people - Ezhavas. 
Can you tell me a little bit about your interactions with them? 
Yeah, when I was in Dubai and Bombay also, Malabaris they have a very 
good name there. You see in Bombay if you go "Malabari, Malabari - he's a 
very good man." In Dubai also Arabs like these Malabaris-they're very 
sincere. Like that, the southern (Kerala) people also migrated to Dubai, (but) 
they started cheating. Because of the sincerity, these Arabs used to be free 
(that) they won't cheat. But these people cheated. For example if you're 
travelling on a bus, if you're in a queue we can see, one fellow from the 
South, he's an Ezhava, he will not stand in the queue. He will say "oh, I really 
want.." And he will come and jump inside. So from that (the residents of 
Dubai start saying) "oh! That mad man is Malabari!” So then people start 
saying that Malabaris don't have any integrity, they are selfish. Because 
actually these Malabaris who went earlier, they were very sincere. But now it 
has been changed because the Ezhavas they came there. And traffic rules 
also… Earlier they were telling that “Malabaris are very good people!” But 
now they're telling "oh Malabaris are cheats!"  
You just mentioned that Malabaris are cooperative, sincere. So is that 
something that all Malabaris have or only Thiyyas have? 
All Malabaris mostly. Muslims and Thiyyas. Some Muslims have it and all 
the Thiyyas have it.   
 (Murali, founder-admin, mid-40s, manager in private firm, Kannur town) 
 
Here it is significant that while Murali was reflecting on what he perceived to be the 
characteristics that distinguished Thiyyas from the Ezhavas, very often he would 
equate caste with region. For instance, in the preceding excerpt, Ezhava was used 
interchangeably with belonging to the South, and Thiyya was equated with being 




observed in the descriptions of some of the other admins and members who 
vigorously expressed this imaginative geography.  
 
In contrast however, some others on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar associated caste 
and region more consciously and deliberately. For instance, in the following excerpt, 
Arun, a Hyderabad-based admin of Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, clarifies that he 
observes a very strong geographical influence on the behaviour of the Ezhavas and 
other communities in South Kerala. 
 
Some members have explained the difference between the Thiyyas and 
Ezhavas to me in this way: Because the Thiyyas come from Malabar 
they have a very sacrifice-based nature, whereas the Ezhavas because 
they come from the South, they have a very seek/selfish-based nature. 
Yes that is there. Although I do not completely agree with that because… 
Sometime back we did mention that (on the group). Because that is more 
a… further... I feel a geographical attitude also. Because, if you look at it, it's 
not just one community which is more selfish. And one of the interesting 
things I've observed about that behavior is it is based more on your social 
structure there. Because if you look at us (Thiyyas), we don't believe in 
dowry and stuff… So there seems to be a social need for human beings to 
have a self-centered approach there (in South Kerala). See that is more of a 
social demand thrust upon those individuals. See that is my understanding 
based on what I have observed. So that could be one of the reasons for those 
people behaving in that manner. See for example, it's not just the Ezhavas. 
Even the Christian community has that attitude of self-centeredness, whoever 
has moved from the South (to Malabar). Whereas if you move back and see 
the Anglo-Indian community of Kannur, they are very open. So what I feel 
is, it has played its part on that behavior. 
(Arun, admin, mid-30s, IT professional, Hyderabad) 
 
Here, Arun represents the perceived selflessness of the Thiyyas as a direct 
consequence of the selfless nature of all the different communities in Malabar, 
including the Anglo-Indian Christian community in Malabar. Similarly, he projects 




for the self-centeredness associated with the Ezhavas on the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar.  
 
As mentioned previously, this imaginative geography, whereby Thiyya selflessness 
was attributed to Malabar and Ezhava selfishness was attributed to South Kerala, did 
not resonate with two-thirds of the members interviewed. A small minority of the 
respondents rejected this construction outright in individual interviews. Others, most 
of them members but also including one admin, expressed varying degrees of 
ambivalence towards this imaginative geography. In particular, they were reluctant 
about the second part of this narrative construction. That is, while they readily 
associated selflessness as a quality of Malabar and projected this characteristic on to 
the Thiyyas themselves, they were reluctant to represent Ezhavas as a whole as 
selfish. While some of this hesitation may well be attributed to their reaction to my 
own identity as the daughter of migrants from the south of Kerala, I found that this 
did not deter others who agreed with the construction, such as during my conversation 
with Murali
89
. These differential readings may also explained by my choice of the 
sample of interviewees - I chose to speak to not only those who would reflect the 
dominant voice on Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar which subscribed to the imaginative 
geography, but also to incorporate oppositional or subversive voices. 
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 During interviews, I made it a point to stress that since I had not grown up in the state of Kerala, my links and 
allegiance to the region were tenuous at best. I especially provided these assurances to those members who 
remarked that they felt uncomfortable in characterizing South Kerala negatively in front of a southerner, so as to 




Some members countered this imaginative geography with differential readings of 
what it meant to be “selfish”.  For instance, Radha, a middle-aged businesswoman 
residing in the United States, also challenges the meaning of "selfish" as a negative 
characteristic. She bases her critique on her own experiences as an internal migrant 
within India and in other countries.  
So ‘the people are more sincere in the Malabar and North area’: that is what 
I've heard from Delhi and Kerala House (a social club for Keralites in 
Delhi). (But) see, even if you looked at Delhi, there were many different 
types of people. For example the Punjabis - people used to say that they're 
very selfish. But if you look at it in the long run it's just because they have 
suffered a lot because of the Partition. And so they have to be selfish for 
survival. 
(Radha, member, early 50s, businesswoman, District of Columbia) 
 
Radha’s oppositional reading of this imaginative geography is particularly interesting 
because she was one of the few members who vocally opposed similar negative 
constructions of Ezhavas. In January 2013, amidst calls for her removal, she had 
temporarily left the group in protest. In her reading, Radha is drawing upon her 
experience of interacting with the ethnic group of Punjabis
90 
in Delhi, many of whom 
had survived a traumatic migration from their homes in current day Pakistan. In re-
interpreting the meaning of “selfish” as street-smart, she draws on this group of 
people who had to build their lives over from scratch in Delhi to eventually become 
one of the most economically successful ethnic groups there. 
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 Punjabi is a term used to refer to people from the multiple castes and religions that hail from the Punjab. The 




“Forward Thinking” and the Atmarthatha of the Thiyyas: Positive 
Identification with Malabar and negative identification with South Kerala 
 
Although I encountered these oppositional readings of the imaginative geography 
around Thiyyaness, I found that the idea that the distinctiveness of being a Thiyya 
was connected to belonging to Malabar still appealed to such members. For most of 
the interview respondents who were reluctant to categorize the Ezhavas as selfish, 
caste identification involved a complex mixture of identifying positively with 
Malabar, while simultaneously identifying themselves negatively with South Kerala. 
Although this identification has something in common with imaginative geography 
mentioned in the previous section, it is distinguished from it through a lack of explicit 
focus on the Ezhavas. They made these associations on the basis of both the 
perceived “forward”-ness of thought in Malabar relative to South Kerala, as well as 
the older narrative of the athmarthatha (selflessness) that characterized Malabar in 
contrast to the selfishness that characterized South Kerala. “Forward”-ness as a 
characteristic was used to highlight their perception that the Thiyyas had the ability to 
treat everyone equally irrespective of their caste and class status. Atmarthatha was 
utilized to highlight the military antecedents of the Thiyyas and represent it as a 
military, and highly-ranked, caste in Malabar. 
 
During our conversations, many of these members pointed out that for them the 
quality of “forward thinking”, or lack of adherence to religious or caste-based 




belonging to the land of Malabar, and in direct opposition to belonging to South 
Kerala. They explained that they saw Malabar as a region where people were not 
typically bothered to mobilize around caste or religious issues. Some among these 
members attributed this forwardness in thought to the cosmopolitanism of Malabar. 
They pointed out that through its status as a port that was significant in global trade 
Malabar had a long history of interaction with outsiders such as the Arabs, the British 
and the Portuguese.  
 
These members argued that within Malabar, the Thiyyas in particular had adopted 
this stance of equality wholeheartedly. In this context, customary practices such as the 
laws of matrilineal inheritance among the Thiyyas of North Malabar 
(marumakkathayam) and the stated aversion to the exchange of dowry among them 
were often referred to as instances of the importance given to gender equality within 
the caste. They inferred that since women were customarily accorded an unusually 
high status compared to other castes in Kerala, the Thiyyas as a whole were a very 
forward thinking caste.  
 
In a similar vein, these members also often pointed out to the Thiyyas long-standing 
allegiance with Communism, to indicate the “forward”-ness of their caste in terms of 
class equality. Further, they made references to the participation of Thiyyas in 
egalitarian caste-based reform movement within Hinduism led by Sri Narayana Guru. 
Although they were eager to dissociate themselves from any associations with 




between Thiyyas and Sri Narayana Guru. Their contention was that it was due to the 
Thiyyas’ forwardness of thought that they had embraced Sri Narayana Guru’s 
message of “there is only one caste, one god, one religion: that is man”.  At the same 
time, however, they also expressed a deep disappointment with these two social 
movements. They felt that while the Thiyyas had wasted time by dedicating 
themselves to the struggle against class and caste inequality, other communities had 
benefitted by mobilizing on the basis of caste. 
 
The use of the term “forward thinking” by members and admins on Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar is significant because it was also a response to the discursive construction of 
Thiyyas as being part of the disembedded caste category of “backward”. 
Consequently, it was not uncommon for members to characterize the Thiyyas as 
being “forward thinking” in terms of their social practices and then argue on the basis 
of this characterization that they were miscategorized as a “backward” caste. 
 
Atmarthatha, or selfless dedication, was another characteristic that was vociferously 
identified by these members as something that was shared between the Thiyyas and 
Malabar. The difference here was that rather than constructing the atmarthatha of the 
Thiyyas in opposition to the selfishness of the Ezhavas of the South per se, these 
members constructed it as based on a more general distinction between the nature of 
people in Malabar in contrast to those in South Kerala. Atmarthatha was used to refer 
to a key definitional aspect of the selflessness of the Thiyyas: their ability to sacrifice 




caste in the Malabar area these were essentially characteristics of the Thiyya caste 
that were later adopted by broader Malabari society. However, others argued that 
these were characteristics that all Malabaris, including the Thiyyas, inherently 
exhibited. 
 
The quality of athmarthatha, as sacrifice, that these members associated with the 
Thiyyas and Malabar is significant because many of them also argued that although 
this was a virtuous characteristic, it had been detrimental to the welfare of Thiyyas. 
For instance, Sarthak, a student who is based in North India, explains how he 
interprets the selflessness as a detrimental characteristic:  
So people in Malabar are more loyal? 
Yes loyalty and the people are…for everything… This is what I think okay - 
for a religion and even for politics they devote themselves as they should do. 
You must have heard about the political killings in Kannur. What I think is 
that people when they start loving that thing.. When they associate 
themselves with something, they associate with it fully. So they are willing to 
even kill themselves, or kill others for that particular ideology or faith. So 
that is happening there. So you will not find that so prominent in the south 
because they just know what the limit is. They wouldn't do anything beyond. 
I mean it's quite a selfish point also, but it's quite a good point also. 
(Sarthak, member, early 20s, student, Gurgaon) 
 
In this excerpt, by referencing the political violence in Kannur, where Thiyyas 
account for the majority of the perpetrators and victims, Sarthak expresses 
ambivalence towards the quality of selflessness associated with Malabar and the 
Thiyyas. For Sarthak, the quality of athmarthatha, or selflessness is not quite the 
positive virtue it is made out to be. Rather, he argues that it often serves as a limiting 




associated with people from the South as a useful quality that the Thiyyas may well 
benefit from adopting. 
  
Often, atmarthatha, as sacrifice, was used to communicate a difference in caste status 
between Thiyyas and Ezhavas, by referring specifically to their historical 
participation in the military labour market. In explaining this characteristic, members 
would draw on the martial arts tradition among the Thiyyas to portray it as a military 
caste. Many members represented both the ability to sacrifice and a perceived history 
of military service in the caste as the key definitional characteristics of the Thiyyas. 
Such military antecedents were then used to represent the Thiyyas as having a caste 
status that was higher than that of the Ezhavas. In the following excerpt, Sarthak 
laments that through an association with the Ezhavas, the Thiyyas had lost much of 
the caste status they had acquired in Malabar through their military history. 
One of the members of the group made a distinction between the 
Ezhavas and the Thiyyas in this way: they said that since the Thiyyas are 
from Malabar, consequently they have a sacrificing culture. 
Yes, yes. That is true. 
But they said that the Ezhavas, because they come from the South, they 
have a very seek or selfish culture. 
Actually this sacrifice I have to point out something. In Thiyya community 
there were so many duels. Actually there were some warriors in every 
family. They will fight duels. I mean the rich people will come and adopt 
them like the fighting cocks. Then they will have a duel between two people, 
and these two people will be sponsored by some rich people. So it means that 
if there is a debate between these two rich people. “Rich” meaning - if they 
are the rulers or something. These two rich people will get there to fight us to 
fight. And if one fighter wins over the other, then that means that the 
corresponding ruler also wins. So thiyyas were associated with these sort of 
duels. So I think what he meant by sacrifice was that thing only. 
But in your own experience, does this sort of a distinction makes sense, 
or does it even appeal to you? 
Actually I don't know. I mean this is angam (duel) and all are associated with 
thiyyas from Malabar so they might be having some sort of an affinity 
towards the sacrifice. Which is quite different from the South because they 




rejected to these… I mean the Ezhavas were always looked down upon in the 
South. The high-class was very prominent in the South. I mean obviously 
you can think that it was the time of the Raja, so the social structure was such 
that you could not challenge them. I mean if the Nairs were above them on 
the social structure, I mean it will be like this only. I mean you don't have a 
direct access to the schools or jobs. So they never enjoyed anything just like 
the thiyyas enjoyed in Malabar. So I don't know there might be some kind of 
an attitude difference. Because if for a long time a person is subjected to 
something like this, their community may also develop such a feeling that 
they are inferior. I mean the confidence level will be very low. Because you 
may have seen it in some Hindi films- the Thakur (feudal landlord) will be 
considered as God by someone who is upper-class. I mean even if someone 
challenges the Thakur, the father (of the protagonist) would say "What are 
you saying? The Thakur is a God!" I mean that kind of belief usually takes 
root in those kind of communities because they have been subjected to these 
kind of activities for such a long time. 
Some people on the group also thought that the Ezhavas had an 
inferiority complex. And they said that if the thiyyas are associated with 
the Ezhavas, even they would get that sort of an inferiority complex. 
Yeah actually that is the main problem. The thiyyas actually enjoyed a kind 
of social status before the coming of the SNDP and all. So when this SNDP 
and all came, they had also started considering themselves as ezhavas. That 
in the whole, Thiyyas are considered as ezhavas. So those people from the 
South who consider Ezhavas as inferior, also consider Thiyyas as inferior. So 
this is affecting the thiyyas actually. They are revolting against this by saying 
that, “no, no we are not the same as Ezhavas”, “we are superior to Ezhavas”. 
I mean this will be the driving force behind these activities such as the 
rejuvenation of caste and all.” 
(Sarthak, member, early 20s, student, Gurgaon) 
 
Here, Sarthak refers to the Thiyyas perceived ability to make sacrifices as a 
consequence of their military past in Malabar. It is significant that he utilizes this 
characteristic and its association with the military past to specifically contrast the 
caste status of the Thiyyas in Malabar in opposition to the caste status of Ezhavas in 
South Kerala. 
 
These members also construct South Kerala as a place marked by selfishness. In 
particular, and in contrast to Malabar, the region was represented as a place where 




is understood by some members to be the cause of the self-centeredness that they 
perceive to be the major distinguishing feature between the Ezhavas of that region 
and the Thiyyas of Malabar. 
Some of the members of the group have argued that the distinction 
between the two castes is that the thiyyas come from Malabar which has 
a sacrifice-based culture, while the ezhavas come from the South which 
has a selfish or seek based culture. Consequently the thiyyas are 
sacrificing, while the ezhavas are selfish. 
I would actually… Look I am a believer in saying that every human is equal. 
So I would not say that Ezhavas are completely a bad race of people. Just 
like what I explained before, that the Thiyyas were, the Thiyya community 
got uplifted by, during the Madras Presidency when the British were there 
and they opened up the doors of education. So that literally got Thiyyas on to 
a better level than the Ezhavas. What I would say about the Ezhava thing is 
that they were trodden down upon for a longer time than the Thiyyas. So for 
them basically, it might be that, I want to get on to a better life by hook or 
crook because there weren't much people to help them. You know open up 
the life through education and stuff. So it's more or less like they were looked 
down upon and treated down for a longer time. And they probably just said 
"Enough is enough! Now I need to get a better life by hook or crook. I don't 
care if I'm going to do it the right way of the wrong way." So it's probably 
the attitude that they have. 
(Suvinay, admin, early 30s, IT services, Abu Dhabi) 
 
As can be observed in the reflection of Suvinay and Arun, many members on the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were not unsympathetic to the oppression faced by the 
Ezhavas in South Kerala. At the same time, it was clear that they felt compelled to 
distance the experience of the Thiyya in Malabar from the Ezhavas in South Kerala. 
For instance Arun, like Suvinay, conceded that the Ezhavas had experienced 
tremendous caste discrimination in South Kerala. At the same time, in most of our 
chat conversations he would allude to the caste distinctions observed by his own 
family when they interacted with Ezhava migrants in their area. He would also rue 
that the Thiyyas chose a historical alliance with the SNDP, instead of opting to align 




following section contains an analysis of the reasons due to which the Cyber Thiyyars 
of Malabar felt compelled to reiterate such a social distance between the Thiyyas and 
Ezhavas. 
 
Re-embedding through Representation: Countering Knowledge of Caste in the 
aftermath of disembedding 
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar identified 
the Thiyya caste through an association with the region of Malabar, and in opposition 
to the region of South Kerala. Through such a re-embedding of caste identity in place 
the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar sought to reconstruct the Thiyya identity. Their 
attempt at such a reconstruction was motivated by the manner in which Thiyya is 
identified as part of the disembedded knowledge about caste. Both ways of 
identification - as embedded and disembedded from Malabar - seem to have 
historically coexisted within the Thiyya fold. However, the emphasis and legitimacy 
accorded to each manner of identification has shifted over time. This section contains 
an analysis of the factors which have prompted a legitimation of the re-embedding of 
Thiyya identity in Malabar on this digital group. 
 
The group’s introductory description provides a good starting point to understand 
their need to re-embed Thiyyaness in Malabar:  
A group of Thiyyar in Malabar, joined for an active discussion and debate to 
the path of integrity and unity among our community. We are the largest 
community with an awesome culture. We have been ignored to reach up to 




Thiyyas of Malabar are one of the most advanced and sophisticated 
communities in India. Thiyyas were forward caste before Independence 
when Malabar was under Madras Presidency same time Ezhavas were 
backward caste, now Thiyyas were clubbed with Ezhavas and one of the sub-
caste of Ezhavas, Thiyya community stands eliminated from the books of 
Kerala Government and they consider us as Ezhavas - which is NOT 
ACCEPTABLE TO every Thiyyan. Thiyya and Ezhava are two distinct 
communities, having totally different ideology, belief and custom. Our aim is 
to maintain our Thiyya identity and our rich Cultrural Heritage and also 
improve the living standards of our fellow brothers and sisters by providing 
better education, better job opportunity and better financial support for the 
needy. Lets unite again! 
(Excerpt of introductory description of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, 
Meerkat.com)  
 
This description indicates that on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the re-creation of 
caste identity through its re-embedding in place is driven by the need to counter the 
existing representation of Thiyya in two distinct but inter-related ways. First, a less 
immediate, but extremely pertinent motivation for the re-embedding to occur is that 
the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar are concerned about how people from other castes 
identified them as part of the disembedded category of “backward”. Here, not only 
are the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar concerned about how knowledge about caste 
identity is disembedded from the regional context of Malabar, but they are also 
affected by the negative cultural evaluation of such disembedded caste categories on 
the basis of ideas about the inherent and biologically determined merit and worth of 
people from different castes. Their experience is that the severity of the consequences 
of such identification varies by region, and is particularly intense outside Malabar. 
 
Secondly, the immediate driving force for such a re-embedding on Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar stems from their anxiety about how the nation-state itself identifies Thiyya 




Identification by the nation-state determines access to the benefits of social policy 
accorded to caste groups. Consequently, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar are driven by 
the anxiety that under the OBC categorization, Thiyyas are progressively being 
identified as part of the Ezhava caste by the nation-state rather than as a separate caste 
unto themselves. They are motivated by the fear that through such categorization, the 
nation-state would cease gradually to identify Thiyyas completely. They fear that, in 
turn, this would affect the material well-being of the members of the caste through its 
impact on access to employment and education. 
 
In this particular project of re-embedding, we can observe that an older way of 
knowing caste - knowledge through a particular place - is being re-legitimated in 
order to address the consequences of disembedding. The tension between two 
categories of the knowing caste - OBC and backward - is crucial to understanding the 
consequences of the disembedding of caste identity and place from the perspective of 
the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. In contrast to the term OBC, which tends to be 
primarily interpreted as an administrative categorization of caste, the term 
“backward” is also used to allude to the negative cultural evaluation associated with 
this disembedded category. Consequently, these two disembedded terms, both of 
which are based on the separation of Thiyya identity from Malabar, resonated very 
differently with the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. While the members did not have a 
uniform approach towards the caste-based affirmative action in India, the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar were, in general, reconciled to the idea of Thiyyas being 




Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar vigorously contested the categorization of Thiyyas in 
everyday discourse as “backward”, since the term invoked negative connotations 
about caste status and they had experienced considerable prejudice on the basis of 
such categorization. 
 
“The Ezhavas give us a ‘backward’ tag”: Contesting the identification of 
Thiyyas as “backward” through the caste-based experience of places  
 
Through associating their caste with Malabar, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were 
contesting how Thiyya was identified by people from other castes as part of the 
disembedded caste category of “backward”. Some on the group were less comfortable 
than others about explicitly engaging in the language of superiority and inferiority to 
describe the Thiyyas and Ezhavas. Yet, the idea that the Thiyyas had been socially 
degraded as “backward” through an association with the Ezhava was commonly 
expressed in conversations in the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar as well as in personal 
interviews with members. 
 
As noted by Galanter (1978), as an administrative term, “backward” has long been 
used to refer to a broad panoply of caste groups in affirmative action programs in 
India. At different points in time, the term has been used to refer to various 
agglomerations of castes. However, the potency of the term derives from its broader 
cultural interpretation in the context of the perception of the inherent inferiority 




“backward” and “forward” - are also interpreted culturally where their meanings 
come to be conjoined with the lack or abundance of being inherently “civilized”. In 
this context, these administrative terms acquire the connotation of savarna/ avarna, 
or “high caste”/“low caste” and the assumption of the superiority/inferiority inherited 
by members of such caste groups at birth. Significantly, these assumptions become 
further entrenched due to the increasingly hegemonic appeal of discourses about 
merit and efficiency in India in the context of globalization and neo-liberalization, 
generating additional stigma associated with the term “backward”.  Consequently, in 
the post 1991-era  the term “backward” has also come to indicate that people from 
castes that are accorded affirmative action benefits by the state are inherently 
incapable (constructed as lacking merit) and indolent (constructed as those looking 
out for government handouts rather than working hard to get a position) (Jodhka and 
Newman 2007, Still 2013). 
 
In the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar’s introductory description the aversion towards the 
identification of Thiyyas as a “backward” caste is clearly visible. This description 
also includes a theme that was often raised on the group - the group’s perception that 
it was an association with the “backward” Ezhavas through which the “forward” 
Thiyyas also started to be identified as “backward”. Further, in this description we 
can also observe the link between this  theme and the group’s attempt to counter the 
“backward” identification through re-embedding Thiyyaness with Malabar. The 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was engaged in recreating the Thiyya identity through 





The narrative followed in the introduction is that unlike the Ezhavas of South Kerala 
who had always been identified as “backward”, the “forward” character of the 
Thiyyas of Malabar had previously been identified and documented by the British. 
Here, the reference a colonial document (the Malabar Gazetteer) in the group’s 
introduction highlights the crucial link between being “forward” and the region of 
Malabar. It refers to how the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar value the manner in which 
the Thiyyas were identified by the nation-state during the colonial period in Malabar. 
It also reflects their sense of loss of prestige through the disembedding of caste from 
place in the post-Independence era. The description implies that it was only in the 
aftermath of Indian Independence and the creation of the state of Kerala that the 
previously “forward” Thiyyas located in Malabar were amalgamated with the 
“backward” Ezhavas of the south of Kerala. Through this narrative, the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar are challenging the identification of Thiyya as “backward” by 
people from other castes within the amalgamated regional setting of the state of 
Kerala. On the group, Thiyya is being reconstructed as a “forward” caste which has, 
over time, been miscategorized as “backward” through an association with the 
Ezhava caste. The popularity of this narrative (the Thiyyas’ loss of “forward” status / 
miscategorization as “backward”) on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar can be gauged 
by the fact that this was uploaded as the introduction to the group.  
 
This narrative of loss and miscategorization was also consistently reflected in the 




members interviewed for this study roughly half identified the Thiyyas as a savarna 
caste. Many of these members particularly emphasized that within the region of 
Malabar itself, they felt themselves to be a savarna caste. While the other half argued 
that they were avarna, their definition of this term was different from its textual 
understanding. They argued that the Thiyyas were avarnas in the sense that in the 
region of Malabar this caste was located outside the conventional four-fold caste 
categorization. By stressing that the Thiyyas were located outside the categorization 
of caste, these members were specifically rejecting the hierarchy as represented by 
dominant caste groups such as Brahmins, and Nairs and Nambiars. At the same time, 
however, through such an emphasis, these members were also rejecting any 
association with other lower ranking castes. Consequently, although on the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar the position of Thiyyas in the caste hierarchy was questioned, it 
was not as if the concept of a hierarchy or the act of categorizing castes as inferior or 
superior itself was challenged. 
 
The reconstruction of Thiyya as a “forward” caste can also be observed in the manner 
in which its history was discussed on the group. Many conversations were dedicated 
to the military past of the Thiyyas and the wealth and riches of the previous 
generations, with a particular focus placed on the mobility achieved by Thiyyas in the 
colonial administration in Malabar. Yet, on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, there was 
very little scope to discuss the struggle faced by even such highly placed Thiyyas to 
counter the caste-based oppression and discrimination they had experienced. Even 




Thiyya families as shared by their descendants
91
 who were part of this group, most 
members were reluctant to acknowledge this historical experience. When they were 
not rejected outright, such instances of caste discrimination in the past were usually 
brushed aside as either being part of medieval history, or as a universal experience of 
all castes in Kerala other than the highest ranking Brahmin caste.  
 
Such instances indicate that the members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar felt a 
need to distance themselves from caste-based discrimination faced by the Thiyyas in 
the past in an effort to avoid categorization as “backward”. Interestingly, the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar were also trying to promote the use of the word “Thiyyar”, 
rather than “Thiyyan” or “Thiyya” to refer to their caste. Kamal, an admin who 
otherwise chose not to participate in the study through an in-depth conversation, 
made it a point to contact me to demand that I use the term Thiyyar rather than 
Thiyya or Thiyyan. Kamal explained that this decision was taken by the admins 
because the names of many other “forward” castes in Kerala ended in an “ar”, such as 
Nair and Nambiar. Similarly, through public posts on the group, other admins also 
started to openly advise people that they should use the term Thiyyar to refer to their 
                                                 
91 For instance, during our conversation, Pran narrated an instance from the relatively recent family history where 
his ancestor had been discriminated against within Malabar because he was a Thiyya. Pran, who belongs to one of 
the most famous Thiyya families in Malabar - the Moorkoth family - narrated the following story about someone 
who went on to become a tehsildar in the colonial administration: “One of our ancestors - later on he became a 
tehsildar. A tehsildar in those days was a big thing because the district collectors were all British (the post of 
tehsildar was the highest post that could be achieved by an Indian in the colonial period). So the first day that 
he joined as a clerk at the Thalassery tehsildar’s office a Brahmin was the head clerk, or the superintendent of that 
office. So normally, when a new entrant comes in he is given a bench or a stool or a table. But this fellow was 
given only a mat. This fellow… See thiyyas are all… I should say, they don't take things lying down. They protest 
and if they feel that they are not being treated properly they show it up. So when he saw the Deputy Collector 
come in, he slowly laid down on that mat in the office. And the Britisher saw that somebody was lying down in 
the office. He said, "Who is this fellow who is sleeping in the office?" He was told that this is the new fellow who 
had joined. So he said “Call him!” That they could talk in English was a big help. He said, "Why are you sleeping 
in the office?" He said "Sir, I am sorry. I am new to this office and I am coming here for the first time. I was given 
the mat. In our house we use the mat for sleeping. So that is why I was sleeping." So then this fellow knew that the 
Brahmin had not treated him well. Immediately he was given a table and bench. So that man went on to become a 




caste. In popularizing the term Thiyyar, the group was specifically attempting to 
challenge the categorization of their caste as “backward”. 
 
Although it is connected to the representation of caste through place, the re-
embedding of Thiyyaness with Malabar in opposition to South Kerala also has much 
to do with the members’ experience of these places on the basis of how people from 
other castes identify Thiyyas. In other words, the representation of Thiyyaness 
through Malabar and South Kerala is intimately connected to how members 
experienced these places based on how their caste was identified there.  
 
In contrast to their experience of Malabar, many members reported that they had 
experienced South Kerala as a place where caste was central to the identification of a 
person. For instance, in the following excerpt, Vijay, who grew up in the city of 
Kozhikode in Malabar, reflects on his experience of pursuing undergraduate studies 
in South Kerala:  
Can you tell me a little bit about growing up in Calicut?  
Yeah, it was a normal childhood of living in a small city. Not getting 
exposed to too much of a metropolitan lifestyle. But talking about my caste, I 
never thought about my caste until I started my Masters in Kottayam (in 
South Kerala), because well while we were in Calicut, being a thiyya, it was 
like normal you know. We don’t have any… actually I never thought about 
my caste. But when I started living in the south part of Kerala, when people 
ask,, “Okay what is your name?” And I will say, “I am Vijay Kumar 
Manakat.” So they would ask me “Okay, okay. Tell me your full name.” and 
I would say “Yeah - this is my full name.” So these people basically want to 
know my caste! So then in the end they will ask, “Which caste do you belong 
to?”  
(Vijay, member, early 30s, researcher, UK) 
 
Like many others on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, Vijay portrays Malabar as a 




where it is acceptable to openly talk and mobilize around caste. In the preceding 
excerpt, Vijay shares the intense focus on caste-based identification that he 
experienced in South Kerala; when he was not asked directly about his caste, other 
proxies for caste identification, such as enquiring about his full name, were 
employed. 
 
However, despite their general characterization of Malabar as a place where people 
do not emphasize the caste of a person, some members did acknowledge that as 
Thiyyas they had experienced prejudice even within Malabar. For instance, Suvinay, 
shared that even within Malabar the Thiyyas are identified as “backward” and 
narrates the prejudice he experienced on account of this:  
My generation would be the - I am 30 years old right now - so I can say the 
older generation would be somewhere around in their 50s. So those people, 
they still, because in their childhood, probably a Thiyya or any other lower 
caste member would be looked down upon. They would not be allowed to 
come near to them, they would not be allowed to enter the temples. So when 
these kinds of things are going on, they did definitely treat people of Thiyya 
and Ezhava communities as a lower and backward caste. So that 
preconceived notion, it comes into their minds somewhere. Some people, 
somewhere in the head they have the notion that “these people are not the 
same as us.” They (think that we Thiyyas) are little… what do you say?… a 
little socially backward. They are just… they don't treat us like equals! 
Is this experience in Kannur (in Malabar) as well as the rest of Kerala? 
It is there everywhere. It is there in Kannur. Because the two examples which 
I told you, both of them were from Kannur.  
(Suvinay, admin, early 30s, IT services, Abu Dhabi) 
 
Earlier in our conversation, Suvinay, had narrated that his friendship with two female 
Nair friends had generated panic among their Nair parents in Kannur. Suvinay shares 
that even though these were not romantic relationships, these Nair parents were 
extremely anxious to make it clear to him that he should not even think about any 




on to clarify that although he had experienced such prejudice within Malabar, the 
experience of being marked by his caste identity was relatively less pronounced there 
in comparison to South Kerala.  
 
Vijay’s description of his experience of being a Thiyya in Malabar helps to shed some 
perspective on the seeming contrast between his experiences and the events 
experienced by Suvinay. Vijay’s narration - that unlike South Kerala, in Malabar the 
experience of being a Thiyya felt “normal” - is particularly pertinent here. Similar to 
Vijay’s narrative, many of the interview respondents shared that their early awareness 
of being a Thiyya was often prompted through their experience of being marked by 
their caste South Kerala or in interaction with South Keralites. In other words, even 
though some amount of prejudice towards their caste in Malabar was not unusual, as 
Thiyyas they felt they were well within the bounds of what was considered to be the 
normal caste status in the region. Consequently, they felt that in Malabar they did not 
have to even think about identifying themselves on the basis of their caste. In 
contrast, in South Kerala they experienced constant scrutiny and evaluation on the 
basis of their caste.  
 
In part, this experience of being normal in Malabar was grounded in the social and 
cultural capital of the Thiyyas in the region, which mitigated the members’ 
experience of prejudice based on caste status in Malabar. For instance, as one of the 
largest communities in Malabar, the Thiyyas have considerable social capital in this 
region. Within Malabar, the Thiyyas are particularly concentrated in the urban centres 




the members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar either resided currently, or had spent 
their formative years. For instance, in the following excerpt Ramanan narrates that 
growing up in the Thiyya stronghold of Dharamadom, he had experienced life in the 
region as a savarna: 
 
On the group there was a lot of discussion about whether thiyyas are 
avarna or savarna. What would you say about this debate, based on your 
experience? 
Actually I was born in Dharmadom. And in Dharmadom, Thiyyas are in 
forward community. And we never felt that we are avarnas. That may be 
because the majority is Thiyyas there, I don't know. We never mingled with a 
lot of other communities, or they (never) called us avarnas. We were always 
forward class - like savarnas. When you say savarnas it means forward 
class. And when I asked my grandfather and all, he said that particularly in 
this Dharmadom place, the Thiyyas outcasted the Namboothiris. That theory 
we can't rule out - my grandfather said like that. 
Did he mean that Thiyyas threw out the Namboothiris? 
No. He said that the Namboothiris had been out-casted for some reason and 
those have become Thiyyas. But as from my childhood itself, I never felt that 
I was avarna. 
Why do you think that some people on the group argue that Thiyyas 
may be avarna? 
That's because I will tell you… Here are a little above forward class are 
supposed to be Nairs and Nambiars (These castes are often ranked as 
ritually higher than Thiyyas). But here they don't show that, anything. In 
Malabar area, we are only supreme, and we always have supremacy! But I 
felt this (diminished caste status) when we were working in Kuwait. There 
you will find to take a Thiyya may be very less there. There you will find 
other community more. So I have felt some supremacy on their part there. 
(Ramanan, member, early 60s, retired engineer, Thalassery) 
 
Apart from their numerical concentration in parts of Malabar, the Thiyyas had also 
garnered considerable cultural capital in the region. The Thiyyas as a caste group had 
achieved considerable upward social mobility from the time of the British and French 
colonial regimes in the area (Abraham 2006, 2010). Not only did they occupy 
important posts in the colonial as well as post-colonial administration in this region, 
up until fairly recently, they also exerted considerable dominance over trade in the 




history of prominent Thiyyas in Malabar. For instance, Renjith, a doctor employed in 
the Middle-East, shared that many of the Indian mayors of Mahe (formerly a French 
municipality in the Malabar region), had been from his family. It was not that the 
members I spoke to claimed that all Thiyyas in the region were affluent, or held the 
same degree of prestige. For instance, Suriya, a 26 year old counselor in Kannur 
town, mentioned that his brothers were engaged in coolie (daily wage) labour in rural 
Kannur. Rather, it was the case that this made for visible capital in the place of 
Malabar which created an additional, more favourable discursive axis for the 
identification of Thiyyas there, as compared to South Kerala. 
 
For instance, in the following excerpt, Harish, a Kannur-based admin explains the 
kind of cultural capital that the Thiyyas have in the region of Malabar:  
Some people said that one of the reasons why they did not want Thiyyas 
and Ezhavas to be confused was that they feared that this way the 
Thiyyas would get a backward tag. Is this something that concerns you? 
Yes that is it. It is like that also. We usually…earlier …. I told you right…we 
have a status here. When you say Thiyya, Nair, Nambiar, the status is the 
same. Even though the Thiyyas are OBC, everyone gives a similar respect 
even today. It an equal type of… even the organization it is the same 
treatment. So because we are thiyyas … but if you go to Travancore side, it is 
considered like a little inferior… among the Nairs, Ezhavas are definitely 
considered like inferiors. That is the difference. Here we don’t have that 
thing among us. So now we are at that level. In our dressing and all, over 
here, we are a little modern. Similarly if you look at the Ezhavas on the 
Trivandrum side, in their dressing and all you can see that they are a little 
backward. So now, the marriage function of a Thiyya is of a very good 
standard, everyone. If you see the same thing there (among the Ezhavas in 
South Kerala), you can observe a significant difference. 
(Harish, admin, early 30s, businessman, Kannur) 
 
As Harish is trying to explain in the excerpt above, although the Thiyyas, like the 
Ezhavas, are categorized as OBC, in the region of Malabar, their identification 




identity. The Thiyyas as a caste group have a considerable degree of social and 
cultural capital within Malabar, which interrupted their discursive construction as 
"backward” in that region and alleviated the consequences of such identification.  
 
During the interviews it also emerged that the members’ anxiety over the 
identification of Thiyyas as “backward” is deeply connected to their experiences as 
Thiyyas in South Kerala or their interactions with South Keralites in other places. In 
these conversations, many members articulated their fear that the continuing 
association with the Ezhava caste resulted in the identification of Thiyyas as a 
“backward” caste, particularly citing their experiences in the South of Kerala as an 
instance.  
 
It emerged that many members of the group, particularly those who were part of the 
mobile, urban, upper or middle-class, experienced that when they moved to South 
Kerala, or interacted with people from South Kerala, they were likely to be identified 
as Ezhava, rather than Thiyya. Further, these members intensely experienced the 
stigma associated with the Ezhavas in South Kerala. When they moved out of the 
region of Malabar, they were much more likely to be constructed outside the 
boundary of the normal, as “backward”. As Murali explained, to be identified as 
Ezhava, was to be automatically recognized as being of inferior status in the South of 
Kerala. 
Okay so that sense that "all Thiyyas must unite"-when did that sense 
come to you? 
Because I told you no, when I go to the southern part, they treat us inferior. 




they (people from South Kerala) feel that Ezhava is equivalent to Thiyya. 
We are inferior there. 
Can you give me some examples of your experiences there? 
So what happened was that my manager was Brahmin-  SC Shekhar. So 
when we were going there, suddenly when we were in Ernakulam (South 
Kerala), he asked me “what is your caste?” I said " Thiyya" and he was not 
knowing that. And then he said "oh! It's a backward caste." And then he 
started treating us differently. But in Kannur and all we didn't face those 
things you know. Then another thing, when we were having drinks, you 
know, my friends, one Christian friend was there, then another Nambiar was 
there and I was there. We were having drinks and in that time this Christian 
friend was from South Kerala. So he was asking me "what is your caste?" So 
I said " Thiyya". Then the Nambiar was telling "He is a Chovvan, backward 
caste, like that”. That made me feel very bad. So from there only I developed 
that Thiyyas should bring back the lost glory of the Thiyya. 
When did these incidents happened? 
This happened I can tell you, some 7 to 8 years back. This is around 2002-
2003. 
And the experience with your manager? 
That happened earlier. Maybe 10 years back. Maybe 2000-2001. 
(Murali, founder-admin, mid-40s, manager in private firm, Kannur town) 
 
 
Outside the region of Malabar, the members experienced a delinking of the regional 
identification from their construction as individuals marked by the disembedded 
contexts of caste (as “backward”). Indeed, during the interviews it emerged that it 
was fairly common for Thiyyas  to navigate this delinking through the strategy of 
passing as other “forward” castes such as Nairs or Brahmins. As this excerpt from 
Siddharth’s interview establishes, not only did his family feel compelled to engage in 
such passing within India, but they also did so even when they migrated to places 
outside India. 
Actually one of the members on the group complained that his 
promotion got stopped because his boss was Nair, when he found out 
that this member was a Thiyya. Have you heard or experienced 
something like this? 
No actually I don't look like a Thiyya. But I haven't experienced any 
problems till now. But people will ask simply. Because based on my merit 
only I got this job. I didn't go and ask for any reservation or something. I 
want to know whether this person is working in government or private? 




Okay. I don't know about the people who are there in the Gulf. They are 
working in a Muslim country and they are doing… okay! But I haven't faced 
in India. I am working in Bangalore. We do not have many Malayalees in our 
place. So they will ask, but I think that's just because they do not know. So 
they will simply ask. Many of them have heard of Nairs. So they will ask 
"are you a Nair?” And I am not ready to tell them that I am Ezhava because I 
know that I don't belong to that community. So it's a question of identity. 
So when you tell them that you are a Thiyya how do they react? 
They don't know. So they may think that it is a branch of Nair or something. 
Some people also told me about Thiyyas who are very hesitant to 
acknowledge that they are Thiyyas. They would much rather be known 
as Nairs in their neighbourhood. 
Yeah some of my close family members… Most people they tell that they are 
Nairs only. Even my mother and all used to tell that… We were in Bahrain at 
that time, when I was studying. Till class 12 I was in Bahrain. So over there, 
we use to tell that we are Nairs only, when somebody asked us. Like when 
family friends, or work friends asked. 
So why would you say that you are Nairs? 
Because we don't feel ourselves as Ezhavas. Because people where they 
come from the South… People who come from the South they don't know 
about this thing… And the Kerala government shows that Ezhavas and 
Thiyyas are the same so… And we're not ready to say that we are Ezhavas, 
because we feel ourselves to be more close to Nairs because our 
characteristics are also. 
(Siddharth, admin, late 20s, IT professional, Bangalore) 
  
Here it is significant that Siddharth explains the common act of passing in terms of a 
reluctance to be categorized as Ezhavas by arguing that the Thiyyas had more in 
common with the Nairs. Earlier in our conversation he had explained that the Thiyyas 
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 Siddharth explains the distinction from Ezhavas and similarity with the Nairs in the following manner: “ See, 
actually what is caste? Currently the forward caste of people who belong to that is chaturvarna, it means four 
varna. So status full of people are very much forward. For example Nairs and Nambodhris are economically and 
culturally and educationally forward, means they are more educated and more well to do people. And avarna 
people there are different people who are very poor and doesn’t have much of a culture. For example in avarna 
there are so many category people like scheduled caste and scheduled tribes. SC like Pulaya, Paraya like this. But 
Thiyyas, character-wise, they are not similar to those people. They are similar to Nairs and Namboothiris. If you 
interact and analyze the Thiyyas people their character wise… and the situation in Malabar is that they are not 
similar to Pulayas and Palaya, SC and STs. So based on that people are not very happy that they should be 
considered as backwards. Because when they are considered as backward class means that they are bracketed into 
this lower caste community. So that why they are not happy about mentioning as backward caste because they 
don’t like to be identified with SC and ST and all the other tribes. So they want to be identified with people having 
the central status like Nairs and Menons. If you go to the southern Kerala you will find most of the respected 





“OBC Separate - 7% like us, 7% for Ezhavas”: Identification with the 
disembedded category of the OBC  
 
Clarifying how the nation-state knew the Thiyyas as part of the disembedded 
administrative category of OBC provided a pressing impetus for the re-embedding of 
caste identity in place on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Over the past decade, this 
cross-section of Thiyyas had started to become progressively anxious about the 
manner in which the nation-state identified them. Their concern was focused not so 
much on the identification of Thiyyas as OBC, as on their categorization as a sub-
caste of the Ezhavas within that disembedded category by the state government of 
Kerala. Further, they were also concerned about the implications of such 
identification in terms of access to the benefits of the policies of affirmative action. 
The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar argued that due to their classification as a 
subcategory of the Ezhavas, Thiyyas would be unable to fully utilize the benefits of 
categorization within the OBCs.  
 
Sudipto Kaviraj (1997) uses the term the “logic of enumeration”, to refer, in part, to 
the anxiety over the nation-state’s identification of social groups in colonial and post-
colonial contexts during modernity. Here, the colonial/postcolonial nation-state 
compartmentalizes previously fuzzy social affiliations such as castes and religions 
                                                                                                                                           
Thiyyas. So when Thiyyas are branded as lower caste people, for example when people say that they are 






into mutually exclusive social categories, and proceeds to address social policy 
towards groups based on this categorization. In turn, this provides a significant 
impetus for the mobilization of social groups around such mutually exclusive 
categories. As noted by Kaviraj (1997) and Appadurai (1996), the logic of 
enumeration came to dominate the field of politics in post-colonial states, wherein 
each group that is mobilized around caste become progressively sensitive to the 
questions of “how many are we” (enumeration) and “where are we located” (social 
mapping). Under the logic of enumeration, the question of how the nation-state 
identifies the social group gains a particular salience since identification is directly 
tied to the allocation of social benefits.  This concept includes within its purview, 
relationships of identification and negotiation between the nation-states and particular 
castes. By implication, it also includes the relationship among castes, which is 
increasingly predicated on their identification by the nation-state and competition 
over access to resources dispensed by the nation-state. The analytical focus in the 
logic of enumeration, however, is placed on the relationship between the nation-state 
and castes, rather than the relationship between different castes. 
 
For many of the members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, their identity as Thiyyas 
had taken on a renewed significance in recent times in relation to the logic of 
enumeration. In describing how they came to be a part of a caste-based group on 
Meerkat.com, members often argued that until a couple of decades ago they did not 
hold such an active interest in discussing or organizing around their Thiyya identity. 




two ways. For some members, their immediate motivation in mobilizing around a 
Thiyya identity and consolidating social organizations around this identity came from 
the realization that the Thiyyas were being officially categorized as a sub-caste of the 
Ezhavas rather than as a separate caste in itself. Irrespective of the scale at which this 
official categorization may actually be taking place (note for instance the disparity 
between the national and state OBC lists), it is significant that many people who were 
joining the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were quite convinced that this was occurring 
extensively and were extremely worried by it. 
 
Others explained that the resurgence of their awareness of themselves as Thiyyas had 
come about more recently when they observed that other castes, which were 
numerically smaller than the Thiyyas, had successfully gained access to the benefits 
of social policy by explicitly mobilizing around their caste identity. These members 
lamented that this kind of mobilization had not occurred among the Thiyyas 
themselves, imparing their ability to negotiate with the nation-state.  
 
The prevalence of the logic of enumeration on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar can be 
observed in the members’ description of a process that came to be referred as 
ezhavanization on the group. The term was occasionally used by members to refer to 
a purposive identification of the Thiyyas as Ezhavas during marriage searches
93
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 For instance, a popular topic of conversation on the group, which was also reflected in the personal interviews 
was the experience of Thiyya brides and grooms being categorized as Ezhavas in matrimonial agencies and on 






. However, a more commonly recognized connotation of 
ezhavanization, and one which was particularly vexing for each member interviewed, 
was as a reference to what they perceived as the progressive identification of Thiyyas 
as a sub-caste of the Ezhavas in official documents pertaining to the identification of 
caste by the government of Kerala. This recent and explicit amalgamation of Thiyyas 
and Ezhavas by the government of Kerala provided one of the primary reasons for the 
current effort towards relegitimating the identification of Thiyya identity through 
Malabar on this digital group. As mentioned previously, there exists a long history of 
the popular identification of the Thiyyas as Ezhavas. However, it was only in the last 
decade that the Thiyyas have begun to be explicitly categorized as a subcaste of the 
Ezhavas in official documents in Kerala where caste details were recorded such a 
birth certificates, high school certificates, public examinations and scholarship forms. 
The admins of the group even argued that such amalgamation had been underway 
even in the census, and was only corrected after the intervention of Mullapalli 
Ramachandran, a minister in the government of Kerala. This could not have been the 
case for the 2011 population census since caste names were only recorded if an 
individual was categorized as SC or ST. However, we can infer that the admins are 
referring to a smaller survey, such as a coastal survey of Kerala that was initiated by 
this minister, or surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization.  
 
During interviews, members recollected that prior to the decade of the 2000s, while 
Thiyyas were identified as OBCs, or even if they were popularly considered to be a 
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 For instance, members cited instances of cultural appropriation such as Thiyya worship rituals and places of 
worship in Malabar being identified as related to the Ezhavas in the popular media, particularly through the new 




part of the Ezhavas, as far as official documents were concerned, they had had the 
option to mark themselves as Thiyya (Ty). However, over the past decade they had 
had no option but to mark themselves as Ezhavas (Ez) in such official documents. In 
the following excerpt, Vijay, explains that shift in categorization is relatively recent: 
Does the rest of your family also feel the need for a separate thiyya 
identity? 
Yes, we all want our caste to be written as Thiyya. We don’t want our caste 
to be written as Ezhavas. See its like losing our identity. As Thiyyas we are 
losing our identity and we are forced to write Ezhavas which we don’t want. 
Where are you forced to write this? 
No the thing is, me, I never had to. Because in those days (in the early 2000s 
when he was filling out college application forms) the Thiyyas had an 
option of writing our caste in every government record. But lately, because 
of the influence of Ezhavas, they are trying to take off Thiyya from that. And 
they are trying to make it as a sub-caste. You can even see that in Wikipedia. 
There, in 2005-6 the heading used to be Thiyya/Ezhava. And now it is just 
Ezhava. And we have tried our level best to write it as Thiyyas. They want to 
write us as a sub-caste of Ezhavas which is not true at all. We have our own 
identity.  
So how recently did this happen   
I think the past one or 2 years I guess. Because I heard one of my dad’s 
cousin saying that when she was applying for PSC (Public Services 
Commission exam) there was no option for Thiyya and she was forced to 
write Ezhava. And one more thing that happened was like one of my dad’s 
friends who is from the Moorkoth family. He was from Trichur and when his 
kid was born there, when he asked them to note Thiyyas as his caste in the 
birth certificate, they actually were saying that it was not possible. But he 
literally fought and they were forced to write Thiyya. So it is like losing our 
identity - why do people have to take our caste name? So it is like calling a 
Hindu a Muslim or a Brahmin a Nair. Do you think that a Brahmin will allow 
to take his identity? Or will a Nair allow it? So it is the same kind of thing 
with us. So we want our identity back. We don’t want this false identity as 
Ezhava. 
     (Vijay, early 30s, researcher, UK) 
 
Vijay’s description of the loss of identity as part of a deliberate tactic of the Ezhava 
caste indicates that the shift in the categorization (of the Thiyyas as Ezhavas), and the 




also needs to be understood in the context of the shift in the substantialized identity of 
this caste in Kerala.  
 
As we saw earlier, substantialization [Dumont (1966)1970] refers to a consolidation 
of a single caste (or even a group of castes) into a single bloc that is in competition 
with other substantialized blocs over access to various economic, political and social 
resources. Like the logic of enumeration, the concept of substantialization is also 
concerned with studying the identification of castes, and the relationship between a 
particular caste, the nation-state and other castes are an important part of this concept. 
Unlike the logic of enumeration, however, in substantialization the analytical focus is 
placed on the relationships of identification among various castes groups, rather than 
on their relationship with the nation-state. Bearing in mind the difference in class (and 
other) allegiances that exist within a single caste, Ishii (2007) has suggested that 
substantialization is necessarily a partial process. More significantly, Ishii 
demonstrated that substantialization was best understood as a multi-directional. A 
caste that acted in competition with other castes in one time period, could 
subsequently join them as part of a single substantialized group of castes or vice 
versa.    
 
Such multi-directionality and in-caste fracturing also be observed in the case of the 
Thiyyas. The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar (in addition to other digital and physical 
groups) was attempting to forge a new substantialized identity for the Thiyya caste. 
As explained in Section 1, for much of the 21
st




tenuous, alliance with the Ezhavas through the SNDP. Under the aegis of the SNDP, 
the Thiyyas and Ezhavas together had acted as a substantialized caste bloc in Kerala. 
Although they were keen on establishing a separation between the Thiyyas and 
Ezhavas, members and admins readily acknowledged that the classification of the 
Thiyyas as OBC in 1960s Kerala was a direct consequence of this historical alliance. 
Anecdotal evidence, from middle-aged members such as Manjushri (aged 60) and 
Sathish (aged 44) who recounted the days of their childhood, also suggests that during 
this period the Nairs were considered as the primary caste Other against which this 
substantialized alignment of Thiyyas and Ezhavas had competitively positioned 
themselves. Today the focus, atleast for a majority of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, 
seems to have shifted away from the Nairs to the Ezhavas. That said, the Nairs are not 
completely outside the pale of the conversation. As can be observed in the previous 
analysis on “backwardness”, considerations such as ‘what do the Nairs think of the 
Thiyyas’ and ‘how do the Nairs stand in relation to the status of the Nairs’ was very 
much implied in the creation of this new substantialized identity. 
 
The motivations for a renewed emphasis on linking Thiyyas with Malabar are of 
course influenced by political developments in Malabar and Kerala. Over the past 4-5 
years a certain section of the Thiyyas had started to organize themselves separately in 
the region of Malabar, particularly in the districts of Kannur, Kozhikode and 
Kasaragod, under the aegis of budding organizations such as the Thiyya Mahasabha 
(TMS) and Malabar Thiyya Mahasabha (MTMS). Consequently, the formation of a 




substantialized identity where the Ezhavas and Thiyyas were aligned with each other. 
Within the Thiyya caste itself, a considerable section was still sympathetic to the 
older substantialized identity where the Thiyyas and Ezhavas were aligned with each 
other. However, in the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the emphasis was on generating a 
new substantialized identity of the Thiyyas as an autonomous bloc. 
 
The influence of various political parties and caste organizations on the emergence of 
such a substantialized identity is certainly not insignificant. Attitudes towards 
different caste organizations - the MTMS/TMS and the SNDP - varied considerably 
on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Most of the admins on the group had either 
formally joined the MTMS, or held office in its administrative structure.  
Nevertheless, not everyone on the group was associated with the MTMS. Indeed, 
during interviews some of the members privately expressed mistrust towards this 
organization. Others were ambivalent towards it - some who had initially shared plans 
to join MTMS had later abandoned the idea. Similarly, animosity towards the SNDP 
was extremely high among the admins and members who had joined the MTMS. Yet, 
there were other influential members on the group who took on a cautious approach - 
although they expressed dissatisfaction with the current management of the SNDP, 
they saw some merit in in co-operative relationship with the organization in the 
future.  
 
That said, with the exception of two people, the idea of a representative caste 




Thiyyas resonated strongly with all respondents. Most members argued that the 
Thiyyas’ Malabari spirit of excessive athmarthatha had done the community a deep 
disservice in the long run. The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar argued that it was due to 
the athmarthatha of the Thiyyas that they had participated so whole heartedly in 
egalitarian movements around class-equality (communism) and caste-equality 
(alignment with Sri Narayana Guru). However, they felt that in the process the 
Thiyyas had neglected to mobilize around their caste in a climate where other castes 
had organized in this manner and had gained from the benefits of such mobilization. 
Consequently, many members felt that the time had come for the emergence of a 
representative organization comprised of and focused mainly on the Thiyyas. Though 
many of these members argued that they would not like such an organization to get 
involved in politics, a political role for such an organization was envisioned 
nonetheless. The frequent exhortation of respondents that the representative caste 
organization should “stay away from politics” meant that a representative 
organization was expected not to formally affiliate itself with any particular political 
party, especially since different sections of the Thiyya caste were aligned to parties 
along the political spectrum - Left (CPI(M)), Centre (Congress) and Right (RSS). 
Yet, a political role for such a caste-based organization was definitely envisioned, 
since most of the respondents felt that an organization was needed which would 
represent Thiyya interests and negotiate with the nation-state. 
 
While these political developments are not irrelevant, the emergence of such a 




of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar is more important in the current analysis of 
distanciation, disembedding and re-embedding. Despite the variety of affiliations that 
existed on the group, each respondent expressed concern about the manner in which 
the Thiyyas were identified by the government of Kerala. On the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar, the argument was that the Thiyyas should be identified as a caste that is 
separate from the Ezhava caste, rather than as a sub-caste of the latter.  
 
The emphasis on the need for government recognition of a Thiyya identity that was 
distinct from the Ezhavas was also motivated by how it influenced access to the 
benefits of affirmative action. Attitudes towards affirmative action policies, and the 
categorization of the Thiyyas therein, differed considerably on the group. A vocal 
section on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar did not approve of affirmative action, and 
would preface conversations about the OBC status of the Thiyyas with declarations of 
opposing the system of reservations in India
95
. These tended to be the predominantly 
urban and middle-class members on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. The aversion to 
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 An interesting tension that I observed among most members I spoke to was that although they were part of this 
online group which was mobilizing on caste lines, they also participated in the prevalent discourse of efficiency 
and merit around caste mobilization (particularly around the OBC, SC and ST categories) which is popular in 
urban, upper-class or middle-class India. Consequently, many of them had to reconcile an acute sense of 
discomfort regarding caste-based mobilization with membership in caste-based group like the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar. For instance, here Arun, an admin of the group narrates his approach to caste mobilization: 
Based on whatever interaction I had with the people from down South, I was never 
comfortable. The way they tried to mingle with you… I don't know, there was always this 
uncomfortable feeling you get. 
Where did you meet them and at what point in time? 
Yeah most of them I met in my work places only, different workplaces. And slowly they tried 
to bring this caste issue, in a sort of not a comfortable way. 
(Arun, admin, early 30s, IT professional, Hyderabad)  
During our conversation Arun also narrated that he was uncomfortable not only with the ease with which people 
from South Kerala engage in discussions about caste, but also because they would attempt to organise the 
workforce based on caste lines. He was particularly incensed at their attempts to include him within their caste-
based group in office, and considered this to be activity that propagated caste inequality. At the same time, Arun 
viewed his own participation in the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, or the offline organizations like TMS and MTMS 





the system of affirmative action stemmed, in no small measure, from the fact that as 
per the creamy layer limitation applicable to the OBC category, such members were 
often unable to access the fruits of affirmative action. In contrast, members who had 
grown up in rural or semi-rural areas of Malabar, and belonged to lower middle-class 
families, tended to express support for affirmative action policies.  
 
Irrespective of the differences in political affiliations and attitudes towards 
affirmative action, nearly all respondents emphasized that OBC classification of the 
Thiyyas still needed to be continued. The term OBC was primarily interpreted by 
these members as an administrative categorization. Most members, irrespective of 
their personal attitudes towards affirmative action, were reconciled to the 
classification of Thiyyas as OBC. The need for the continuation of this classification 
was justified primarily in practical terms. Although much of the discussion on the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was devoted to stressing that the Thiyyas on the whole 
were very affluent, these members also argued that OBC reservations were required 
for the benefit of a small proportion of Thiyyas who were less affluent. Alternatively, 
the OBC status of the thiyyas was also justified through the argument that it would be 
imprudent of the Thiyyas to give up on a pre-existing classification, when all other 
communities were vying with each other to be classified as OBC, SC or ST. 
 
Although the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar wished to continue the categorization of the 
Thiyyas under the OBCs, there was considerable debate on the group about whether 




group was that while only a small section of Thiyyas had been able to avail the 
benefits from their classification as OBC, their caste as a whole had been disparaged 
through an association with the Ezhavas. The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar argued that 
it was the OBC classification that had enabled the equation of the Thiyyas with the 
Ezhavas in the first instance. Secondly, they argued that such an equation of Ezhavas 
with the Thiyyas had in turn led to their categorization as a “backward” caste, and led 
to their degradation from an erstwhile “forward” caste. Consequently, the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar argued that the Thiyyas had lost social prestige, but had largely 
been unable to use the benefits of OBC classification. 
 
The logic of enumeration was employed strongly and vocally on the group, where the 
argument was made that in being clubbed under the Ezhavas, the Thiyyas were being 
deprived of the benefits they were entitled to under the OBC classification. The Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar argued that although as part of the combined categorization the 
Thiyyas and Ezhavas together were entitled to 14% of all OBC benefits in the state of 
Kerala, the Ezhavas had usurped the lion’s share of these benefits. As will be detailed 
in the next chapter, the perceived inability of the Thiyyas and the perceived ability of 
Ezhavas to access these benefits were often expressed through spatial imaginaries. It 
was referred to as yet another instance where the calculating Southerners (Ezhavas) 
had exploited the naivete of the selfless Malabaris (Thiyyas). The expectation was 
that once the Thiyyas were categorized separately, they would be assigned a separate 





As can be observed in this chapter, over the past decade, the nation-state had 
legitimized a disembedded manner of identifying the Thiyyas by subsuming them as a 
part of the Ezhava caste in official categorizations. The disembedded identification of 
their caste made these Thiyyas more vulnerable to stigmatization on the basis of their 
caste identity in other regions. In this case, we can observe that such disembedding, in 
interaction with the emergence of a new substantialized autonomous Thiyya identity 
and the pressures of the logic of enumeration, prompted the re-legitimation of a 
Malabar-based narrative construction of caste identity on the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar. In other words, the re-embedding of caste is occurring in response to the 
very consequences of the disembedding of caste for a particular set of actors. Here, 
the group is reviving a co-existent yet delegitimized manner of identifying 
Thiyyaness (through Malabar) in order to specifically counter the manner in which 











Chapter 5:  The Spatial Imaginaries of Place: Reconstructing 
Boundaries and Belongingness of Malabar 
 
 
In this chapter, I study how the identification of caste shapes the manner in which the 
members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar visualize the region of Malabar. In 
particular, I analyze how the re-embedding of Thiyya identity in Malabar on this 
group shapes discussions about what the boundaries of Malabar are, who belongs to 
the region, and just how they can belong in Malabar.  
 
The chapter consists of two sections. In Section 1, I analyze how the members of the 
group articulate connections between the well-being of the Thiyyas and the well-
being of Malabar. Through this analysis, I demonstrate how this group constructs the 
Thiyyas as the legitimate representatives of the interests of Malabar. In Section 2, I 
analyze the manner in which the region of Malabar is envisioned on the group, 
particularly the form Malabar should take and questions of which communities 
belong to Malabar.  In this section, I demonstrate that the way in which the 
boundaries of and access to Malabar is envisioned by the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar 
is influenced both by the popular and disembedded identification of the Thiyyas as 
Ezhavas, as well as the substantialization of the Thiyyas as Hindus in Malabar vis-à-





Connecting the Welfare of the Thiyyas and Malabar: Thiyyas as the legitimate 
representatives of Malabar 
 
On the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar much of the discussion about events and issues 
related to the Thiyyas was focused on the region of Malabar. To an outsider, the 
preponderance of Malabar-centered discussions may have been puzzling. After all, 
Thiyya migration to destinations within India and abroad is considerable. More 
significantly, those Thiyyas who were either currently residing outside Malabar, or 
had done so over their lifetime, are somewhat disproportionately over-represented 
among the vocal members and admins of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. However, 
the group’s continuing perception of a strong connection between the well-being of 
the Thiyyas and the well-being of Malabar was demonstrated in the manner in which 
members and admins publicly responded to my posts, particularly one where I had 
solicited comments about what they considered to be the key challenges experienced 
by their caste. While some members framed their responses only in terms of what was 
happening to the Thiyyas, most other members articulated the key concerns about 
their caste in terms of what was happening to the Thiyyas in Malabar.  
 
To substantiate this observation, during the course of the one-on-one in-depth 
interviews, different group members were asked to reflect about what they thought of 
such Malabar-centered discussions when it came to talking about Thiyyas. It became 
clear that despite the substantial differences in opinions among members on the 




From the perspective of the members and admins, it was but natural that 
conversations on the group would be focused not only on the Thiyyas, but what was 
happening to the Thiyyas in Malabar. In this section, I analyze the manner in which 
the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar perceived the well-being of the Thiyyas and Malabar 
to be inter-linked. 
  
An important way in which a large section of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar 
(particularly the admins but also members) visualized the interconnection between 
caste and place was by arguing that the Thiyyas had a crucial role to play in the 
welfare of Malabar. Most people on the group represented Malabar as a region that 
was lagging behind the other parts of Kerala in a variety of development indicators 
due to the lack of access to physical infrastructure, particularly in terms of 
educational institutions. Although the tendency to reflect on such deficiencies in the 
Malabar region was the most intense among those who were physically based in the 
region, it was also echoed by those members who lived elsewhere. Only a minuscule 
minority of those interviewed expressed the opinion that Malabar was not falling 
behind developmentally; these people resided outside Malabar. 
 
What is particularly interesting in the group’s attitude to Malabar is that in 
articulating the intersecting interests of caste and place, these members and admins 
constructed Thiyyas as the legitimate representatives of Malabar. In making such an 
argument, they varyingly stressed on factors such as the size of this caste relative to 




had contributed to the region as compared to other caste and religious groups. The 
dominant section of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was making a case for the need 
for Thiyyas to mobilize as a caste in the region, not only so as to benefit the caste 
itself but also because they considered it to be a crucial means of negotiating for 
resources for the region of Malabar itself. 
 
These members and admins would often allude to the numerical dominance of the 
Thiyyas in this region to discuss the lack of resources for Malabar itself. They argued 
that since the Thiyyas were numerically the largest Hindu caste in the region of 
Malabar, the welfare of this caste in particular would significantly determine the 
welfare of the Malabar region as a whole. This manner of thinking can be observed in 
the following excerpt from my conversation with Rakesh, a Kannur-based admin on 
the group. Except for a few years in Goa and South Kerala, Rakesh has spent much of 
his life in Malabar. He currently resides with his wife and children in Kannur, a city 
where much of his extended family is settled. 
Do you think that the Thiyyas have been at a disadvantage because they 
did not organize earlier? 
Yes. “Thiyyas were disadvantaged” means the northern side, in the northern 
districts of Kerala population is mostly are Thiyyas. And we were not getting 
education institutions, industries, roads and electricity, water like that. We 
were not really getting our due because these people (Thiyyas) were not 
much organised in the name of caste. Development was not coming to the 
northern side. Even now there is a little change in this part, but still now it's 
like that. Malabar is backward. If you go through the budget of the Kerala 
government or Central government of the railway, we can see that a major 
portion is earmarked for the southern side. There is no equal distribution. 
That is one of the reasons which prompted us (Thiyyas) to organise. 
Do you think that there is a connection between the problems that 
Malabar is facing and the problems that the Thiyyas are facing? 
Yes, because in Malabar are most people are Thiyyas. Major portion belongs 
to Thiyya caste, I think. The latest census I don't know, we… Because the 
caste census started in 2011. Caste census was undertaken by the government 




completed. Probably after that we will get the correct population of the 
various castes. Anyhow we are the biggest caste, in population in Malabar. 
(Rakesh, admin, early 40s, mid-level government official, Kannur) 
In this excerpt, is it significant that in order to articulate the challenges faced by 
Thiyyas, Rakesh draws not only on the lack of caste-based mobilization of this 
community but also on the disadvantages of Malabar. Further, Rakesh sees the 
welfare of Malabar as organically connected to the Thiyyas on account of their 
numerical strength in this region. Here, Rakesh argues that Malabar lags behind on 
various development indicators because as the largest caste group in the region, the 
Thiyyas have historically not organized themselves on the basis of caste. In Rakesh’s 
opinion, the Thiyyas have as a result, been unable to utilize their potential strength in 
negotiating with the nation-state not only for the benefit of the caste but also the 
benefit of Malabar. The employment of the logic of enumeration can be observed in 
such a stress on the numerical dominance of Thiyyas in Malabar. Both enumeration 
(how many are we) and mapping (where are we located) are important components of 
the logic of enumeration.  
 
Thus, a large and vocal section on the group considered the Thiyyas to be the 
appropriate source of representation as far as a struggle for resources related to 
Malabar was concerned. As can be observed in the following excerpt from 
Ramanan’s interview, members often argued that for Malabar to develop, more 
representation from the Thiyya caste was required. Ramanan’s family is based in 
Dharmadom, a town that is famous as a stronghold of the Thiyyas in Malabar. 
Although he has traveled extensively within and outside India as a naval engineer, he 




When did you start thinking more about the problems that Thiyyas are 
facing?  
No that is basically, whoever is Kerala government… Basically this was 
under Madras presidency, Malabar during the British times. And that side 
was under Travancore king. So the thing was after that Madras presidency 
was gone and whatever happening development in Malabar was very slow. 
You know even if we want a bridge we have to fight and struggle with the 
government. So Malabar is right now also it is neglected. That is because 
other communities taking advantage of developing their own places. So we 
have no much Thiyya representation from Malabar in the ministry because of 
the politics here. And you know because of our brazenness they used ask for 
other purposes, not as a leadership. 
Which other communities, and which other places got developed? 
Okay, for example if you take the ministry of Kerala you will find that the 
major people on the top positions are Christian community, then you will 
find the Muslim community. Then you will find very few you will find 
Ezhavas and… In thiyyas community, you will not find many leaders in 
there. See when you have a (Thiyya) leader, you have a representation from 
Malabar for development. Or some other people… There were some leaders 
but they are not from our community and they did not do much… So we start 
feeling "why our Malabar is not…?” Since the British our roads are same. 
The British made… You have seen our roads. They made it for bullock carts 
and horse carts and now the vehicles are so much congested. They did not 
even give for a highway, or bypass, or big roads or something like that. The 
British who made the bridges are still used, you know! But all the expansions 
are there on the other side of Kerala, in South Kerala. Even if you go to the 
estates (within Malabar), where rubber things are planted you'll find very 
good road and bridges where the people are very less. Because money is 
diverted and pumped for by certain communities (here Ramanan is 
referring to the Christian settlements in the eastern part of Malabar) for 
their own interest and purposes. So then I start feeling that we're neglected, 
you know. 
  (Ramanan, member, early 60s, retired engineer, Thalassery) 
 
Like Rakesh, Ramanan response situates the problems of the Thiyyas more broadly 
within problems in the region of Malabar (“development was very slow”). It is 
significant that he identifies the major reason for the neglect of Malabar to be the 
selfishness of other caste and religious groups both within Malabar and in South 
Kerala. For Ramanan, the solution to the problem of Malabar’s development was not 
simply one of representation, or the emergence of “leaders” from the region. Rather 




Thiyyas (“there were some leaders but they are not from our community and they did 
not do much”). 
 
Indeed, a few members who were closely aligned with the MTMS on the group, such 
as Arjun and Shantanu, even went to the extent of attributing the relatively unequal 
distribution of resources between South Kerala and Malabar to a power struggle 
between the Thiyyas and their caste Others, the Ezhavas. Such members argued that 
through their dominance in the state government administration or as elected officials 
in the state government, the Ezhavas had succeeded in a concerted effort to draw 
resources towards the regions of South of Kerala and thus deprived the region of 
Malabar. This view however, did not have sufficient traction on the group, neither 
among others who were explicitly aligned with MTMS nor among those who were 
more ambivalent towards it. The broader consensus favoured on the group was that 
although there were quite a few elected Thiyya political leaders, Malabar did not have 
access to adequate resources because these leaders did not work for the benefit of the 
Thiyya caste per se. 
 
Some members of the group, particularly those who reside in the rural parts of 
Malabar, further suggested that the fate of the Thiyyas is crucial in understanding the 
current state of Malabar because this large group of people has experienced intense 
disadvantages relative to other social groups in the region. That is, they argue that 
even within Malabar, a region that already experiences considerable neglect the 




educational and physical resources. In this context, the members and admins 
specifically engaged in a critique against the Thiyya engagement with Communism in 
the region of Malabar.  
 
Here, members drew on the athmarthatha or sacrifice of the Thiyyas that had 
specifically contributed to Malabar. An argument commonly articulated on the group 
was that while the Thiyyas had worked tirelessly for the cause of Communism, they 
had in the process failed to mobilize as a caste. As a consequence, the members 
argued, the Thiyyas themselves had become impoverished over time while other 
communities had progressed through caste-based mobilization. On the other hand, 
some members attributed a much more active role of the Left parties in obstructing 
the mobilization of Thiyyas as a caste.  
 
Here the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were constructing the Thiyyas as a set of people 
who had selflessly put in the most amount of effort in developing Malabar. At the 
same time, many in the group identified the Left-based alignment of the majority of 
the caste as a factor which prevented the caste-based mobilization of the Thiyyas. 
They argued that this in turn had left the Thiyyas as vulnerable actors without 
adequate representation in Malabar. To explain this, the speedy prosecution 
conducted in the case of the 2012 political murder of TP Chandrasekharan, a Nair, 
was frequently discussed on the group as well as during in-depth interviews. The 
admins in particular contrasted it with lack of action in many older cases involving 




successfully mobilized on the basis of caste, the Thiyyas lacked representation in 
Malabar particularly since they did not think of themselves in caste terms. This 
critique of Communism was expressed as an absence of those who would account for 
the interests of the Thiyya community and get what was rightfully due to them 
(“njanakku kannakku parayan aarumilla”). Interestingly, this critique was widely 
echoed on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, often across the varying political 
affiliations of members. This included those members on the groups who explicitly 
aligned themselves with the Left in Malabar as well as those who adopted a pro-Dalit 
agenda.  
 
The broad narrative on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was that the development of 
the region depended on the caste-based mobilization of the Thiyyas. Further, the 
welfare of Malabar was tied to a particular form of Thiyya engagement. In order to 
channelize resources towards Malabar, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar argued that 
what was required was not only a greater number of elected Thiyya leaders but also 
that such leaders should work to represent the Thiyyas rather than pledge their 
primary alliance to Communism. 
 
Constructing Place through Caste: Thiyyaness and the Boundaries of Malabar 
 
In this section I analyze how the identification of caste influences the manner in 




Malabar construct both the physical and social boundaries of Malabar based on their 
identification of the Thiyya caste. 
 
Here, I will explore the degree to which caste identification influences the 
visualization of the physical boundaries of place. In the process, I will also provide an 
insight into the manner in which social boundaries in place are envisioned. In other 
words, how does the identification of caste shape questions addressing the 
belongingness of different social groups in place. To study the visualization of 
Malabar on the group, it is important to consider how it envisions the membership of 
the Thiyyas and other social groups in Malabar, and the extent to which they can lay 
claim to this place.  
 
I will conduct this analysis by examining the group’s approach to the secession of 
Malabar from Kerala. The approach on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar is shaped, in 
part, by their dissatisfaction as Malabaris, and the connection they observe between 
the place and caste. At the same time, the approach to secession is also shaped 
specifically by caste interests. To a certain extent, a separate Malabar is considered to 
have the potential to improve both the material and social well-being of the Thiyyas. 
In this context, the physical boundaries of Malabar are visualized in a manner that is 
peculiar to the caste. However, the translation of the caste-specific vision of a 
separate Malabar is unlikely to be translated into action because it is over-ridden by 
the perception that the Thiyyas are positioned competitively as Hindus vis-à-vis the 




secession of Malabar is shaped both by their dissatisfaction with the disembedded 
identification of the Thiyyas as Ezhavas, as well as the substantialization of Thiyyas 
as Hindus vis-à-vis the Muslims and Christians in Malabar. 
 
Dissatisfaction from Kerala as Malabaris and Secession of Malabar 
 
For the most part, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar expressed considerable resentment 
against the union of Malabar with the state of Thirukochi. These regions were united 
in 1956 in the aftermath of Malabar’s separation from the erstwhile Madras 
Presidency as per the linguistic reorganization of states in India. The question of the 
impact of this amalgamation for Malabar in general and the Thiyyas in particular 
manifested itself periodically in various public conversations on the group. The 
predominant attitude expressed on the group was one of dissatisfaction: at the very 
least the union was considered to not have brought any significant positive changes to 
the region, or resulted in the betterment of the plight of the Thiyyas. Indeed, some 
even argued that the union had actually led to a deterioration of both place and caste. 
 
Sometimes, members would push the envelope even further: on such occasions they 
would raise the topic of the secession of Malabar from the state of Kerala in public 
posts and comments on the group. In July 2013, the secession of Malabar was revived 
once again as a major point of discussion. The topic gained a new fluency on the 
group in the aftermath of the official announcement of the formation of the new state 




terms, the demand for a separate Telangana was more recent than similar demands for 
Malabar. The tangible success of the separate Telangana movement had piqued the 
interest of members on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Consequently, the group 
discussed whether a similar feat may be achieved as far as Malabar was concerned, 
what the potential role of Thiyyas could be in achieving this, and how this would 
affect the interests of the Thiyyas. Since this topic was encountered sporadically on 
the group as well as during the initial in-depth interviews conducted in Malabar, it 
was included as a theme in successive interviews with various members and admins.  
 
On the whole, despite the degree of resentment against the amalgamation, there was 
not a large degree of public support for the secession of Malabar from Kerala on the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Public conversations would often boil down to the 
conclusion that the secession of Malabar from Kerala was a quixotic venture: a dream 
that may well be justified but whose time had nonetheless passed. Similarly, in 
private conversations, some members and admins would fondly consider the idea of a 
separate Malabar before acknowledging that the Thiyyas should not divert their 
energies towards achieving what seemed to be an unattainable goal. However, these 
discussions were valuable since they provided an insight into how the Cyber Thiyyars 
of Malabar visualized the physical and social boundaries of Malabar through the 
prism of caste interests.  
 
A popular and clearly observable sentiment on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was 




Kerala, particularly from the government of Kerala. In articulating the experience of 
such neglect, the members negotiated their dual identities of being Malabari as 
opposed to a broader identity of being Malayalee. Malayalee is a term used to refer to 
people who speak the Malayalam language. Since Kerala was formed on the basis of 
the linguistic reorganization of states, it is supposed to be the home of all Malayalam 
speakers. Consequently, the term Malayalee is broadly used as a synonym for anyone 
who originates from the land of Kerala. This usage was not unusual on the group. 
However, as can be observed in the analysis that follows, on the group the term had 
multiple connotations in different contexts. In some cases, members also used the 
term Malayalee to refer specifically to people from South Kerala in order to indicate 
the relative exclusion of the North from the dominant idea of Kerala and Keralites. 
 
As Malabaris, members discussed the neglect of the region by drawing on the 
distance between Malabar and the concentration of power in the Kerala. Here, the 
members variously referred to the physical location of Malabar vis-à-vis the capital 
city of Thiruvananthapuram and the cultural marginalization of Malabar within the 
idea of Kerala.  Further, members also referred to the theme of regional 
selflessness/selfishness while considering the unequal relationship between Malabar 
and the rest of Kerala in terms of budgetary allotments. 
 
An idea that was often reiterated on the group was that the region of Malabar was 
considered to be a distant outpost the government of Kerala. In expressing the 




physical distance between Malabar and Thiruvananthapuram, the state capital, which 
was located at the southern end of Kerala. They argued that due to this physical 
distance, it was easier for the government of Kerala to neglect the region. In the 
following excerpt, Siddharth articulates the sense of relative invisibility that develops 
due to the distance between Malabar and Thiruvanathapuram. Through most of his 
life, Siddharth has split time between Malabar and other locations. His childhood was 
spent in Bahrain and Malabar. Although he currently works as an IT professional in 
Bangalore, a city located in the neighboring state of Karnataka, Siddharth frequently 
visits to Malabar to spend time with his parents who are settled there. 
Some of the members that I spoke to were upset about what they 
thought was a stepmotherly treatment to the region of Malabar. What 
do you think about this observation?  
Yeah, I think that is true. Because initially most of the political area was 
located in Malabar - it was the main area like Samodiri and Kolathunadu 
(precolonial feudal states). So in olden times this is the main area where all 
the revolutions and all those things happened. Then finally after the 
formation of Kerala they shifted (the center of political power) to 
Trivandrum (the old name for Thiruvanathapuram). And that is very far 
from our North Malabar. So we're receiving the differential treatment 
because they believe that we are very away. So they don't care. So that's 
what, I'm not very happy with the way that the southern Kerala government 
is handling matters. They are more inclined towards the south part, they are 
not much concerned about the North. This usually happens. But that is what 
is the problem with them. 
(Siddharth, admin, late 20s, IT professional, Bangalore) 
 
Here, Siddharth argues that because of the distance between Malabar and 
Thiruvanathapuram, this region is off-the-radar as far as governance and policy 
decisions are concerned. In this excerpt, it is also interesting to note that Siddharth 
expresses this distance by characterizing the entire state machinery as being southern 
(“southern kerala government”) referring to its concentration at the extreme end of 





Since Thiruvananthapuram is the state capital, members understood physical distance 
from it not only as a lack of visibility but also as lack of access to a place where 
important decisions were taken. In particular, this was most intensely articulated by 
those members who were based in the rural areas of Malabar, and did not have the 
kind of mobility that more urban members such as Siddharth had access to. For 
instance, in the following excerpt, Suriya, a member on the group, discusses the 
limitations that emerge from this physical distance. Suriya resides with his mother 
and brothers in a village outside Kannur and travels into the city every day to work as 
a health counsellor.  
People complained that Malabar has been neglected as a region because 
Thiyyas have been neglected as a caste because of a conscious strategy of 
the Ezhavas of the South. What do you think? 
No that actually, it is not only in the matter of caste reservations alone. 
Because Malabar as a region has been neglected. Because, the decision 
making power in the state is concentrated in the South. Basically it is in the 
Travancore region that these things proceed. And so there is a routine neglect 
of the Malabar region itself….  
Some of those who complained that Malabar was neglected by the 
government also argued that it would be better if Malabar seceded and 
became a separate state along with Mangalore. What do you think? 
Yes I am interested in that concept. Because first of all, the capital is not 
even located in the middle of the state. The capital of Kerala is located near 
Kanyakumari. It is (in) a district right at the end, towards Tamil Nadu. So 
actually speaking in effective terms, it is a waste for us. So I personally 
would like this concept. 
What would be the benefit of this to the Thiyyas, or Malabar? 
If that happens there will be a change to the situation of Malabar as a whole. 
And when that happens, because Thiyyas are the majority community here, 
they would also benefit. It will not only benefit this community, but also 
other communities in this region. But (the benefit will be) more so for this 
community (the Thiyyas). 
(Suriya, member, mid 20s, health counsellor, Kannur district)  
 
As can be observed in this excerpt, as a Malabari, Suriya communicates a strong 
sense of disconnect from the region where significant policy decisions are taken and 




the secession of Malabar on the difficulties that arise from the fact that the state 
capital was physically located so far away. Like Suriya, other members who were 
located primarily in rural Malabar were much more articulate about the manner in 
which this distance affected the everyday life of a citizen in Malabar. In particular, 
they drew attention to the challenge of making day long journeys across the state to 
the capital in order to participate in administrative proceedings. 
 
Indeed, some members argued that a cultural difference between Malabar and South 
Kerala also complements the physical distance. For instance, in the following excerpt, 
Suvinay refers to the colonial past of Malabar to argue that in cultural terms, this 
region has been considered as less than an equal part of the state of Kerala since 
1956. Suvinay is currently working in Abu Dhabi. Despite various links with South 
Kerala (for instance his wife originates and resides in the region), he plans to 
ultimately retire to Malabar where his parents and extended family are settled. 
Some folks on the group argued that Malabar has always received 
stepmotherly treatment from the Kerala government. These members 
explained this treatment in terms of the Thiyya-Ezhava difference. To 
what extent would you agree/disagree with this?  
I agree that the above stated is true. The government does more for the 
southern districts than the Malabar area. Cochin should have been the capital 
of the state. That would have made a equally accessible governing body. For 
a person staying in Kasargod it’s a strain to go to Trivandrum for government 
related matters whereas for people in southern districts have easier access to 
the same. Malabar, Cochin and Travancore united to form Kerala. Since 
Malabar was never under the rule of either the Cochin or Travancore kings, 
they have a step sibling attitude towards us. 
(Suvinay, admin, early 30s, IT services, Abu Dhabi) 
 
Here it is pertinent to observe that Suvinay expresses a sense of the neglect of 
Malabar both in terms of physical distance as well as cultural distance from the south 




by the British, rather than indigenous royalty. Suvinay wishes to stress that Malabar 
was not under the same feudal culture as the princely states of Travancore and 
Cochin. Suvinay, like other members on the group, attributes the neglect of Malabar 
partly to the cultural marginalization of the region in the idea of Kerala and ideal 
Keralites. Other members had previously expressed this cultural distance in various 
ways. For instance, they referred to the marginalization of the Malabari dialect as 
being less pure than the Southern Kerala dialects of Malayalam. As active migrants, 
many members on the group had felt the pressure to “correct” the way they spoke 
Malayalam in places outside Malabar. Further, they also pointed out to the 
prominence given to South Kerala in official narratives of the history of Kerala.   
 
A common refrain on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was the disparity in the 
budgetary allotments provided to Malabar. The members argued that an important 
indicator of the systematic and regular neglect of the region was the 
disproportionately low share of government revenue earmarked for development 
projects in Malabar. For instance, in the following excerpt, Rakesh expresses his 
anger at the unequal distribution of resources between the different parts of Kerala.  
In general do you think the region of Malabar has suffered because the 
Thiyyas were neglected? 
Yes, that is one of the reasons, because the Thiyyas are the backbone of the 
Malabar. Majority population of Thiyyas is in Malabar and we can say 
Thiyyas are the backbone of Malabar. Negligence of Malabar means 
negligence of the Thiyyas. And there are concrete proof for that. Today I put 
a post in Meerkat…if you go through the budget of state, i.e. Kerala, central 
government or even the railway budget you could see that out of the total 
allotment for Kerala state a major portion goes to the South. There is, it is a 
proof to show that Malabar is neglected. Yesterday or day before I put on 
(the) Meerkat group regarding (a post in which) somebody had argued for a 
separate state for Malabar and like that. Upon that I commented. 




As can be seen in this excerpt, on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar the conversation 
around secession from Kerala was informed by considerable anger at the relative lack 
of public investment in the region of Malabar. Education was a key area that most 
members concentrated on in discussions regarding neglect from the Kerala 
government. Another area that was often raised in such discussions was the extent of 
public investments in the transport infrastructure in Malabar. Members argued that 
the current state of road, rail and air linkages were deplorable and much of these 
facilities had been built by the British colonial rulers rather than the government of 
Kerala. For the members, the lack of transport infrastructure exacerbated the problem 
of distance from the south and intensified the isolation faced by Malabar. In this 
excerpt, it is also important to note that most members on the group perceived the 
state’s neglect to be a deliberate choice where the region of South Kerala was 
consistently favored over Malabar in public investments. 
 
It is also important to recognize that on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar the theme of 
regional selfishness/selflessness was often employed in order to discuss the Malabari 
dissatisfaction with the government of Kerala. This dissatisfaction was often 
conflated with resentment towards South Kerala. For instance, in the following 
excerpt, Vijay discusses why it is that he thinks Malabar has been neglected by the 
government of Kerala. Vijay’s family has been settled in the city of Kozhikode, in 
South Malabar. Although Vijay has spent time in South Kerala as a student, and is 
currently studying in the United Kingdom, he continues to have very strong 




Some members of the group complained that Malabar has received a 
step motherly treatment from the GoK. What do you think? 
Yeah, yeah. I agree with that. Because it used to be Thirukochi and Malabar 
before. And when the state was formed like uniting them, Malabar district 
was stitched to Thirukochi. And you know malayalees have a reputation of 
being selfish: “malayalees are crooked”, “they know how to make money.” 
So the thing is that Thirukochi was already an entity there. Because even 
though they joined Malabar together, they were still not ready to give all the 
resources to Malabar. And they want to take resources from Malabar. Like 
the same thing that happened between East Pakistan and West Pakistan - 
money was coming in from East Pakistan and it was spent in West Pakistan. 
So Malabar used to have a lot of revenue and they used to spend a lot of it in 
South Kerala. See when you consider the number of schools and colleges 
there is a sharp divide between the north and the south. I am talking about 
government schools. We have more private schools and colleges in Malabar. 
But when you go to the south you can see more government schools and 
colleges. So that itself is a proof that we are sidelined. But still Malabar is 
growing and is financially safe because of hardworking people who are 
outside of India. 
Some people on the group actually connected the problem that Malabar 
is facing with the political neglect of the thiyyas - it’s a conscious strategy 
on the part of the Ezhavas of the south. 
Its not particularly against the Thiyyas. I would say it is particularly against 
Malabar. There are certain lobbies who take away from Malabar and who do 
not give it back. There are certain area specific lobbies such as the Cochin 
lobby and the Trivandrum lobby that want development only in that area. 
They always hijack the projects that are marked for Malabar. 
(Vijay, member, early 30s, researcher, UK) 
 
In this excerpt, Vijay portrays the relationship between Malabar and the rest of Kerala 
as an exploitative one. He argues that for the most part, the government of Kerala 
takes away much more from the region in revenue than it invests back into Malabar. 
It is also significant that in expressing this relationship through specific reference to 
the theme of the naïve northerner (Malabari) versus the selfish southerner 
(Malayalee). Vijay articulates the neglect of Malabar as a consequence of the selfish 
and calculating nature of South Kerala/Malayalees which is employed to deprive the 
region of both public and private investment. Like Vijay other members also 




are no match for the cunning Southerners who have mastered the kali (game) required 
to corner various resources in Kerala.  
 
As can be observed in these excerpts, the dissatisfaction of place was often, but not 
always, connected to caste. In the following sub-section, I consider how the 
identification of caste explicitly influenced discussions regarding the physical and 
social boundaries of Malabar. 
 
Secession and Disembedded Identification: Ezhavanization and the form of 
Malabar 
 
The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar often drew connections between place and the 
disembedding of caste identification. For instance, the need to challenge the 
disembedded identification of Thiyyas as Ezhavas partially influenced the demand for 
the secession of Malabar as a separate state. Some drew on a caste-based perspective 
(Thiyyas are not Ezhavas) to visualize a separate state of Malabar created through a 
combination of areas where they perceived that castes similar to the Thiyyas resided. 
Murali, the founder-admin was particularly enthusiastic adherent of this view. As we 
sat watching the ritual of Velattam at a kavu near his house, Murali had taken the 
time to elaborate on his dream of a separate Malabar. Remarking on what was unique 
about this ritual, Murali had observed that other communities such as the Kodavas of 




Thiyya kavus in Malabar. Murali had suggested that the Thiyyas needed a separate 
state of Malabar which also incorporated areas similar to Kodagu. 
 
You had mentioned earlier that culturally the Malabar area is more 
similar to South Canara as compared to the rest of Kerala. Can you 
explain that? 
Because geographically it comes like that. Because Malabar, Coorg, the 
Nilgiri Hills and South Canara, this should be formed as a state. But the only 
thing is that linguistically we're different - Tamil, Tulu and Malayalam. That 
is why we are not joining. But the same thing the Muslims are also fighting 
for the same - Malabar as a separate state. They (Muslims) are not fighting to 
join the other areas (with Malabar). What we Thiyyas (require is a separate 
state combining Malabar with these areas) … Because when we came from 
Kyrgyzstan, the culture also is there (in these other areas). You know there 
is this Kottiyoor Ulsavam, there is a temple here. For that (temple) the people 
come from Coorg with a cow. And in Parassini Kadavu also they come for 
that, they bring rice here. So that is a custom that is happening.  
(Murali, founder-admin, mid-40s, manager in private firm, Kannur town) 
 
Here Murali is articulating that what the Thiyyas require is the creation of a state 
which will be formed through the secession of Malabar from Kerala and its 
combination with the areas of Kodagu, South Canara (in Karnataka) and the Nilgiri 
Hills (in Tamil Nadu). In doing so, he is drawing on the Kyrgyzstan theory of origin 
which was popularly referred to on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar to distinguish the 
Thiyyas: as opposed to the sea-faring Ezhavas who originated from Sri Lanka, the 
Thiyyas are a part of a martial group that migrated from Kyrgyzstan. On the group, 
members frequently argued that sections of this large migratory group from 
Kyrgyzstan had settled in various locations, including the three places that Murali 
mentions above. While not all members adhered to the idea of a geographic unit that 
took on this precise form, the imagination of a Malabar that unifies the Thiyyas with a 





Apart from its explicit influence on the visualization of the physical boundaries of 
Malabar, on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar the disembedded identification of the 
Thiyyas was perceived to have a strong influence on the welfare of this caste within 
this place. For instance, the members often discussed the manner in which the 
consequences of disembedded caste identification were exacerbated by the problems 
associated with Malabar. Further, over time, Ezhavas had migrated to the region, a 
movement which was also connected to the disembedded identification of the 
Thiyyas on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. They argued that in some significant 
ways, this migration had important consequences for the welfare of the Thiyyas.  
 
i. Place and its influence on the consequences of disembedding:  
 
The dissatisfaction that the group expressed as Malabaris was intertwined with their 
sense that the caste itself had experienced considerable loss in status and material 
well-being after the incorporation of Malabar within Kerala. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the vocal majority on the group often contrasted the “forward” caste 
status of Thiyyas in colonial Malabar with their inclusion within the category of 
“backward” caste in the amalgamated state of Kerala. On the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar such a change in categorization was often referred to as the Thiyyas being 
“downgraded” after the formation of the state of Kerala. Further, they considered 
such disembedded categorization to have adversely affected the relative well-being of 




the dual disability of region (secondary status as Malabaris within Kerala) as well as 
the loss of caste status. 
 
For many on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the disadvantages stemming from the 
disembedded identification of the Thiyyas as Ezhavas was exacerbated by their 
disadvantaged position as Malabaris. As the members saw it, the disembedded 
identification had generated a loss of caste status, while simultaneously denying them 
relative access to the benefits of affirmative action as compared to the Ezhavas. A 
common refrain on the group was that while the Thiyyas had been “downgraded” by 
their disembedded categorization within the Ezhavas, the latter had garnered the 
lion’s share of the common quotas in government employment. In their view, the 
limitations of place strongly influenced the inability of the Thiyyas to access these 
resources. Here, members referred to both the infrastructural constraints in Malabar 
as well as general cultural attributes among Malabaris. 
 
That the members perceived a connection between the decline in well-being among 
the Thiyyas and the poor infrastructure in Malabar is clear in this excerpt from my 
conversation with Rakesh. Not unlike others on the group, Rakesh worried that over 
time the Thiyyas as a caste “came down” because they no longer dominated 
government service like they did during the colonial period. 
You mentioned that although the reservation is combined for both, it is 
the Ezhavas who are taking maximum benefit. How is this situation 
coming about? 
Situation came because this (Kerala) government was not ready to give 
education institutions and other facilities for education in north Malabar. 
There were very few colleges in north Malabar, some 30-40 years back.  I 




were many colleges for higher studies. So that was a big disadvantage for us. 
You see our people could not go for higher education. Only the people who 
had money could go outside the state, ie Mangalore or Chennai, for higher 
education. So deprived of our rights. That's how, that's how we came down. 
Otherwise, before the formation of Kerala state, Thiyyas were dominating 
the government service. And almost in higher posts we were dominating. 
Even then, at that time, there were no Ezhava in any of the higher posts.  
(Rakesh, admin, early 40s, mid-level government official, Kannur) 
 
Here, Rakesh, who himself is a government servant, makes the observation that over 
time more Ezhavas than Thiyyas have availed the jobs earmarked through combined 
reservations for both castes.  Here it is significant that Rakesh presents this as a 
problem the Thiyyas face on account of the limitation of place, i.e. the drawbacks 
faced by Malabar in general. He argues that the Thiyyas lost their hold over 
government service because of the lack of educational infrastructure in Malabar. As 
compared to South Kerala, where the Ezhavas reside, the facilities for higher 
education in Malabar are relatively limited. Consequently, the Thiyyas along with 
other Malabaris have suffered. As it was understood on the group, this place-specific 
problem had constrained the Thiyyas in caste-specific ways. The lack of education 
has affected their ability to access employment opportunities as part of affirmative 
action. In turn, Rakesh perceives that not only have the Thiyyas lost out on caste 
status, but they have also lost out on other forms of social status such as the prestige 
and power invested in government service. 
 
The Thiyyas inability to access reservations was also explained in terms of cultural 
constraints peculiar to the region of Malabar. Here, the spatial imaginary of the 
Thiyyas as naïve Malabaris and the Ezhavas as calculating Southerners was often 




government service. For instance, in this excerpt, Tejas, a Thiyya settled in the 
Middle-East, identifies the limitations of Malabari culture vis-à-vis Southern Kerala 
culture and its impact on Thiyya employment: 
 
Has your awareness of being a Thiyya changed over time?  
See basically I am a Thiyya, but sometimes when issues came… Nowadays 
the Ezhavas, they are replacing our name from the government sector, in our 
school certificates and employment register and all these things. They are 
replacing the name Thiyya with Ezhava. Its not a right practice.  And they 
are getting the benefit like in government sector jobs they are getting the 
opportunities for... And we are from Malabar, specially Malabar people… If 
you take the statistics of the employed people in the government sector, you 
can clearly see that these people from South, they are given more importance 
in these fields.  
You said that Malabar people in general are less represented in 
Government service as opposed to South Kerala people right. Why do 
you think that happens? 
Initially I told you that we do not practice bribes, favoritism, dowry and all 
those things. These (southern) people, they are giving the money and gaining 
things. And they have got a system, if one Ezhava is there he will help out 
other caste members to get things done. We don’t have such unity or such a 
closely knitted society. We are lacking these skills.  
(Tejas, member, early 40s, engineer, Dubai) 
 
Over the course of the interview Tejas bitterly recounted how, as a youngster in the 
1990s, he struggled to find employment within Kerala. In doing so, Tejas employs a 
commonly used metaphor of Ezhava as southerners and Thiyyas as Malabaris. In 
articulating his experience, he specifically highlights the limitations that he faced as a 
Malabari. After many unsuccessful attempts Tejas left Kerala for a job in the city of 
Coimbatore and eventually migrated abroad to Dubai, where he is currently settled. 
As can be observed in the excerpt provided above, in explaining the problems faced 
by Thiyyas, Tejas refers to the cultural traits that he thinks holds Malabaris back in 
general. He argues that the Thiyyas, like other Malabaris, are not particularly adept at 
utilizing kin networks for employment or negotiating the system through bribery. 




immersion in South Kerala culture which he portrays as being very calculating. 
Although he expressed considerable anger in these reflections, Tejas, not unlike other 
members of the group, also thinks that these are “skills” that Malabaris in general, 
and the Thiyyas in particular, need to inculcate. 
 
In discussing the relative inability of Thiyyas to access reservations, members also 
referred to the general Malabari preference for business or employment abroad over a 
government job. This, they argue, is diametrically opposite to South Kerala, where 
the tendency is to seek government employment. Some members traced this 
preference to the historical location of Malabar as a significant coastal city with long 
established business and trade relations. At the same time, others referred back to the 
spatial imaginary of the naïve Malabari who is discouraged from even applying for 
government service since they assume that such jobs require “skills” such as nepotism 
and corruption. 
  
ii. “Ezhavanization” of Thiyyas and the presence of Ezhavas in Malabar:  
 
The migration of Ezhavas into Malabar generated some concern for the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar, primarily through the perceived connection between such 
migration and the impact of the disembedded classification of Thiyyas. In 
contemporary history, Ezhavas had first started to migrate to Malabar in the first half 
of the twentieth century, primarily as agricultural laborers accompanying Christian 




gradually petered out by the 1970s. Ezhavas have continued to migrate to the Malabar 
after this period, primarily in the form of professional workers employed in the state 
administration and other service-based professions. Despite this long history of 
migration, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar consider Ezhavas in Malabar to be 
outsiders on account of both their caste and their Southern origins.  
 
The group’s concern about the migration of Ezhavas to Malabar was sometimes 
explicitly discussed through posts. For instance, Siddharth, an admin on the group, 
initiated a discussion on the “colonization” of Malabar by Ezhavas, regarding the 
formation of Ezhava dominated settlements in Malabar. Apart from such explicit 
posts, issues regarding Ezhavas in Malabar also featured in mundane discussions on 
the group. Significantly, this topic emerged as an important theme during the initial 
in-depth interviews, particularly with those members and admins who were residing 
in Malabar. Consequently, Siddharth’s colonization post was incorporated in the 
interview schedule so as to initiate a discussion regarding perspectives on Ezhavas in 
Malabar.  
 
For the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the problem of Ezhava migration was not so 
much connected to the sheer number of people migrating to Malabar. Most members 
considered the scale of migration to be a fairly small one. Rather, it was concentrated 
on how such migration would influence ezhavanization and its consequences for the 






To begin with, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar considered the presence of Ezhavas in 
the region as a source of the blurring of social boundaries between the two castes. 
This can be observed in the following excerpt from my conversation with Sarthak: 
I wanted to talk to you about that post on the colonisation of land in 
Malabar. Siddharth had put up that post on the group where he said 
that one of the things that really bothered him was that between 1930s 
and 1970s there was a huge migration of Christian and Ezhavas from 
Travancore to Malabar. So that sort of entry of the Ezhavas into 
Malabar is something that really bothered him. 
(He chuckles) Actually, a part of that is true. A part of that is like… I mean 
you can see that in every country nobody supports migration. Even the BJP is 
telling that Bangladeshi migrants are causing problems in India. So in a way, 
in my place, when I talk to my friends, they are very hesitant… I mean they 
are less happy about this. They are very rude about this kind of migration like 
people coming from the South and settling here and they are starting their 
own things and they are planting rubbers. I mean they are like not even… 
they are bothering too much about this migrations I think. And as Siddharth 
said, it's like… Partially it's true because if these people (Ezhavas) comes 
and settles down they will be starting their organization here. And most of 
the society thinks that the people here, I mean the Thiyyas and the SNDP 
Ezhavas are same. And that can cause an misunderstood. I mean people can 
misunderstand easily. That might be the problem we will be facing. 
(Sarthak, member, early 20s, student, Gurgaon) 
 
It is significant that despite his disinclination towards the explicit anti-migrant 
attitudes that is common among his peers, Sarthak is perturbed by the migration of 
Ezhavas in Malabar. His concern was shared by others on the group. For them, 
Malabar held the key to the distinction between Thiyyas and Ezhavas. What 
distinguished these two groups was that Malabar was the homeland of the Thiyyas. 
However members worried that the presence of Ezhavas in Malabar would reinforce 





Others attributed a much stronger agency to the Ezhavas when it came to the 
disembedded identification of Thiyyas with Ezhavas. These members expressed 
wariness towards Ezhavas in Malabar, and argued that these migrants were 
consciously categorizing themselves as Thiyyas in the region to obfuscate the 
distinction between the two castes. Further, some members also argued that these 
migrants contributed more directly to a process of the erasure of the distinction 
between Thiyyas and Ezhavas, by facilitating the disembedded identification of 
Thiyyas. This can be observed in the following excerpt from my conversation with 
Murali. 
So how do you think that decline in number has come about? (Murali 
had been expressing his concern that the number of Ezhavas had 
ballooned over time as compared to Thiyyas)  
Yeah, because decline in number came… There are two reasons. One reason 
is that Thiyyas are literate. They reduce the population to one or two children 
only. Where Ezhavas didn’t look for that. They give birth to four or five, like 
that. One is that reason. The other reason is most Thiyyas started writing 
“Ezhavas”. Because as I told you the college principals and college 
headmasters and school headmasters from South, Ezhavas, came to work at 
Kasarkod and remote areas (of Malabar). They made the children, they told 
the children that "both are same, so start writing ‘Ezhavas’”. So from 
childhood itself they started writing “Ezhavas”. It happened!  
(Murali, founder-admin, mid-40s, manager in private firm, Kannur town) 
 
Here it is significant that Murali attributes a perceived fall in the number of Thiyyas 
to the active participation of Ezhava migrants in Malabar. He suggests that Ezhavas 
who migrated from the South into Malabar have been engaged in an insidious 
programme of encouraging Thiyyas to self-identify themselves as Ezhavas.  
 
On the group, particularly among those residing in Malabar, there was a fairly strong 




region, due to the advantages of their Southern origin. Although they observed that 
this was not happening on a large scale, the members would nonetheless refer to this 
as an instance of how the Thiyyas were losing out on combined reservations, even in 
an area where they are in the majority. For instance, in the following excerpt, 
Siddharth refers to this issue while assessing the disembedded classification of the 
Thiyyas: 
So yesterday I think we were discussing the OBC classification of the 
Thiyyas and whether they have helped the community or not. 
There was some benefit, some people got jobs and all. But generally you can 
see that most people go for private jobs. So there is no reservation in private. 
That means that there is no benefit for everyone, maybe some people got it. 
If you compare it with Ezhavas… Actually if you see it in our place only, 
there are many Ezhavas coming to our place for work.  
Do you mean in Malabar? 
Yeah. Because they're saying that 14% of reservation is given to Ezhavas. 
But actually it's not happening like that. Like currently we are considered as 
part of Ezhavas. But we're not getting the due share of reservation. And most 
of the people are actually Thiyyas. More than Ezhavas there are Thiyyas 
actually in Malabar. So all the reservation is actually taken by the Ezhava 
people. So finally there is no benefit for us. 
Can you tell me a little more detail about how they end up taking up all 
the reservations benefits? 
Okay, for example if you go to the Wayanad region. In that region after 
writing the PSU exams, if you look at all the railway jobs, and other jobs, 
they are mainly Ezhavas actually. So there is actually no benefit for most of 
the Thiyyas from reservations actually. But still we are included as part of 
Ezhavas but there is no use actually. It's just namesake. 
  (Siddharth, admin, late 20s, IT professional, Bangalore) 
 
 
Here Siddharth is articulating a very common refrain on the group that Ezhavas often 
migrated into Malabar to access jobs earmarked under a common quota for both 
Thiyyas and Ezhavas. As can be observed from the excerpt above, Siddharth clearly 
resents that Ezhavas have “taken” away jobs in “our place”, positions that he thinks 
rightfully belong to the Thiyyas as a numerically dominant community in Malabar. 




the group did not favour measures such as explusion as a solution. Rather, what they 
considered to be more significant in this instance was that due to the disembedded 
caste classification the Thiyyas were being shortchanged by southerners in a place 
they claimed as their own.  
 
The mistrust expressed towards migrant Ezhavas on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar 
also drew heavily on the assumption that they were aligned with the Sri Narayana 
Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDP). The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar considered the 
SNDP to be an organization that was instrumental in the disembedded classification 
of the Thiyyas as Ezhavas
96
. The SNDP was often portrayed as an organization with a 
vested interest in this identification: with the inclusion of the northern Thiyyas in the 
Ezhava fold the SNDP could claim to represent a larger proportion of the population 
of Kerala. Members argued, that while the SNDP had claimed representation, it had 
not actually provided any substantial representation to the Thiyyas of Malabar. 
 
A pro-SNDP perspective was not tolerated on the group.  A large part of this 
silencing stemmed from the direct association between organizations such as MTMS 
and TMS and the admins of the group. However, as mentioned earlier, in more 
private conversations, a few members of the group displayed a more tolerant attitude 
towards the SNDP. Nonetheless, what most group members had in common with 
each other was a sense that SNDP was an organization that had not provided much 
caste-based representation for the Thiyyas in Malabar, but had continued to focus on 
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the Ezhavas of the South. At the same time, even those members who adopted a 
skeptical approach towards MTMS/TMS argued that the Thiyyas had not gotten as 
much out of a relationship with the SNDP as had the Ezhavas. On the whole, on the 
group the SNDP was portrayed as a southern organization which had reaped much 
monetary benefit from Thiyyas in Malabar and then channelized it for the benefit of 
Ezhavas in the South.  
 
The approach that the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar adopted towards Ezhavas in 
Malabar should also be understood in the context of the perceived relationship 
between the latter and the SNDP. To a large extent, the group viewed them as proxies 
for the SNDP and its activities in Malabar. Indeed, some of the dissatisfaction that 
they felt towards SNDP came to be concentrated on these migrants. For instance, 
admissions and jobs in the SNDP managed educational organizations in Malabar 
were at the center of vociferous discussions on the group. Here, members argued that 
Thiyyas received no preference in admissions or jobs even though they contributed 
generously to these SNDP. Rather, it was the Ezhavas who were brought in from the 
South for teaching and administrative positions in these institutions. On the one hand, 
the group considered this to be yet another instance of the increasing influence of the 
Ezhavas as compared to the Thiyyas. On the other hand, and perhaps more 
significantly, this was considered as a symbol of the SNDP’s disregard for Thiyya 





Sometimes the displeasure regarding the presence of Ezhavas in Malabar was 
expressed in terms of decline in the numbers of Thiyyas vis-a-vis Ezhavas in the 
region.  Here members referred both to the migration of Ezhavas into Malabar as well 
as the co-optation of local Thiyyas into the Ezhava fold through inter-marriage with 
these migrants. This fear can be observed in the following extract of my conversation 
with Siddharth where he clarifies his post on the “colonization” of Malabar by the 
Ezhavas: 
 
I wanted to talk to a little bit about your post about the colonization of 
land in Malabar. Can you tell me a little bit about that? 
Yeah, actually many Ezhavas have migrated from south to the Kannur area. 
Kannur, then Wayanad and all these things. Maybe immediately after the 
British left, I don't know maybe there was some other reason. I'm not very 
sure. But so many people have left southern Kerala and move to the North. 
And they have moved towards the hilly areas, hilly regions. For example, the 
forest regions for cultivating rubber and all these things, for plantation 
purposes. And these people are the main supporters of the SNDP. If you see 
in our area also there are people who are very much deeply involved in 
SNDP. And they are doing that because they have some relation with the 
people who migrated there. But the ordinary Thiyyas they are least concern 
about which community and which caste you are, they are not concerned. 
But these people they migrated 50 years ago . They have married into Thiyya 
community. Thiyyas have married people in Ezhava. So the relation between 
Thiyya and Ezhava has increased over the past 50 years because of 
intercommunity marriages. So it is a problem because they are the main 
supporters… So if you create a fully Thiyya community, these people will be 
the most opposed to that. Even in my relation, there are intercommunity 
marriages. And that is why many people are not very happy with discussing 
this thing because they feel "okay if we are different. It already happened. So 
what can we do now?" So if you have mistaken marriages then you will not 
be so deeply involved in the community because… Ezhavas something… 
Because you feel that you're not exactly that (fully Thiyya). It usually 
happens. 
So how is this connected to the "colonisation" of land? 
Yeah, if you see in Iritti and Keloth … It's actually near… It's a hilly area… 
So in the Iritti and Keloth area there are many Ezhava families. So they had 
migrated from the South and settled there. And now they are somewhat in 
majority, so that's what we have seen an effect in that. So since there are 
slight majority areas in Kannur itself, where there are Ezhavas. It is a 
problem because… it could be a problem for Thiyya people there. And those 
people are marrying into Thiyyas and like this they are trying to become 




regions is coming to, or is getting extinguished. So that's what the same thing 
is happening to…. There are people in my family also who are moving 
towards that direction. So I am not happy with that - what to say? 
(Siddharth, admin, late 20s, IT professional, Bangalore) 
 
As can be observed here, Siddharth is concerned about the presence of Ezhavas in 
Malabar because he worries that in some pockets in the region they are beginning to 
outnumber Thiyyas (“somewhat in majority”). Significantly, he connects this to the 
problem of the erasure of social boundaries between Thiyyas and Ezhavas in 
Malabar, particularly through inter-marriage between these groups. There was also 
some concern in the group regarding intermarriage and its effect on the numerical 
strength of both groups in the future. The worry was that if Thiyya women married 
Ezhavas, their offspring would be classified as Ezhava rather than Thiyya. However, 
on the group, this was considered to be a general problem, rather than a pressing issue 
within the region. For the most part, this anxiety about numbers of Thiyyas vis-a-vis 
Ezhavas within Malabar was relegated to that of a potential problem.  
 
Instead, the influence of the SNDP in these pockets of Malabar was a much more 
significant and immediate problem for the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. The presence 
of Ezhavas in Malabar was significant in terms of the identification of Thiyyas and 
who had the right to represent the latter in a region where they were predominant. The 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were not only resentful of the disembedded identification 
of Thiyyas as Ezhavas, they were also dissatisfied with how the SNDP used this 
narrative to claim that it represented Thiyya interests. It is in this context that the use 




among those admins and members who were closely aligned with the MTMS. They 
portrayed the presence of Ezhavas in Malabar as an attempt by the SNDP to create 
strongholds in various pockets in the region. For instance, in the following excerpt, 
Murali expresses concern about the increasing dependence of Thiyyas on Ezhavas 
and SNDP in these pockets. 
 
I discussed Siddharth’s post on colonization. He said that he was 
worried because in earlier times are lot of Christians and Ezhavas had 
come in and bought for cheap in Malabar. 
Yeah, yeah. In hilly areas. That also is there. That is there, that is there. 
Christians and Ezhavas. 
He seemed to be quite unhappy with that situation. 
Yeah. That also is happening. In hilly areas, no. In hills, they get in very low 
prices. And they started colonising in that area and slowly they come here 
and capturing. Like capturing itself. Now also, some issues are happening 
here…  
Is it continuing, or has it stopped after a certain point? 
Yeah, it's continuing. Its continuing. But now they have started dominating 
also. 
How have they started dominating? 
Yeah, they… Like I said they became self-sufficient. They have enough 
money. They have enough power from politicians. So some people, Thiyyas 
also started to depend on them. 
Sorry who? The Christians and Ezhavas? 
In some areas, Thiyyas who are in population, they are strong in Malabar, 
they started depending on these Ezhavas who had colonised in those hill 
areas. 
How are they dependent on them? 
Because they have money power, they have political power…. Vellapalli 
(leader of the SNDP) and all will help them. Anything for them: Vellapalli 
will feed them and give help for them. Okay? And they will make some 
artificial ways. That Vellapalli and colonised leaders you know, they are for 
the benefit of the… They will do some help (for thiyyas). Just for one time 
they'll do one help to them (local Thiyyas), and they'll think that this is the 
lifetime help for them. They'll be happy with that. They started colonising 
those areas. It's all happening, ya. 
(Murali, founder-admin, mid-40s, manager in private firm, Kannur town) 
 
In this excerpt, we can see that despite using the language of the “capturing” of land 




of land ownership by the Ezhavas in the region. Rather, through the language of 
“colonization” Murali’s emphasis is that in pockets of Ezhava concentration, the 
influence of the SNDP is progressively increasing among both the Ezhavas as also 
local Thiyyas. Further, as a functionary of the fledgling MTMS, Murali is concerned 
about the influence of the long-established SNDP since the latter took an 
oppositionary stand towards the separate mobilization of Thiyyas outside its fold. 
Admins such as Murali were also concerned that among such pro-SNDP Thiyyas, this 
influence translates into self-categorization in line with their disembedded 
classification as Ezhavas. 
 
However, even others who were more ambivalent towards the MTMS were 
concerned about the influence of the SNDP through the pockets of Ezhava 
concentration in Malabar. For instance, in the following excerpt, Vijay tells me about 
the recent Maha Sangamam conducted by the SNDP in Kozhikode. 
(We discuss about the TMS) To be honest I don’t know when this TMS was 
formed. Because it was only recently, when I joined the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar that I came to know there was an organization like TMS (at this 
point the TMS had not bifurcated into the TMS and MTMS). Its literally a 
new organization and its on the path of progress I would say. Murali is the 
president right? 
I am not sure- they themselves seem to be figuring out those details. 
Yes, that is why I said its a very new organzation. That is why SNDP is 
calling it a paper organization. Because they know Thiyyas don’t want to 
associate themselves with Ezhavas. That is why they were organizing that 
Maha Sangamam in Calicut. And do you know the fact that all the buses 
were coming straight from the South like Cochin and… 90 percent of them 
were from the South. 
So very few people from Malabar? 
Very few. I have never heard any one from my family talking about it. And 
there were very few people from Kannur and Calicut. Yes people from 
Mallappuram and Wayanad came - but they were immigrants (Ezhavas) 
from the South. 





The SNDP’s Ezhava/Thiyya Malabar Maha Sangamam was organized in February 
2013. This event was vigorously discussed event on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar.  
The organization of the Mahasangamam was interpreted on the group as a signal that 
the SNDP had acknowledged the discontent among Thiyyas in Malabar, and 
particularly was troubled by the emergence of the TMS and MTMS. However, 
admins such as Suvinay also rued that the SNDP had “painted Calicut yellow”
97
. 
They were concerned that due to its own financial clout and the relative lack of caste 
mobilization among the Thiyyas, the SNDP event had garnered heavy participation. 
At this point, like Vijay, many members, had explained that it was not the local 
thiyyas who had turned up for this event. Rather it was the Ezhavas who had migrated 
to Malabar who had attended the event. These members were agitated about the 
misrepresentation of Ezhavas as Thiyyas in Malabar for the benefit of the SNDP.  
 
In this section, I have analyzed the different ways in which the members of the group 
established a connection between the limitations of place and the consequences of the 
disembedding of caste identity. On the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, dissatisfaction 
with the status of this region combined with dissatisfaction about the identification of 
Thiyyas (as Ezhavas) contributed, in a small way, to the imagination of a Malabar 
that should be separate from the state of Kerala. Despite such musings, the secession 
of Malabar was not heavily favoured because it was perceived to be an unfeasible 
division on account of factors such as the division of the existing infrastructural 
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resources in the state of Kerala. Further, a much more significant obstacle in the 
mobilization of a strong demand for a separate Malabar on this group, and something 
that is more pertinent to this particular analysis, was the consideration of Thiyya 
interests from the perspective of its intersection with a religious identity as Hindus. 
 
Secession and the substantialized identification of Thiyyas as Hindus 
 
The anxiety surrounding the need to identify Thiyyas as distinct from Ezhavas was an 
important consideration in shaping the demand for a separate Malabar on the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar. Yet, this influence was overshadowed by the group’s religious 
identification of the Thiyyas as Hindus who were competitively located in opposition 
to other religious communities, such as the Christians and the Muslims.  
 
While the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were keen on identifying Thiyyas as distinct 
from Ezhavas, they were just as committed to identifying themselves as Hindus. 
Members had a distinctive manner of identifying themselves as part of a Hindu 
religious entity. When the group was started initially, the identification of the Thiyyas 
as Hindus was relatively muted since the focus was on clarifying the identification of 
their caste. This approach was also partly developed as a counter to the broader 
narrative which equated the Thiyyas and Ezhavas, within which, as many members 
noted in the in-depth interviews, the Thiyyas were not encouraged to mobilize 






In contrast to this initial silence, in the summer of 2012, the identification of Thiyyas 
as Hindus on the group became particularly visible through the public discussions 
initiated by Suriya, a member who had adopted a Dalit perspective. Suriya had put up 
a series of posts asking members to reflect on whether the Thiyyas should align 
themselves as Dalits and what they thought of the position that Hinduism accorded to 
their caste. In his posts, Suriya specifically suggested a Thiyya identity which was 
outside of, and even oppositional to, Hinduism. Suriya’s identification with the Dalit 
perspective was not well received among the vocal sections of the group, and he was 
castigated by most as a potential trouble maker. Considering the enthusiasm with 
which these questions were discussed on the group, members were asked to reflect on 
these posts during the in-depth interviews. They were also asked reflect on whether 
and how they considered the Thiyyas and Hinduism to be connected to each other.  
 
The group was extremely vocal in its critiques of the Brahminical strand of 
Hinduism: it was not uncommon to find discussions challenging the dominance of 
Brahmins and Brahminical practices in Kerala. At the same time, members made it 
very clear that it was important to situate Thiyyas as Hindus. In negotiating their 
place within the Hindu fold, the members would argue that the manner in which 
Hinduism was practiced in Kerala and particularly in Malabar was very different from 
other parts of India where the Brahmins were acknowledged as heading the caste 
hierarchy. Through reference to this place-based history of caste, the members argued 




only in more recent times that the Brahmins and aligned castes such as the Nairs and 
Nambiars had been able to subjugate them. From the perspective of the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar, the Thiyyas were squarely located within Hinduism, although 
the rituals and deities associated with this Hindu caste took on a peculiar form in this 
region.   
 
Not only did the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar strongly argue in favour of a Hindu 
identity for the Thiyyas, there was also a strong sense on the group that as Hindus this 
caste was pitted against other religious communities in Malabar. This intersection of a 
substantialized caste identity and a substantialized religious identity for the Thiyyas 
as Hindus, significantly influenced the question of whether Thiyyas should be 
committed to creating a separate state of Malabar. The negation of the secession of 
Malabar was particularly determined by the perception that the Muslims were in 
competition, and indeed posed a substantial threat to, the interests of the Thiyyas as 
Hindus in Malabar. This logic is clearly visible in the following excerpt from my 
conversation with Arun. 
 
On the group some people had posted about the formation of a separate 
state of Malabar. What is your opinion about this? 
That was there. I heard during the Kerala formation itself, there was a talk on 
that one. But now I don't know how much of it will be helpful. Maybe it will 
be helpful. 
In your opinion, is something that the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar or even 
the MTMS should be focused on? 
Not really. Because that (new state) could go either way. Because need not 
that Thiyyas to get prominence in such an eventuality. I mean, you have a 
good percentage of other communities (like Muslims). So it doesn't mean 
that Thiyyas has to be prominent. 





As can be observed above, on the one hand, Arun considers that the creation of a 
separate Malabar might potentially benefit the Thiyyas. As a numerically dominant 
caste in the region, part of the expectation is that the Thiyyas would figure 
prominently in the new state’s administrative and political machinery, and will also 
be better placed to access other resources in the region. On the other hand, however, 
Arun considers the comparative influence of other communities such as the Muslims 
to be a factor that would limit the benefits that Thiyyas can reap in the event of the 
secession of Malabar. As a result, although he is not favorably disposed to South 
Kerala especially from the Thiyya perspective, Arun does not think that the current 
mobilization around caste should include the secession of Malabar as a goal. 
 
A similar argument was articulated by Murali, who had initially explained the grand 
idea of a separate state of Malabar with great enthusiasm.  
You had mentioned this earlier and a few people also put up posts about 
this on the group. They were discussing the possibility of Malabar being 
formed as a separate state? 
Yah, yah, yah. Because as per cultural rituals, anthropology… But language 
is different…. Malabar has a separate region you know. Like Malabar starts 
from Calicut, Kannur, Wayanad, Kasarkod and part of Mallappuram. These 
makes all Malabar region. Okay? Then other region is this Nilgiri areas - 
Coonoor, Ooty area and all. Then Kodaikanal, Palani area. Then Coorg or 
Kodagu area and all that is South Canara - South Canara, Mangalore that 
area and Chikmalglur that area. (The area that is formed after combining all 
these regions) that to be a separate state! But we are not demanding (it 
currently). If we demand, another peoples (the Muslims) are more to 
demand. Their supporters. And it will become a big political problem. So 
we're keeping quiet. Later when we (MTMS) become strong, we will ask for 
a separate state. Not now, later. 
(Murali, founder-admin, mid-40s, manager in private firm, Kannur town) 
Here it can be observed that although Murali is attracted to the vision of a separate 
Malabar which will unite the Thiyyas with other castes perceived to be similar to 




Although there is support for the creation of a separate state of Malabar among some 
sections of Muslims in the region, Murali does not think that the Thiyyas should join 
such a mobilization. To begin with, the current demand is focused on the secession of 
Malabar from Kerala, whereas from the Thiyya perspective the cognitive map of the 
new state of Malabar would include other areas. More significantly, he argues that the 
Muslims in Malabar are relatively well organized, and in comparison the Thiyyas 
would be no match for them in competing for resources or power in the new state. 
Although he is still committed to the idea of a separate Malabar, Murali argues that 
the Thiyyas should not mobilize to translate this dream into a reality until they have 
consolidated their own bases and organized sufficiently as a substantialized bloc that 
can compete with the Muslims. 
 
The manner in which the issue of the colonization of land was discussed by members 
provided an important indication that the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar felt the need to 
identify themselves simultaneously as Thiyyas and Hindus specifically in opposition 
to other religious communities in Malabar. It may be recalled that this term was 
initially used on the group by Siddharth to specifically refer to the presence of 
Ezhavas and the SNDP within Malabar. However, it is significant that when members 
were invited to reflect on this term during in-depth interviews, for a lot of them it also 
evoked the threat that they perceived emanated from other religious communities in 
Malabar, such as the Christians and in particular the Muslims. For the Cyber Thiyyars 
of Malabar, the term colonization evoked very different understandings with respect 




rather than a reference to land ownership, the term colonization was used to refer to 
the perception that their influence was progressively increasing in this region. In 
contrast, in the case of the Christians and Muslims, the term colonization was 
specifically used to refer to articulate unease regarding land ownership and perceived 
mobilization by these groups.  
 
When the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar used terms like colonization in the context of 
the Christians, in the main the reference was to the Malayora Meghala, or the hilly 
regions in eastern Malabar. Between the 1930s and 1970s Christians from the South 
of Kerala had migrated to Malabar and converted dense forests into commercial 
plantations. On the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the approach to this Christian 
presence in Malabar was complex. On the one hand, there was resentment about the 
amount of land that was owned by the Christians in this region. Many members 
portrayed it as an invasion, where Christians had come in to Malabar and bought land 
for very cheap prices. This was often portrayed as the naïve Thiyyas having been 
cheated out of land ownership in Malabar. On the other hand, this migration was also 
considered by most members to have been an indication of the enterprising nature of 
this community. Consequently, even those who complained about this “colonization” 
appreciated that the Christian migrants had worked very hard to reap profit from a 
terrain that most locals at that time considered to be wild and inhospitable. This 
tension can be observed in Ramanan’s description.  
Malabar is forgotten even for any development even now. I don't know why 
because those people are… You go to the hilly area side (Malayora 
Meghala), there are people who can fight for the farmers there. I have 
travelled once. Beautiful roads through rubber estates! Beautiful bridges 




that from the government to make all these things. But you see the main 
roads of the Tellicherry. Because there is nobody to ask and fight, it doesn't 
mean that the total community and the total people are neglected by the 
government. Because we are not saying anything. There are people there who 
were elected from there and became ministers. These people are just 
neglecting. You have seen Malabar roads, right. 
Do you think that the neglect that Thiyyas have been facing is connected 
to the neglect that Malabar has been facing? 
Actually Malabar attention is not there because of the supremacy of… Before 
itself Kerala was… Malabar was under the Madras presidency and it was 
detached from that. So earlier it used to be Travancore and (later) we were 
joined with it. Still the preference is Travancore again. But as I said, you go 
to the hilly areas of Malabar (now). The hilly areas of Malabar are occupied 
by, they call Christians who are farmers, they occupied that land and they 
cultivate and work hard. But for them there is somebody to talk. The 
representatives are there to talk to the government and they get the benefits 
such as road and infrastructure. Here (in Thalsseri), who is there to talk? 
Thiyyas - there is nobody to talk. Here I tell you, something happens, the 
politicians will say go to the Collectorate. What will it do their-will be open 
onions or what?  
(Ramanan, member, early 60s, retired engineer, Thalassery) 
 
Ramanan was the first to refer to the Christians in using the term colonization in his 
post on Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Although he was appreciative of the hard work 
that the Christian farmers put in to cultivate the land, it is significant that Ramanan 
characterizes their ownership of land here as an occupation. This excerpt is also 
significant since it indicates that the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar considered Christians 
as being a community with a high degree of mobilization based on religion. It was 
through such organization, members argued, that Christians were able to collectively 
bargain for disproportionately greater access to state resources such as roads and 
bridges. Other members also considered Thiyyas to be at a disadvantage with respect 
to the impact of Christian mobilization on the political mix in Malabar. Christians in 
the South are understood to be traditionally aligned with the Congress party. The 




indicated a greater presence for this party in Malabar. In contrast, they argued that 
most Thiyyas worked for various political outfits but were not mobilized as a 
community. In all, however, the focus on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was not so 
much on the Christians as it was on the Muslims in Malabar.  
 
The ownership of land by Muslims in Malabar emerged as a tremendous source of 
concern among the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. Through the use of terms like 
colonization, members were referring to their perception that the Thiyyas as Hindus 
were being edged out of land ownership in Malabar by Muslims. This perception was 
vigorously articulated by almost all members of the group, particularly during in-
depth interviews. While the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were fearful of Muslim land 
ownership in general, they were particularly vexed by a declining share of Thiyya 
ownership of land in the urban areas of Malabar. They saw this as a problem that was 
combined with the acquisition of businesses that were previously owned by Thiyyas 
by the Muslims. This anxiety can be observed in my conversation with Ramanan: 
Last time when I visited, members in Kannur had complained about the 
increasing power of Muslims. Some said they were buying up more land. 
What do you think?  
Actually, this is money power because they have many source of money 
nowadays. I don’t know illegal or legal, something like that and their plan is 
to have… and another thing is they can have any amount of children. Our 
government is campaigning for 2 children. But for them there is no 
restriction of having children, any amount. They don’t care the government 
says like that or like this. They said “Allah gives, no problem!” And money 
most of the… you will find they are working outside in Gulf countries. Those 
who are bringing money in a normal earned way, other people who is getting 
money… I don’t know from where the money comes, the big, big lands are 
purchased by them. So it is a …if you say it is a threat, those who have land, 
why they sell to them? This is another problem. If you don’t want to sell, 
don’t sell to them. But they (Muslims) throw money, any amount you know, 
to get some places. 




See owning a land… owning a land is not a threat for a community… You 
need not own a land to complete…because here nobody… (but) business 
land are a problem. They (Muslims) are concentrating on business land, not 
agricultural land. So they are basically business community. And they are 
concentrating in each cities business land to have their own mall or 
something like that and money is pumped from all over the world for this 
purpose. I don’t know from where they arrange and things like that. It is not a 
threat for the common man like me because now I am living… You have 
come to my home - I am living in a one acre land. Nobody will purchase this 
- no muslims will purchase this. And I am not intending to give to them also 
this land (or) any part. 
I am curious. A lot of Thiyyas also migrate to the Gulf. How is it that 
they are not able to bring back that sort of money? 
No in most of the case… because I brought the money and I bought the land. 
I bought the land as an investment. I found it is grown maybe about 200 
percentage now in 10 years time. So people like me brought the land. Some 
people are not … (they are a) little poor in investment. And most of the 
(thiyya) people who goes, its not in a higher position. They have many things 
to look after - their home. And whatever money they earn they spend like on 
their own house. By the time they come you will find they don’t have much 
balance to buy this thing. Other people (like the) Muslim community is 
basically the business community. They go there and do business also. And 
the illegal business also, they are ready to do it. And when the money is 
brought nobody is thinking “how it is made - legally or illegally?” 
   (Ramanan, member, early 60s, retired engineer, Thalassery) 
 
Here it is significant that Ramanan explains the decline of Thiyya entrepreneurship in 
Malabar through a reference to the Gulf migration among the Muslims in Malabar. 
Ramanan’s perception that in comparison to the Thiyyas, the Muslims had reaped 
unfair benefits from their migration to the Gulf was shared by others on the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar.  It was not uncommon to hear members complaining that 
Muslims were either engaged in “illegal” activities, or had received preferential 
treatment as Muslims in the Muslim dominated countries of the Middle East.  
 
The anxiety over urban land and business ownership was also extended to general 
ownership of land in Malabar. It was often combined with the rhetoric that the 




buying and selling practices. For instance, in the following excerpt, Jairaj, a young 
member based in Oman, initially responds to the post on colonization by referring to 
land ownership by Muslims in Malabar: 
Did you see the post about the colonization of land in Malabar? 
Yes, that is going on. In Malabar there are some dealings going on associated 
with land. It is a current thing. And it is happening a lot in our area.  
So what is going on? 
I’ll explain it to you. You know the Muslim community right? In our area the 
Muslim community, Muslims mostly… Our area is one in which Muslims, 
Christians and Hindus are all equal, in the sense that people from all religions 
are there. So in our area, if a person from the Muslim community wants to 
sell their land, if the land is to be sold, that person will never give it to 
Christians or Hindus. If a person has that sort of desire to sell his land, he 
will tell his mosque committee and will give it only to people from their 
community. That is so that their land, the area does not leave their hands. 
This is something that I am seeing more of now. So for them it is a way on 
which it does not go to outsiders. I don’t know if this is happening outside in 
other areas, but it is something I can see in our area. 
So when that happens, does it affect the Thiyyas? 
Well to tell you the truth I am against it. It is only after the sale happens that 
we get to know about it on the outside. This is a definite thing that is done. 
Those who do it, they are definitely doing it. 
(Jairaj, member, early 20s, subcontractor, Oman) 
Here Jairaj is articulating a common argument on the group: the Muslim community 
seeks to consolidate its power in Malabar through tightly controlling the ownership of 
land. He argues that unlike the Hindus and the Christians, the Muslims only sell land 
to other Muslims and not people from other religious communities. This perception, 
that the Muslims as a community were hoarding land, either through control over the 
sale of their own lands, or through an aggressive pursuit of lands owned by Hindus, 
was fairly common on the group. Although Jairaj depicts that the Thiyyas as Hindus 
do not follow this practice of selling land only to others within their community, it 




of not selling land and houses to Muslims has historically been prevalent even among 




It was clear that such a tussle over land ownership was a metaphor for the members’ 
perception that the Muslims were becoming more powerful in Malabar. This sense of 
a loss of power from the Thiyyas to the Muslims was often expressed in everyday 
conversation on the group as well as in in-depth interviews. It is significant that the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar perceived this as a threat not only as Thiyyas but also as 
Hindus. This can be observed in the following excerpt from my conversation with 
Rakesh: 
Some of the members told me that they were worried the Muslims were 
becoming more powerful in Kannur. They seemed to think that this 
could harm Thiyya interests. What do you think about this?  
Yes, it may harm. There is chance of harming Thiyyas because monetary 
wise some of them (Muslims) are very rich. And they are getting funds for 
help from Gulf countries and all that. They are getting help from almost all 
Gulf countries, Muslim countries and all, like that. We (Thiyyas) do not have 
such facilities. So they are buying not only our property…. but this Vaniyas, 
Nairs and all their property, they (Muslims) are buying. It is a trend. 
And how do you think this will affect Thiyya interests? 
On the one hand, the Muslim population is increasing. On the other hand, our 
population is decreasing. And if this goes, ultimately… and on the one side, 
they are buying our property on a large scale. So finally after many years I 
think, they can demand that … and based on the population, the election is 
all based on voting all that… they will demand more seats in the assembly, 
Lok Sabha and all, like that. Ultimately they will be having control over 
Malabar - some people are fearing like that. 
(Rakesh, admin, early 40s, mid-level government official, Kannur) 
 
Rakesh response is interesting because it highlights two aspects of the threats that the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar perceived as emanating from land ownership by Muslims. 
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 For instance, Manjushri recollected that during the sale of tharavadu houses in her family, a primary 




First, he articulates that the Muslim pursuit of land is not something that is limited to 
the Thiyyas alone, but is common to all Hindu castes in the Malabar. Secondly, he 
articulates the fear that such land-ownership by the Muslims will ultimately translate 
into their overwhelming “control” over Malabar itself.  
 
Many members saw the loss of power as a challenge that Thiyyas not only experience 
as part of their caste, but also as part of a beleaguered Hindu community within 
Malabar. Just as they had perceived a lack of mobilization among the Thiyyas as a 
caste, most members also commented on what they perceived was a lack of unified 
mobilization among the Hindus in Malabar. For instance, in the following excerpt, 
Arun responds to Rakesh’s concern about the decline in Thiyya majority by referring 
to the lack of mobilization among them, both as a caste in itself and as part of a 
religious group. 
 
Rakesh, had put up a post on the group that said that "Malabar is the 
land of the Thiyyas”. He followed this up by saying that at one point 
Thiyyas were a majority in Malabar, but now they feel like a minority 
there. What do you think?  
That is… Like there are a lot of factors to that. Muslim population has been 
growing and Christian migration has happened. So that has contributed. And 
the growth of the population has a lot to do with the way it is. One is if you 
look at most of these Hindu and Christian families, they adhere to the 
population policies, which is two kids mostly. Whereas, that hasn't been the 
case of the Muslims. And another issue related to the growth of Muslim 
populations, what I understand is… See they, even among my friend circle, 
most of them got married around before 25… say around 24 like that. 
Whereas Christians and Hindu crowd usually get married around 32, 33 on 
an average. You have more or less a ten-year gap there, so the cycle repeats 
for a couple of generations… The number, the growth difference will be 
huge, right? Because by the time you have your children ready for marriage, 
the Muslim grandchildren will be ready for marriage. 
It seemed that he was referring to majority in terms of political power 
and economic resources, apart from just numbers of people. So this 




the thiyyas enjoyed earlier, that has been going down. Is that your sense 
as well? 
That, if you look at last few years the way the political this one is kind of… 
It's more of a pressure group I would say… Like you see Muslim parties 
forcing for certain benefits to be given to their communities. Same with 
Christian parties. Whereas usually the Hindu kind of community is divided 
across party lines, most of them. I mean when you compare the other 
communities a good part of, a good chunk of them align to a certain party, 
which is not the case with the Hindu groups. They are just spread across 
party lines. So because of that they are not able to act as a pressure group. I 
would say more than community, these groups (Hindus) are affiliated on the 
political lines. 
So that has become a disadvantage for the Thiyyas also? 
Yes. 
(Arun, admin, mid-30s, IT professional, Hyderabad) 
It is significant that Arun considers the mobilization of the Muslims and Christians in 
Malabar as a challenge to the numbers and influence of the Thiyyas in the region. As 
Arun explained it, for him the mobilization of both Thiyyas and Hindus vis-à-vis the 
religious minorities in Malabar is crucial. He considers the mobilization of Thiyyas to 
be an integral part Hindu unity, a goal that was quite important for him, rather than as 
a movement that stands in opposition to it. Here he explains that the relative 
consolidation among Muslims and Christians in Malabar has emerged as a 
disadvantage to the Hindus in general and the Thiyyas in particular. It is interesting 
that Arun considers the mobilization around caste by the Ezhavas and around religion 
by the Muslims and Christians as an unwelcome divisive element in Malabar. Yet 
when he was asked how he would characterize the current mobilization among 
Thiyyas, he argued that he saw this as a means to correct the divisiveness in Malabari 
society, rather than as something that would contribute to it. 
 
On the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, a connection was made between the lack of 
mobilization by Thiyyas and its influence on what was happening to Thiyya 




to a furore over the transfer of control of a cremation ground used by the Thiyyas in 
Payyambalam Beach in Kannur city. This cremation ground had been managed by a 
committee formed by the Thiyyas for many years. However, recently its management 
had been transferred to the local panchayat after a court order. Although there were a 
few different root causes that were cited behind this move, a refrain that was 
commonly heard on the group in connection to this issue was that it would have never 
happened to lands managed or owned by the Muslims or the Christians in Malabar 
since they were much more organized than the Thiyyas. This can be observed in my 
conversation with Vimal: 
When we spoke the last time you had mentioned that communism does 
not take into account differences based on caste. You also said that this 
has harmed the Thiyyas. Can you tell me a little bit about that? 
You want me to explain that? Most of the Thiyyas are of a secular mindset. 
So asking about caste et cetera has not come up as an issue in our area. Other 
than in marriages and things like that, this caste spirit… I’d say 90% of the 
Thiyyas do not bear this in their minds. So even if an outsider comes to our 
house, we never enquire about what his caste is. So if someone comes 
because they have a need or whichever way they come to our house, we do 
not enquire about this thing. But the problem that has come up is that because 
we have become excessively secular. When everyone else collects benefits 
by citing numbers (“kanakku paranju vaangumbol”), because the Thiyya 
community is not organized, they have not been able to achieve this. That is 
the main problem. That is there in whichever area. Right now the 
management of the Thiyya community cremation ground has been usurped. 
If this had happened to the grounds for any other religion, I think they would 
have organized against it and the government would not have been able to 
give this order. 
(Vimal, member, early 20s, postgraduate seeking employment, Kannur) 
 
Like other Thiyyas in his neighborhood in rural Kannur, Vimal is openly and strongly 
committed to the CPI (M). At the same time, he expressed that the allegiance to 
Communism had come at a certain cost to the Thiyyas. He argues that in combination 
with the athmarthatha of Thiyyas, their adherence to Communist principles had made 




Payyambalam cremation ground as an instance of the Thiyyas being “excessively 
secular”. In explaining this term Vimal is referring to what he perceives to be a lack 
of organization among the Thiyyas both as a caste and as part of a religious 
community. It also indicates that he perceives a threat both as a Thiyya and as a 
Hindu. 
 
Significantly, when the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar drew on the substantialized 
identification of being both Thiyyas and Hindus, the scope of the region in question 
expanded. They were identifying themselves as not only a caste in Malabar, but also 
as part of a larger religious community in Kerala, one which they perceived was in 
competition with the Muslims and Christians in this state. Members often made a 
reference to their perception that due to their unity and organization, the Christians 
and Muslims had successfully been able to access various benefits from the state 
government. This can be observed in my conversation with Anish, a member studying 
in Russia: 
So what do you think makes better sense for Thiyyas: align with the 
SNDP or with the TMS? Because from the group I understand there is 
some tension between these two. 
Yes there is some tension. But it's like one person is now ruling there is 
SNDP. Because it's like a - I don't know how they manage it. They have 
some sort of internal democracy and all. And we Thiyyas are not satisfied 
with the organizational setting. And one more point I'd like to add is that the 
Thiyyas were not organized at all in the past. And that was the reason for 
their failure also. They were not organized at all. 
Can you explain what you mean by organized? 
Organized means like for example vote bank politics. If we organized 
ourselves we could have had a better deal. 
So you're saying that there was not that sort of unity? 
Yes that is what I mean. But at the same time I don't think that we should be 
like apart. We should not be like pockets or islands. In the long run it's not 
too good for the community either. 
What do you think are the top five things that Thiyyas need to do for 




The first one is know your political strength. Know your strength. Like 
numerically and in other aspects. So there should be a common platform to 
unite other than this SNDP. 
For the Thiyyas themselves? 
Yes. Then second one is that now in the politics of Kerala more importance 
is given to the minorities (he is using the term to refer to religious 
minorities, specifically the Christians and Muslims). So I am somebody 
who has been… Of course minorities should not be denied any rights, but 
they should not be given any special rights. So Thiyyas should do something 
in electing leaders to do something for the community. 
The Thiyya community? 
The Thiyya community. To do something for the general community rather 
than appease any particular community. Now the Muslim league is having a 
major role in Kerala politics. And there is a development between… There 
are two organizations one for the Nairs and one for the Ezhavas. So they 
have come to a common platform to do something politically. I support that. 
It doesn't mean that everything should be given to the majority community 
(the Hindus). But even a term like majority I don't know if it is applicable 
for a state like Kerala because of the percentage of the population of Hindus. 
So everybody should be given an equal right. Because it's a policy of the 
federal government that they are giving some scholarship for the minorities. 
I see. I wasn't aware of this. 
Yes, of course they're giving. But that far exceeds what they are giving for 
the SC, ST community. It's a technical problem that the money given for the 
scheduled castes, they are following the old pattern. That's why minority 
communities are given more importance.  
(Anish, member, early 30s, Ayurvedic doctor, Russia) 
 
Anish was one of the first people on the group to publicly post about how the 
amalgamation of Malabar with ThiruKochi had been detrimental for the Thiyyas in 
the region. It is significant that when he is prompted to consider how Thiyyas can 
help themselves, Anish suggests that they should consolidate not only as a caste in the 
region but also as part of the mobilization of Hindus in the state of Kerala.   
 
This chapter considered the becoming of place through caste on the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar. The identification of caste on the group shapes the manner in which the 
membership of Thiyyas in Malabar is envisioned, as well as the manner in which 
other caste and religious groups can claim belongingness in the region. The 




region of Malabar is envisioned on the group. However, it is subsumed by the 
emergence of a simultaneous substantialized identification of the Thiyyas as Hindus 
who are perceived to be at odds with Christians and Muslims in both Malabar and 








This study explores the mutual production of caste identity and place through 
reference to each other. The aim was to understand how and why the members of the 
digital group, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, connect Thiyya caste identity with the 
region of Malabar. Since Giddens’ theoretical framework of distanciation is one of 
the few sociological theories that explicitly addressed the connections between space 
and social relations, it seemed to be the correct place to start such an analysis. 
Consequently, the framework of distanciation was extended to the study of caste 
identity and place.  
 
The study began with a rather close reliance on Giddens’ suggestion of a concrete 
break between social relations and place as social systems start to exist beyond the 
immediate contexts of physical presence. Consequently, at the outset of the study the 
focus was on tracing the rupture between caste identity and place, following which 
only an ephemeral connection can be established between them. After all, the 
contemporary reality of the categorization of castes through the institutional 
mechanisms of the nation-state seemed to make complete sense from the confines of 
this framework. These institutional mechanisms create a standardized categorization 




from prior spatial contexts. When we consider the way the nation-state understands 
caste, the place and caste are indeed disconnected, or disembedded. 
 
However, once interactions with the digital group itself were underway, it was 
observed that for the members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar the moment of 
disconnection between the Thiyaness and Malabar seemed not to have occurred. If 
anything multiple and contradicting place-based narratives seemed to exist within the 
same caste. This was reflected in the struggle regarding the identification of the 
Thiyyas within the online group, where the connection between Malabar and 
Thiyyaness was enforced. Further, from the perspective of many of these members 
Thiyya and Malabar had always been connected to each other, and some even found 
it difficult to think of one without the other. Indeed, for them, over the past few years 
there seemed to have been an intensification of this association between the 
identification of caste and place. More interestingly, the intensification of the way 
members connected place and caste was based on a reaction to how the nation-state 
classified the Thiyyas. As far as the objectives of the study were concerned - a 
moment of pause occurred. Although the framework of distanciation in its present 
state is useful in partially explaining the connection between caste identity and place, 
it seemed that there needs to be a shift in the manner in which the very concepts of 
disembedding and re-embedding are currently visualized. As the study progressed, it 






Through the ethnographic study of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the following 
hypothesis was tested:  
In the context of heightened time-space distanciation, ways of identifying caste 
become disembedded from places they were intimately tied to, and can only be 
partially and temporarily re-embedded in these places.  
 
This hypothesis was then translated into two empirical research problems. First, how 
and why do members of this digital group identify their caste by referring to 
Malabar? Second, how do members envision the area of Malabar based on their 
identification of caste?  
 
This chapter consists of three sections. Section 1 includes a discussion of the 
theoretical contributions of this dissertation. Here the empirical findings of the 
dissertation are discussed in the context of lacunae in the existing literatures covered 
in the dissertation. In section 2, the empirical contributions of the dissertation are 
discussed. Some suggestions for future research are noted in the concluding section. 
 
Theoretical Contributions of the Study 
 
Distanciation, disembedding and re-embedding 
 
Based on the empirical findings outlined in chapters 4 and 5, I reject the hypothesis 




theoretical framework of distanciation. In so rejecting the hypothesis, it is not my 
contention that the theory of distanciation is no longer useful. Rather, the theoretical 
approach to place and identity adopted in this study and the findings outlined above 
indicate that the concepts of disembedding and re-embedding require modification.  
 
As originally envisioned by Giddens, distanciation refers to the re-ordering of time 
and space with respect to social relations in a manner that the social system can exist 
beyond the immediate context of physical presence. Here Giddens specifically adopts 
an institutional and ontological approach.  Distanciation occurs through disembedding 
mechanisms which pull social relations out of more immediate spatial contexts to 
recombine them across wider spatio-temporal contexts. Giddens identifies symbolic 
tokens as a type of disembedding mechanism. These are media of interaction which 
can be transferred without being influenced by the specific characteristics of those 
people or groups which handle them. In order to avoid the suggestion of a unilinear 
movement of social change, Giddens developed a paired concept of re-embedding, 
whereby social relations can be reconnected to older, intimate spatio-temporal 
contexts. For Giddens, any such reconnections can however only be partial and 
temporary. 
 
As outlined in chapter 2, Giddens’ framework of time-space distanciation and the 
concepts of disembedding and re-embedding are partially useful in understanding the 
relationships between caste identification and place. The literature has long 




structure of and access to space is based on caste identity (Béteille 1965, Ghurye 
1969, Gandhi 1983, Trivedi 1996, Dupont 2004, Singh and Vithayathil 2012). 
Further, caste identity has also been known to be shaped in reference to the 
immediate spatial context (Pant 1987, Srinivas 1970, Raheja 1988, Appadurai 1996, 
Jaiswal 1997).  
 
The institutional and ontological emphasis in Giddens’ original theoretical exposition 
is useful to the extent that it facilitates understanding of the manner in which the 
nation-state generates knowledge about caste. Caste identity becomes disconnected 
from place through the generation of a symbolic token of knowing caste on the basis 
of orientalist attempts at standardization of caste classification; the logic of 
enumeration; and classification based on affirmative action policies of the colonial 
and post-colonial state. Consequently the nation-state does generate a body of 
knowledge about caste which freezes caste identity into a standardized, spatially (and 
temporally) abstract entity that does not change based on those who refer to it. 
Giddens’ theoretical framework is useful particularly since his original aim was to 
illustrate “the unifying features of modern institutions” (Giddens 1991: 27). 
 
However, as this study demonstrates, the connection between place and caste identity 
continues to exist despite the prevalence of such disembedding mechanisms instituted 
by the nation-state. Indeed there seemed to be a struggle between multiple spatial 
narratives, often within the same caste itself. Within the broader Thiyya fold two 




Thiyyas to distinguish them from the Ezhavas. The other one was aligned with the 
state’s favoured narrative that the Thiyyas and Ezhavas were the same caste with 
different regional monikers.  The struggle over these narratives was also reflected in 
the digital group itself, where the former narrative was enforced.  
 
It may be argued that from within Giddens’ framework, this multiplicity can be 
explained through the concept of the reflexive project of the Self.  Giddens (1991: 
244) identifies this as a peculiarly modern phenomenon whereby self-identity is based 
on the “reflexive ordering of self-narratives.” He further suggests that this reflexivity 
also involves a choice among “countrfactuals”, where individuals are actively 
“choosing between possible worlds” (Giddens 1991: 28-29). As per this perspective, 
the multiple spatial narratives of place are but different options that individual 
Thiyyas can choose from in constructing their self-identity in conditions of high-
modernity.  
 
However, the concept of reflexive self-identity, as envisioned by Giddens, is not 
neatly applicable to the current case. We can only get a partial explanation from 
within the original framework of distanciation. To begin with, in this concept of 
reflexive self-identity, Giddens prioritizes identification by self over identification by 
others. This emphasis is chosen by Giddens because it enables his argument that in 
modernity, the individual has a greater (although not absolute) freedom to pick and 
choose narratives about the self. However, as can be seen in this case, the identity 




of caste. At the heart of this emphasis is Giddens’ tendency to approach modernity as 
being essentially discontinuous, where the pre-modern/modern are considered as 
mutually exclusive. At the very least, this results in the loss of analyses that consider 
the continuities between the pre-modern and modern.  
 
The problem also appears in sharper contrast when the scale of understanding identity 
is broadened from the microsociological category of self-identity adopted by 
Giddens, to the macrosociological category of self-identification (via cultural studies) 
as adopted in this dissertation. As explained in Chapter 2, the former approach to 
identity has the tendency to overstate the agency of the individual at the cost of 
understanding the discursive construction of the self. In this case, the place-based 
narratives of caste, even in their multiplicity, are projects of the identification of the 
self, not in terms of the individual per se, but in terms of the attempt to identify the 
self as part of a caste group. Even if, as Giddens suggests, it is indeed so easy to pick 
and choose aspects of individual self in modernity, this certainly is not the case when 
it comes to the identification of larger groups. Groups necessarily have to respond to 
identification by others, engaged though they may well be, in temporary and strategic 
articulations.  
 
Similarly, it may also be argued that it is possible to explain the continuiung reliance 
on place in defining caste through a faithful reading of Giddens.  It can be argued that 
this is precisely the kind of rekindling between social relations and place that he had 




demonstrates that the moment of rupture that Giddens envisions through the term 
disembedding does not necessarily occur for everyone. Instead, the connection with 
place continues to exist within the caste, although attention to the spatial connection 
may wax and wane with the demands of time. Further, re-embedding is not quite as 
inconsequential as originally envisioned in distanciation. The attachment to place that 
was encountered in this case was not the feeble effort at re-embedding that was 
promptly dismissed in Giddens work as being “too vague to recapture a glimmer of 
what used to be” (Giddens 1991: 147). In addition, re-embedding as Giddens 
envisions was not exactly applicable in this case since place retained its significance 
as something more than simply a container where people lived. While many Thiyyas 
who connected their caste to Malabar in this digital group lived in this place, there 
were many others who had ceased to reside there many decades ago. Place was still 
an important element of their caste membership for these Thiyyas. This suggests that 
within a section of the Thiyyas have always continued to represent both as being 
connected to each other. In other words, although the rupture between caste identity 
and place may be valid from the perspective of the nation-state and some interest 
groups (within and outside the caste), it is not the case for other interest groups within 
the caste.  
 
This suggests that although the symbolic token of knowledge about caste is 
generated, and may gain legitimacy due to the nation-state’s influence, older place-
based ways of knowing caste continued to exist at a more subdued level, and regained 




symbolic token therefore needs to be analyzed in the context of a continuing struggle 
regarding how caste is known and represented by multiple groups, within and outside 
the caste. Consequently, both the disembedding and re-embedding of caste identity in 
place should not be understood as points of disconnection and re-connection alone. 
Rather, they need to be studied as points where some ways of knowing caste gain 
more power and legitimacy for specific social groups. 
 
i. Implications for knowing place:  
 
Divergent approaches to studying spatiality explain the partial manner in which the 
theory of distanciation can explain the relationship between caste identity and place 
on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. In this dissertation, the approach to studying space 
and place differs from Gidden’s approach. Within the framework of distanciation, 
Giddens has clarified that he is primarily concerned with the phenomenological 
approach to the study of space and place. Therefore, Giddens argues that the 
reordering of social systems under distanciation also influences time and space. The 
representation of space becomes standardized and is not restricted to any one 
perspective. Further place is increasingly influenced by interactions with absent 
others and by distant events.   
 
However, from within the critical social constructionist approach adopted in this 
thesis, the geographer Derek Gregory (1989) has pointed out some important flaws in 




by the structures of signification and legitimation in the study of space and place. 
Gregory correctly challenges Giddens argument about the standardization of the 
measurement of place, pointing to the peculiar representation involved in official 
cartography which is often at odds with other representations of place. Gregory 
argues that Giddens’ conception regarding place is limited to envisioning it as a mere 
container, and therefore it does not include its normative and symbolic elements.  
 
An overview of Giddens’ social geographical approach, however, indicates that 
within his preference for the phenomenological approach, Giddens does accord some 
recognition to the symbolic aspects of place
99
. Further, if we follow the trajectory of 
Giddens approach to time-space, it can be observed that in his initial work he does 
consider the normative elements involved as well. For instance, in his early work on 
structuration, Giddens (1984) has drawn on Foucault and written about the 
organization of space as a tool of disciplinary power. Here Giddens (1984: 261) has 
also made observations regarding the normative connection between restructuring of 
social systems, and time-space that are important for this particular study. Here 
Giddens refers to the role of the storage of information with respect to time-space as 
something that generates power. Therefore, in his earlier work, apart from experience, 
Giddens does concede a part for the knowledge and representation of space in the 
theory of structuration. However, this emphasis seems to have been dropped in 
Giddens’ (1990, 1991) later work elaborating on globalization and distanciation.  
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Using Gregory’s critique as a starting point, this study seeks to re-infuse some of this 
emphasis on knowledge and representation of space into the concepts of 
disembedding and re-embedding. The representation and knowledge of places are not 
fully congruent with how they are experienced. Neither are these representations 
stable or fixed by the nation-state alone. Consequently, along with the original 
emphasis on stretching out of social systems across larger chunks of time-space, 
based on the findings of this study I would suggest the incorporation of the discursive 
elements of spatiality within distanciation.  
 
Thiyya identity and Malabar may well have been disconnected due to the nation-
state’s narrative of knowing caste. Further, in official cartographies of India, Malabar 
has primarily been relegated to an odd historical and geographical category - it is 
unlikely to figure in official maps of Kerala or India. However, the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar have not ceased referring to Malabar, nor from representing it from the 
perspective of their caste. This continues to influence their vision of this place - the 
cognitive map of Malabar for them corresponds greatly to a place where Thiyyas 
reside. It also influences the manner in which they represent the place of different 
social groups in Malabar - Thiyya interests represent Malabar above other social 
groups for many on this group. Finally, the Thiyya specific cartographic vision of 
Malabar may well influence its physical boundaries at some juncture in time, based 





Places are not limited to boundaries within which interaction and experience occur. 
They have a powerful function in discourses - they are used in a struggle over how 
social agents are known and how they want themselves to be known. Therefore the 
negotiation over legitimizing narratives about caste identity and place is important in 
gaining a fuller understanding of this case. The incorporation of the discursive aspect 
of place has important implications for how we can approach distanciation and 
understand the relationship between disembedding and re-embedding. 
 
ii. Implications for distanciation, reconceptualizing disembedding 
and re-embedding:  
 
Giddens argues that under distanciation, the experiential connection between social 
relations and place is severed due to changes at the institutional level. However, this 
generates a great amount of ontological insecurity - social agents become 
progressively unsure of themselves. Consequently, he argues that sometimes they use 
the very tools which facilitate disembedding - such as the new media - to re-embed 
social relations in place. Since this analysis does not provide much room for multiple 
representations - either of caste or of place - it can only partially explain how and why 
caste identity and place are reconnected on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar.  
 
In contrast, once connections between place and social relations are considered from 
the perspective of representation as well as experience, we can start to understand that 




among multiple narratives. This symbolic token of knowledge around caste does not 
exist in a vacuum determined only by how institutions know people and how people 
experience their lives in place. It also interacts with culturally specific ways of 
evaluating caste groups. As can be observed in this study, the institutional 
classifications of caste generated by the nation-state are incorporated within 
prevailing dominant notions regarding the biological basis of caste and the unequal 
status of caste groups.  
 
Conversations within the group and interactions with members indicate that these are 
not simply people who have lost their bearings on how to be simply because the 
nation-state now knows them in the context of the historico-spatial stretch of Kerala 
rather than Malabar. In reconnecting the Thiyya caste with Malabar through an online 
forum they are not just warding off a great modern dilemma of existence and 
negotiating time-space. 
 
Instead, they are anxious because the way the nation-state knows them, as being the 
same as Ezhavas and as being part of the “backward” category, is drawn into the 
broader discourse of caste inequality. This interaction between an institutional 
classification and the older discourses on caste inequality serves to stigmatize them 
(“those categorized as backward are inherently inferior and incompetent”). Further, 
they also perceive a connection between the manner in which the state identifies them 
and the extent to which they can access the benefits of social policy through the state. 




the Ezhavas under the broad category of Other Backward Classes, they are unable to 
access much of the 14 percent reservation allocated to them.  Consequently, they seek 
to revive the Malabar based identification of the Thiyyas to distinguish themselves 
from the Ezhavas as well as to negotiate for access to 7 percent of these affirmative 
action quotas. Both of these factors influence the current instance of the re-
embedding of Thiyya identity in Malabar on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. 
 
From this case, the disembedding of caste identity and place does not appear quite as 
permanent as implied in the original exposition in Giddens later work. Nor does the 
re-embedding of caste identity in place seem quite as temporary or ephemeral. If 
anything it seems rather persistent, a linking together which is likely to resurface 
periodically. 
 
Implications for Studying Caste 
 
The connection between identity and place is discussed rather briefly and indirectly 
within the literature on caste (Ghurye 1969, Srinivas 1970, Barnett 1976, Hardgrave 
1979, Appadurai 1986, Pant 1987, Raheja 1988, Manor 2001, Widmalm 2006, 
Annamalai 2010). Further, where the connection between both is taken into account 
as a central part of the analysis, the discussion often occurs at the level of a fixed 
identity that influences or is influenced by a fixed place (Miller 1954, Béteille 1965, 
Gandhi 1983, Trivedi 1996, Dupont 2004, Singh and Vithayathil 2012). In contrast, 




junctures in time, the constructs of caste identification and place can significantly 
shape the collective creation of the other.  
 
i. Place and the Identification of Caste:  
 
By adopting a fluid approach towards the construction of caste identity (through 
place), this study also demonstrates that both its identification and composition can 
become sites of contestation within the caste itself. Despite the existence of status 
differences (Thurston 1909, Nossiter 1982, Kodoth 2001), the Thiyyas had previously 
been identified as synonymous with the Ezhavas in a disembedded manner within 
academic writings and popular discourse (Hardgrave Jr 1964, Abraham 2010, Nag 
1989, Osella and Osella 2000). This identification also emerged partly as a reflection 
of the political alignments between these groups through the course of the past 
century, which at its peak resulted in providing access to OBC benefits for the 
Thiyyas in the 1960s. Over the past decade this identification has congealed through 
the classification of these castes by the government of Kerala (Kerala Public Service 
Commission 2013).  
 
It was in opposition to this coagulation that the region of Malabar was used in the 
collective conversation on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar to identify the Thiyyas as a 
caste that is distinct from the Ezhavas. Over time, the alignment with the Ezhavas 
seems to have soured, atleast for a small but growing section of the Thiyyas, 




towards this identification by the nation-state stems from a combination of factors 
including the stigma generated from it and its influence on the caste-based experience 
of places outside Malabar, the progressive entrenchment of the logic of enumeration, 
and a shift in the substantialized identification of the Thiyyas. 
 
ii. The identification of caste and stigmatization 
 
The Thiyyas are currently classified under the Other Backward Classes (OBC). While 
the national list of OBCs lists them as a caste that is separate from the Ezhavas, the 
state government list locates Thiyyas as a subset of the broader category of the 
Ezhava caste. Anecdotal evidence from members of the group indicates that this 
difference in the state list has been a recent occurrence. Apart from this list, the 
identification of Thiyyas as Ezhavas was also reported for things like public 
examinations and school records. Members of the group narrated multiple instances 
where they had experienced ridicule and even discrimination on the basis of their 
identification as “Ezhavas” and “backwards”. This stigmatization was particularly 
intense in Southern Kerala, or when they interacted with people from south Kerala in 
places other than Malabar. 
 
In analyzing the impact of caste identification by the nation-state on resolving caste 
inequality, Dudley-Jenkins (2003) identifies a dual movement. While in some cases 
these disembedded caste categories are consciously embraced in an effort to 




tribal groups, caste differences are also reinforced through the potential for further 
stigmatization. An important addition to this analysis would be Aloysius (2011) 
response: any consideration of state-based identification through these categories 
must also observe prevailing older and newer cultural discourses which legitimate 
caste inequality. In other words, it is important to consider how this symbolic token 
(disembedded institutional knowledge in the form of caste identification as SC, ST or 
OBC) interacts with prevailing and new cultural interpretations which legitimate caste 
inequality through caste-based stigma.  
 
Groups categorized as SCs and STs have conventionally been the most 
disenfranchised and experienced the most stringent discrimination within the caste 
system. Consequently, the literature on the contemporary stigmatization of caste, 
particularly in terms of these disembedded institutional categories, has been 
concentrated on the SCs and STs. Research indicates that classificatory terms based 
on affirmative action policies, particularly the term SC, ST and “backwards” are read 
through the lens of superiority and inferiority, resulting in a coded, yet stigmatizing, 
discourse (Still 2013, Gudavarthy 2012, Froystad 2010, Jodhka and Newman 2007, 
Vasavi 2006, Mitra Channa 2005, Dudley-Jenkins 2003) involving these categories. 
As part of this discourse, these terms are infused with older notions of purity of blood 
and natural intelligence as being inherently distributed unequally based on biological 
differences between castes (Still 2013, Gudavarthy 2012, Froystad 2010, Vasavi 
2006, Mitra Channa 2005). This stigmatizing discourse also incorporates resentment 




promoting inefficiency, and those who are classified in disembedded categories such 
as SC and ST are portrayed as inherently lacking merit (Jodhka and Newman 2007).  
 
The stigmatization of groups classified as OBCs also warrants some attention since 
research also indicates that as compared to affirmative action policies for the SCs and 
STs, OBC reservations have attracted much more upper-caste resistance (Jaffrelot 
2006, Deshpande and Yadav 2006). The question of how the OBCs respond to this 
kind of stigmatization is an interesting one, given that they may be better positioned 
to counter it on the basis of their relatively better material position and social status.  
 
In his analysis of destigmatizing affirmative action in India, Gudavarthy (2012) 
suggests that since OBC as a category comprises heterogenous and differentiated 
groups, stigmatization is likely to be relatively ineffectual. However, as this research 
indicates, the Thiyyas continue to experience stigmatization on the basis of caste, 
particularly on the basis of their disembedded caste classification by the nation-state. 
Further, in everyday discourse, the term “backward” has become a blanket term to 
incorporate various groups covered under affirmative action policies, covering the 
OBCs along with the SCs and STs (Galanter 1978). In this manner, the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar also find themselves to be discursively produced as “backward”.  
 
In part, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar counter this stigmatization through employing 
spatial imaginaries of caste to refer to region-specific social and cultural capital. The 




stigmatization. However, this does not always entail a direct critique of the higher 
ranking castes that engaged in attaching the stigmatizing labels. Instead, in the 
immediate situations where they experience stigma, many of them still resorted to 
passing as the Nairs, who are understood be a higher-ranking caste in the 
conventional caste hierarchy. The critique was engaged in a more covert form, in the 
relative safety of areas where their numbers are higher such as on the digital group. 
They also sought to direct a much more concentrated critique at caste groups who 
they considered to be the source of the stigma – such as the “backward” Ezhavas who 
have made Thiyyas “backward” by association. 
 
Gudavarthy (2012) further argues that unlike the SCs and STs who have adopted a 
moral position of the “victim-subject” in the context of reservations, the OBCs have 
the potential to resignify the discourse on affirmative action. He argues that the 
OBCs, in contrast, have adopted a pragmatic approach using the language of rights 
and legal and constitutional entitlements to justify reservations. The current study can 
only partially corroborate Gudavarthy’s observations. While the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar did adopt the pragmatic-legal narrative to claim reservations, they also 
combined it with the narrative of a “victim-subject”. They adopted this approach 
through the language of place: by referring to their caste-based experience of places 
outside Malabar and by referring to the limitations of region combined with caste.  
 
Gudavarthy (2012) invests considerable confidence in the ability of the OBCs to 




his empirical work, he found that OBC respondents justified reservations for SCs as 
well. He suggests that rather than altruism, this approach is adopted because OBCs 
cannot justify affirmative action policies for themselves without fully legitimizing 
them for the SCs as well. Gudavarthy also points out that the dominant discourse 
stigmatizes the SC and ST reservations as something that is mainly utilized by 
successive generations of elites within these groups. In contrast, since OBC 
reservations are limited through a “creamy layer” restriction, he argues that this is 
also used to resignify affirmative action as time-bound and as limited to those who 
truly deserve them.  
 
However the current study suggests that these observations regarding the seemingly 
uniform resignifying potential of OBCs needs to be modified. On the Cyber Thiyyars 
of Malabar the approach to affirmative action varied on the basis of class divisions. 
Gudavarthy’s observations better applied to those rural members who belonged to 
lower middle-class families such as Suriya and Vimal. The majority of the members, 
who were urban and belonged to the middle and upper classes, seemed to reject the 
reservations in their entirety. They pointed out that personally affirmative action had 
only been the source of stigma, since they were unable to access the affirmative 
action policies due to the creamy layer restriction. Further, although they were 
unwilling to give up on the OBC classification, stating that poor Thiyyas would 
benefit from them, they were also resentful of other groups that utilized them. In 
particular they reserved strident critique for the affirmative action policies designed 




“backward” seems to primarily have generated resentment against the SCs rather than 
solidarity with them. 
 
iii. Identification of caste and the Logic of enumeration:  
 
Sudipto Kaviraj (1997) uses the term “logic of enumeration” to refer to a reciprocal 
movement regarding the identification of caste between the nation-state and caste 
group. He argues that the colonial (and post-colonial) state initiated a logic of 
enumeration by first counting colonial subjects in terms of mutually exclusive social 
groups such as castes, and then predicating social policy on the numerical strength of 
these groups. In response to such enumeration, caste groups themselves started to 
mobilize around collective identities (Appadurai 1996, Kaviraj 1997). Kaviraj argues 
that caste groups gained a specific type of political agency– they started to think of 
and mobilize themselves around the idea of enumerated (how many of us are there?) 
and mapped (how far are we spread?) entities, abstracted from local spatial contexts. 
 
The logic of enumeration was particularly strong on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabars. 
It was, in some ways, the driving impetus on the group since the prevailing 
assumption was that unlike other castes, the Thiyyas had so far failed to organize 
themselves as an enumerated whole to negotiate for various resources from the 
nation-state. Indeed for many of the members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, their 
identity as Thiyyas had taken on a renewed significance in recent times in relation to 




themselves as Thiyyas had come about more recently when they observed that other 
castes, which were numerically smaller than the Thiyyas, had successfully gained 
access to the benefits of social policy by explicitly mobilizing around their caste 
identity. These members lamented that this kind of mobilization had not occurred 
among the Thiyyas themselves. 
 
They also justified the current mobilization of Thiyyas through Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar and the offline organizations of MTMS and TMS as a response to the 
strategy of enumeration by the Ezhavas. They considered the previous alignment with 
the Ezhavas as detrimental: although the Thiyyas had added their numerical strength 
to the Ezhavas, they had not received any benefits from it. Indeed the use of the term 
ezhavanization, reflects anxiety of the members that this state of affairs would 
become permanent. The term was occasionally used by members to refer to the 
incorporation of the Thiyyas as a sub-section of the Ezhavas, during marriage 
searches and cultural representation. A more common and related connotation of 
ezhavanization was as a reference to what they perceived as the progressive 
identification of Thiyyas as a sub-caste of the Ezhavas in official documents 
pertaining to the identification of caste by the government of Kerala. This recent and 
explicit amalgamation by the government of Kerala provided one of the primary 
reasons for the current effort towards relegitimating the identification of Thiyya 





Consequently, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar wished to create separate Thiyya 
organizations which would use the logic of enumeration to negotiate directly with the 
nation-state to secure benefits for Thiyyas first. The idea of a representative caste 
organization for the Thiyyas resonated strongly with most respondents. Consequently, 
many members felt that the time had come for the emergence of a representative 
organization comprised of and focused mainly on the Thiyyas. Though many of these 
members argued that they would not like such an organization to get involved in 
politics, a political role for such an organization, which would engage in account 
keeping particularly with respect to the nation-state, was envisioned nonetheless.  
 
The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar argued that although as part of the combined 
categorization the Thiyyas and Ezhavas together were entitled to 14% of all OBC 
benefits, the Ezhavas had usurped the lion’s share of these benefits. Those members 
and admins who were explicitly affiliated with the MTMS and TMS had in mind a 
clearer strategy of how this logic of enumeration might be employed.  Citing various 
calculations regarding their numerical strength, they expected that once the Thiyyas 
were categorized separately, they would be assigned a separate 7% of the OBC 
benefits.  
 
The enumeration of caste also had implications for the region of Malabar. This digital 
group constructed the Thiyyas as the legitimate representatives of Malabar by citing 
the large size of the caste relative to other Hindu castes in the region. Here the vocal 




MTMS, focused on counting and mapping the members of the caste in the region of 
Malabar. Consequently, they argued that what happened to the Thiyyas in Malabar 
would determine not only the well-being of the members of the caste but also the 
region itself. The majority of the group perceived the lack of consolidation among 
Thiyyas as a caste to be the central problem. They considered the lack of mobilization 
of the Thiyyas to have been an important detriment in negotiating with the nation-
state to access benefits not only for members of the caste but also for the region of  
Malabar (such as educational and transport infrastructure). 
 
iv. Substantialization and the identification of caste:  
 
The concept of substantialization was most famously suggested by Louis Dumont 
[(1966)1970] to characterize what he visualized as a complete shift from a relation of 
interdependence between castes towards a relation of competition between them, 
wherein each caste positioned itself as a competitive bloc against others to access 
economic and political resources. The narrative use of place to identify caste on 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar certainly reflected the mobilization of the Thiyyas as a 
substantialized bloc against a relatively recent caste other, the Ezhavas. Irrespective 
of various internal differences, including political affiliations, all members on the 
group argued that it was important for the Thiyyas to be united and known as a caste 





Scholars of caste (Béteille 1997, Parry 2007) have fittingly questioned the utility of 
the concept of substantialization since it tends to lend itself to an assumption of 
internal homogeneity within each caste. This caution proved useful in understanding 
events on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar which pointed to a struggle over the 
narrative characterization of the Thiyyas within the group. However, the narratives 
themselves indicate that despite this critique of the concept of substantialization was 
not devoid of utility. I encountered two contradictory narratives regarding the place-
based identification of the Thiyyas, both of which highlighted the need for the 
development of castes as united blocs in competition with others. The dominant 
narrative in this group was that Thiyyas are from Malabar, and on this basis sought to 
posit the Thiyyas as a separate and united bloc against all other castes, including the 
Ezhavas, and religions (Christians and Muslims). The second narrative, was that the 
Thiyyas and Ezhavas are essentially the same caste known by different names in the 
north and south of Kerala. This narrative supported the formation of a substantialized 
bloc which incorporated both Thiyyas and Ezhavas unified in opposition to other 
castes (particularly the Nairs) and religious groups (Christians and Muslims). The 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar reiterated the first narrative on the group, while the 
second narrative was muted through threat of expulsion from the group. As the furore 
over Radha’s
100
 comments indicates, those Thiyyas who tried to voice the second 
narrative on the group were silenced with accusations of being Ezhavas disguised as 
Thiyyas or even simply being confused.  
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 Radha was a member on the group who had expressed her discomfort at the anger expessed against the 
Ezhavas, since she subscribed to the narrative that the Ezhavas and Thiyyas are essentially the same caste in 
different parts of Kerala. Her post in early 2013 had generated a tremendous backlash in the group. Radha had 
temporarily left the group in protest in January 2013, amidst calls for her removal on the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar. Her oppositional reading of the imaginative geography on this group is discussed in Chapter 4(Error! 





The literature seems to indicate the existence of a history of class-based striation 
within the Thiyya fold. In his observations about the establishment of Thiyya temples 
in Malabar, Menon (1994) notes that rather than Thiyyas in rural areas, the Thiyya 
elites in urban areas had aligned themselves with the SNDP.  
 
In the current study, the form of counter accusations and the composition of the 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar also indicated that the popularity of the first 
substantialized identification partly reflected class-based differentiation within the 
Thiyya caste. Those who were removed from the group protested that the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar were elite Thiyyas who were not considering the interests of 
poor Thiyyas who, through the second strategy of substantialization, could access the 
substantial network of educational institutions and hospitals run by the SNDP across 
Kerala. The composition of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar was also such that each 
member interviewed could not access the OBC quota reservations since their annual 
income was greater than the creamy layer cut-off (greater than Rs 6 lakhs). This 
formed an important component in the members’ perception that the Thiyyas had not 
gained anything from being aligned with the Ezhavas. They often referred to the 
creamy layer ceiling when labeling the accusation that the Ezhavas of the South were 
usurping the majority of OBC reservations since they tended to be more 
impoverished. Other admins, such as Siddharth, also lamented that the Thiyya-only 




motivated by concerns of food and education rather than the mobilization around 
caste. 
 
This dissertation also observed that substantialization as a complex phenomenon, a 
process that is inherently self-contradictory (Fuller 1997) and partial (Fitzgerald 
1996, Ishii 2007). This study bears out the observation made by Fuller (1997) that 
internal differentiation within each caste accompanies a heightened normative 
emphasis on the difference between castes. The existence of multiple place-based 
narratives reflects internal differentiation within the Thiyya caste. At the same time 
their form also indicates that both narratives supported the creation of substantialized 
blocs – what was debated was the composition of the caste-bloc, rather than the need 
for a substantialized bloc itself. 
 
This study also supports the work conducted on Nepali castes by Ishii (2007) and 
Fitzgerald (1996). They had observed that the substantialization of caste in Nepal was 
not unilinear – it fluctuated, among other things, according to the broader political 
climate. This can also be observed in the case of the debates on the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar and the anecdotes narrated by some of the members. The alignment of the 
Thiyyas and Ezhavas seems to have been acceptable to even Thiyyas in the group at a 
previous point in time. Some members narrated family history that indicated prior 
involvement with or support for the SNDP. However, today they were not willing to 
accept this substantialized identity. Kodoth (2008: 270-271) had also observed 




Many on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar voiced their disaffection with the leadership 
of the SNDP by Vellapalli Natesan, who they considered to be nepotistic and corrupt. 
A common argument on the group was that the SNDP had only drained resources 
from the Malabari Thiyyas in the name of Sri Narayana Guru and it had not 
represented Thiyya interests. An over-riding fear was that under the influence of the 
SNDP, the Thiyya identity would be lost forever. 
 
Finally, the study also supports Parry's (2007: 487) suggestion that substantialization-
as-caste-groups interacts with substantialization-as-religious-groups. As this study 
demonstrates, on the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar there existed a complex interaction 
between the need for a substantialized Thiyya bloc and the need for a substantialized 
Hindu bloc. On the one hand these were seen as competing issues. Members often 
questioned whether Hindu unity had to be achieved at the expense of Thiyya unity, 
citing that when they had raised the issue of a Thiyya identity distinct from Ezhavas 
on other forums they had been silenced through a reference to Hindu unity. On the 
other hand, as the discussion of the secession of Malabar indicates, the 
substantialization of Thiyyas as Hindus was still important to most members of the 
group. They perceived the Christians and Muslims in both Malabar and Kerala as 
highly organized groups that the Thiyyas were in competition with in terms of access 
to the benefits of social policies instituted by the nation-state. 
 





In this dissertation the broad focus was on studying the connection between identity 
and place. Within the social sciences, this relationship has conventionally been 
studied through material and phenomenological approaches, particularly in the form 
of the influential “sense of place” framework which predicates the experience of 
place. Since this literature has some important limitations mentioned in Chapter 2, in 
this study, a critical social constructivist approach was adopted to study identity and 
place. Consequently, the analytical framework of spatial imaginaries was adopted to 
study how the becoming of caste identity and place can influence each other. This 
framework combines a consideration of both representation as well as experience of 
place. 
 
In this study, the term spatial imaginary was used to cover talk about places, rather 
than the being limited to the translation of this talk into action. Here, spatial 
imaginary incorporates not only how people identify places, but also how they 
identify themselves through places. Identification through places involves not only 
the identification of self, but also identification of others. For instance, thorough the 
narrative construction of Thiyya identity through Malabar on the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar, the group also conveyed how they identified their caste Others (the 
Ezhavas). Although much of the study explicitly concentrated on identification 
through place, it also necessarily involved a consideration of positive or negative 
identification with places. As can be observed in this thesis, while the explicit 
narrative of the group mentioned the region of Malabar (a place with which they 




and experienced South Kerala (a place with which they identified negatively). Since 
the question of how place was used in the construction of caste identity has been 
discussed in the previous section, in the following section the focus will be on how 
caste identification was used in the construction of place. 
 
i. The construction of place through caste identification:  
 
The existing literature on the identification of caste mentions its influence on the 
imagination of place in a peripheral manner, such as in the imagination of the Dravida 
Nadu in the Dravidian movement (Barnett 1976, Hardgrave 1979, Manor 2001, 
Widmalm 2006, Annamalai 2010). This study also provides a detailed demonstration 
of the manner in which caste identification influences the shape that place can take. 
Malabar, portrayed as the land of Thiyyas, was imagined as a land inherently 
characterized by selflessness (athmarthatha). South Kerala, in contrast, was perceived 
as a place of inherent selfishness. At one level, the equation of the Thiyyas with 
Malabar and selfishness was undertaken to establish the distinction from the Ezhavas 
of the South. However, this thematic equation also served as a metaphor for the 
perception that the Thiyyas had been shortchanged not just by the Ezhavas of the 
South alone, but also by the state machinery of Kerala which was concentrated in the 
South. Malabar was hence constructed as a place that contributed a valued, though 
flawed, virtue (selflessness) to the Thiyyas. Malabar was also envisioned as the place 
which through its own secondary status in Kerala contributed to the marginalization 





The identification of caste itself can also play a crucial role in the determination of 
the physical boundaries of place. For instance, Gudavarthy 2012 notes that the 
identification of caste by OBCs in the region has played a crucial role in shaping 
contemporary regional politics, specifically in the demand for creation of new states 
such as Telangana and Bundelkhand. The current study analyzed the extent to which 
the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were willing to connect their identification of the 
Thiyya caste to the issue of the secession of Malabar from Kerala. It was observed 
that the identification of the Thiyyas as a substantialized caste did influence the vision 
for a separate Malabar. From this perspective, it made sense to have a separate region 
where the numerically dominant Thiyyas could suitably represent the interests of both 
the caste as well as the region. Further, to the extent that the group grounded the 
Thiyyas squarely in this region, such a vision was also fuelled by their disaffection 
from Kerala as Malabaris. However, at present, apart from pragmatic considerations, 
this vision is also interrupted due to the construction of a substantialized identification 
as both Thiyyas and Hindus. 
 
Finally, the identification of caste can also influence the manner in which social 
boundaries within place are drawn up. Here we can concentrate on how the 
identification of caste influences the manner in which a particular caste stakes claim 
to membership in places, and further, how it envisions the existence of other social 
groups in that place. The Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar constructed the Thiyyas as the 




the athmarthatha through which this caste has served the region. From their 
perspective, other castes in the region may well have been elected to power in 
Malabar, but they have been too preoccupied in caste-based mobilization to attend to 
the problems of Malabar. At the same time, members also argued that the problems of 
Malabar would be solved not just when Thiyyas started to represent the region, but 
rather when they started to mobilize as Thiyyas.  
 
Based on the identification of caste, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were particularly 
concerned with the presence of Ezhavas in Malabar. While the concern was not 
precisely with the land they occupied, or even with their numbers per se, this group 
was concerned with the manner in which their presence would propagate the 
influence of the SNDP in this region. The identification of the Thiyyas in terms of 
both caste and religion also had implications for the manner in which they thought the 
Muslims and Christians could claim membership in the region. The Christians were 
primarily perceived as outsiders to Malabar, as migrants who had usurped land in the 
region through the selfishness characteristic of Southerners. Although the Muslims 
were not perceived as external migrants, they were certainly portrayed as a 
radicalized community whose allegiances were not completely towards Malabar or 





Empirical implications of the Study  
 
When narrowed down to its basic elements, this thesis examines how the imagination 
of place figures in the struggle between the solidified manner of caste identification 
by the State, the symbolic and material resources at stake in such identification, and 
the shifting manner in which castes (and different interest groups therein) seek to 
identify themselves in response. Relegitimizing narratives about the connection 
between caste and place provide an important tool to challenge the influential but 
sticky manner in which caste identity is officially classified. It can also provide a 
crucial resource in the negotiating the consequences of such identification. In this 
case, the revival of the Malabar-based identification of caste enables the Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar to challenge the stigma emerging from the state’s identification 
while simultaneously making a case for access to affirmative action on the basis of 
both caste and regional identity. 
 
Census Enumeration and recording the fluid identification of caste in India  
 
Given that the study records the stigma associated with the dis-embedded caste 
classification by the nation-state, somewhat paradoxically, one of the implications of 
this study is that the enumeration of castes in the national census is all the more 
necessary. The census can potentially provide a platform where the self-identification 






This study catalogues the intense anxiety about the manner in which the nation-state 
classifies castes in India. The enumeration of caste has certainly resulted in the 
solidification of caste boundaries (Appadurai 1996, Kaviraj 1997, Bayly 1999, 
Dudley-Jenkins 2003). This is in large part due to the association of social policies 
with caste identification since the colonial era, although the implication of this differs 
in the colonial state vis-à-vis the post-colonial state. In the post-colonial state, the 
classification of castes is required for affirmative action. In the case of the OBCs, 
currently this classification is conducted in a rather thorough manner by the national 
and state commissions
101
 (Dudley-Jenkins 2003).  
 
Given that the pursuit of caste equality is, and should be, an important consideration 
in the manner in which the state’s resources are distributed, are we to be reconciled to 
knowing caste in this fixed form? This is an important question since in this study, we 
can observe that the contours of any caste group are fluid, and are quite responsive to 
the vagaries of political alignments and disaffections. The shift in the boundaries of 
caste groups over time, results in shifts in legitimacy accorded to identification 
narratives by different interest groups within the caste. 
 
On the basis of this study, I would argue that the census needs to move beyond the 
limited manner in which caste data is currently captured, and include data about Other 
Backward Classes in its ambit as well. Further, and more specifically, it calls for the 
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feature of self-reporting of caste to be an integral feature of how the enumeration is 
undertaken. The enumeration of caste has recently been revived in restricted form in 
2011, wherein only data about Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) are 
currently collected. Currently, the census records whether the respondent is SC or ST: 
an affirmative response is followed by categorizing the respondent within the existing 




In contrast, this study would suggest that it is important to collect data about the 
OBCs as well. Further, in the census, respondents need to be provided the voice to 
categorize their caste themselves. For instance, instead of asking respondents to 
identify whether they are currently categorized as SC, ST or OBC, and checking for 
the name of their caste group in the existing lists, respondents can be asked whether 
they are categorized as SC/ST/OBC and provided the option of recording the name 
through which they refer to their caste. This is not an unusual feature of censuses 
conducted elsewhere - for instance this approach has been adopted in the recording of 
race and ethnicity in the United States. If data about Other Backward Classes is 
included in successive censuses, it would provide for an additional channel for 
recording the shifts in the substantialization of castes. Consequently it would facilitate 
a clearer dialogue between the nation-state and caste groups. It would also make 
available clearer data on the socio-economic conditions of caste groups, albeit in 
terms of a numerical gist. 
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Caste, its place-based capital and translocalism 
 
Another implication of this study is that the connections between caste identity and 
region need to be acknowledged. The study of castes needs to recognize the varying 
composition of caste groups in particular regions, as also the connections that 
members of castes draw between these constructs. Of course, this regional ecology of 
castes has to necessarily be understood as subject to fluctuations over the course of 
time. As recorded in this thesis, serious disruptions include events such as enhanced 
migration as well as classificatory programs of the nation-state. However, as can also 
be observed from this study, at specific historical junctures, these disruptions can 
actually contribute to revive the regional identification, rather than simply subdue the 
connection. Once the place-based identification of caste is acknowledged, it paves the 
way for the articulation of two further implications of this study. First, symbolic 
resources accrue to caste members from the regional identification. Second, the 
identification and the experience of caste are embroiled in a translocal matrix through 
migration.  
 
This study highlights that resources of caste membership can be region-specific: 
although they are recognized and acknowledged in the place of origin they do not 
translate well in other regions. For instance, the numerical strength of the Thiyyas and 
the history of this caste were quite well recognized in Malabar and certainly 
generated important material resources for people from this caste. Even more 
significantly for the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar, the recognition of Thiyya history 




what is their place in Malabar, did not immediately translate in regions outside 
Malabar. Provisionally, we can identify this as a place-specific symbolic capital of 
caste. To some extent, the concept of dominant caste (Srinivas 1955, 1987) captures 
the specific resources that a caste enjoys within a region. The concept of a dominant 
caste includes both material and symbolic resources that this group would enjoy in a 
specific area, such as a village or even a larger region. The original articulation 
however has primarily emphasized on material resources such as the ownership of 
land, political dominance and Western education among members of the dominant 
caste. Further, in its application the ambit of this concept typically been limited to one 
caste in a region, although Srinivas does suggest the possibility of a small number of 
dominant castes in a rural area (1966: 11).  
 
Although it has been subjected to critiques from a variety of perspectives (Oommen 
1970, MacDougall 1979), the concept of dominant caste has specific limitations from 
the perspective of understanding the symbolic capital of caste that is peculiar to a 
particular place. The concept of a place-specific symbolic capital of caste enables the 
examination of how multiple caste groups enjoy different types of symbolic capital 
within a region. Oommen (1970) also launches an important critique of the concept of 
the dominant caste on the basis that it implies that the entire caste is homogenous. 
The concept of a place-specific symbolic capital of caste can also facilitate the 
articulation of how a caste group, and different interest groups in it, may try to 
employ place in the generation of symbolic capital outside the region. In this respect, 




group in the context of its “local” village or area, this concept can also be used to 
discuss the spatial capital of caste in the context of places outside of these “local” 
boundaries. 
 
A second and related implication of the study is that both the experience and 
identification of caste can be categorized as what Brickell and Datta (2011) refer to as 
translocal. Translocalism refers to how social relationships across the boundaries of 
particular places shape migrant networks as well as the social and economic exchange 
in a diaspora. This study highlights that the experience of caste, particularly the 
stigma of caste identification, is something that is still relevant within Indian diaspora 
outside the country. To that extent, it is reflects that tiny part of the literature on the 
Indian diaspora which has focused on, rather than simply nodded to, the significance 
of caste and caste-related practices in the diaspora (Bhatt and Mukta 2000, Kurien 
2001, Kumar 2004, Fuller and Narasimhan 2008, Jodhka 2009). However, this study 
puts into sharp focus some additional and specific aspects of the contemporary 
translocality of caste. 
 
To begin with, through its starting premise of how people project a close association 
between caste identity and place, the study demonstrates the very value of paying 
attention to the diasporas of caste. Further, unlike the work done on caste in the 
Indian diaspora, which focuses on migrants who live outside India, this study 
demonstrates that diasporas of caste can exist both within and outside the boundaries 




voices often belonged to people who were had either presently or previously moved 
out of Malabar to other places in India and outside the country. Such conglomerations 
can be classified as the internal versus external disaporas of caste. To the extent that 
their ability to convene as caste groups and exert influence increases through 
improvements in communication technology, it becomes even more important to 
study these different types of caste diasporas. The translocal framework is important 
precisely because it muddies the previously straightforward association between 
migration and national boundaries. 
 
Even more significantly, this study highlights the use of translocal geographies for the 
mitigation of caste stigma as well as caste identification. For the Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar, the stigma of caste identification is not limited to Malabar. In many ways, it 
has been intensified as they have migrated away from the region. As can be observed 
in this study, the internal and external Thiyya diaspora heavily rely on Malabar to 
negotiate their experience of caste, particularly to address stigmatizing encounters, 
outside the region. The translocal aspects of caste are likely to gain in significance in 
the future, particularly since new media have enhanced the capacity of the internal 
and external diasporas to contribute to and be immersed in caste groups. 
 
The identification and mobilization of caste and implications for new media 
 
In its influence on caste relations, new media, like other channels of communication 




new media in other contexts, in the case of caste as well, new media certainly 
contributes to “augmenting” offline discourses and experiences (Graham, Zook, and 
Boulton 2013, Jurgenson 2012). On the one hand such media reflects the 
contemporary caste relations and movements which organize offline life. It should 
come as no surprise that the new media are being used by various groups both enforce 
and resist caste inequality. 
 
That said, the impact of the new media extends beyond that of a simple mirror. Such 
media also help shape caste in the offline context in powerful ways. Access to new 
media is still restricted to a relatively tiny percentage of the population of India. 
Nonetheless, new media as “voice” (Mitra and Cohen 1999) is still influential in their 
contributions to broader offline discourses through intertextuality of digital and 
physical texts and conversations. This dissertation provides an insight into this 
reflexive mirroring regarding both the identification of caste as well as the 
mobilization of caste. As new media access improves in India, and more significantly, 
as the convergence between old media and new media continues (Jenkins 2006), it is 
likely that they will continue to exert a powerful influence on both the identification 
of caste and its mobilization. 
 
As can be observed in this study, new media are used as important platforms in the 
struggle over identification of caste. To those who are able to access new media, the 
opportunity for the self-documentation of their caste-group is unparalleled. While 




serve as convenient and efficient means to challenge popular narratives regarding 
how a particular caste is known in physical groups and interactions. The Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar were particularly invested in the digital platform since they had 
found themselves unable to draw a distinction between the Thiyyas and the Ezhavas 
in physical interactions. Thirumal (2008) has made a similar observation in the case 
of the Dalit middle classes in India. He argues that in contrast to their conventional 
exclusion in older print media, the newly educated Dalit middle class has seized upon 
the new media with a particular vigour to establish a pan-Indian presence. This 
development can also be observed among other caste groups, including in this case, 
the OBC Thiyyas, who consider the new media as important in their endeavor to 
recast their discursive production. 
 
New media also serve as repositories of tools which could aid in the struggle over 
identification. For instance, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar used this particular digital 
platform as a convenient means to recount an idealized version of Thiyya history. 
Here, they share information, documents and photographs regarding the Thiyyas 
which could potentially aid in clarifying a separate identity. The digitization of a 
variety of official colonial documents regarding Thiyyas were particularly 
appreciated and shared on this group. New media are also being used by caste groups 
to document idealized caste rituals and practices. For instance, on the Cyber Thiyyars 
of Malabar, part of the public conversation regarding Thiyya identification was 
dedicated to recounting the location of kavus and also the variety of rituals associated 





Needless to say, the project of caste identification is not limited to platforms such as 
digital groups alone. Indeed Meerkat.com, like many digital arenas, is the site of 
vigorous identification and counter-identification by caste groups, each seeking to 
ensure first that the caste is known, and second it is known in the correct manner. The 
members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar were actively engaged is establishing a 
unique Thiyya identity not only within Meerkat.com, but also through other digital 
platforms such as Wikipedia and Youtube and other social networking sites such as 
Orkut.com and Facebook.com. Indeed, during the time of fieldwork, many of the 
younger and more technically adept admins on the group were intensely involved in 
the identification of the Thiyyas as a distinct caste on Wikipedia. They had been 
involved in this activity for over 5 years during which the Thiyya page on Wikipedia 
automatically re-directed readers to the page on Ezhavas. The Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar had emerged as a platform to not only voice their concerns but also solicit 
knowledge from other Thiyyas who could provide folk and academic documentation 
regarding the distinction from the Ezhavas. The intertexuality between digital texts 
created on these different platforms, as also between digital and physical texts, 
provide a vital component for countering popular narratives with less accepted ways 
of knowing caste. In the current case, since there are not many representations of the 
Thiyyas as a separate caste in the print media, the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar serves 






Apart from the identification of caste, new media is also being used to facilitate the 
mobilization of members of a caste into caste-specific organizations. The Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar made for a very obvious case of this development. However, the 
same can be observed, if in a less obvious fashion, for innumerable digital caste 
groups which work closely and support physical caste organizations.  
 
As many of the MTMS (and TMS) allied admins explained during the course of 
fieldwork, digital groups such as the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar and the 
MahaThiyyars had contributed in no small part to the momentum that these Thiyya 
organizations went on to achieve. As mentioned earlier, not all members on Cyber 
Thiyyars of Malabar were affiliated to either of these organizations, yet they all 
agreed that this group had been instrumental to their introduction to these caste 
organizations. This particular digital group provided an important source of 
information regarding meetings and activities of these physical Thiyya organizations 
within Malabar itself.  It also facilitated the mobilization of internal and external 
diasporas of caste. Where people had previously found themselves to be the only 
Thiyyas for miles around in their city of residence in Middle-East Asia, through new 
media they were able to track developments of these caste organizations in Malabar. 
Although it had not yet occurred for the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar during the period 
of fieldwork, other caste groups on Meerkat.com have witnessed members from the 






These projects of identification and mobilization of caste on various digital platforms 
are bound to proliferate over time. The number of digital groups from some of the 
well-recognized Indian castes on Meerkat.com alone has increased in leaps and 
bounds as the numbers of subscribers of Indian origin have increased on this social 
networking site. Apart from this, these projects are continued in other digital 
platforms as well. Even those castes which have so far been digitally invisible, either 
due to their small numbers, or the poverty of their members, are likely to register a 
digital presence over time.  
 
This study on a digital caste group suggests that the use of new media needs to be 
studied from outside of perspectives focused on the West alone. Popular discourse 
regarding the new media in the West has been concentrated on their role in the 
creation of radically new, spatially disconnected and anonymous identities. While 
these are not completely inapplicable in other places, this study indicates the need to 
make room for discussions about how new media is being used to reiterate and 




One of the most important requirements in terms of the scholarship on caste is further 
socio-historical work on the regional variation in caste organization and 
identification. The last work which took this as its primary focus was conducted by 




of Malabar. As this dissertation indicates, there is space for more of such scholarship. 
At the very least, it is important that a place-awareness be incorporated in future work 
on caste.  
 
Another area of future research indicated by this study is the impact of discourses of 
neo-liberalization on attitudes to caste-based affirmative action. Such research could 
examine the variation of attitudes towards caste-based affirmative action within the 
same caste, and focus particularly on the degree to which they are influenced by these 
new discourses regarding “merit” and affirmative action. A different line of research 
could be to engage in a comparative analysis of this impact among castes that are 
categorized differently. For instance, attitudes within OBCs, SCs and STs could be 
analyzed on a more thorough, comparative basis. Although Gudavarthy (2012) has 
attempted something along these lines, this study has established that there are some 
important limitations in that work. In addition, variations in attitudes among the 
“forward” castes as they are known popularly, or other castes not included under the 
ambit of affirmative action, can also be included in such a comparison. This research 
would be of immense value in terms of the potential for comparison between 
contemporary attitudes to caste based affirmative action and race-based affirmative 
action. Here, the attitudes among diasporas of caste, particularly external diasporas of 






Although instances of people passing as members of other castes were encountered 
during the study, the phenomenon was not adequately explored due to time and 
theoretical limitations. A review of the existing literature on caste also suggests a 
scarcity of work on what appeared to be a very common phenomenon. Again, an 
important site for studying caste-passing would be among the internal and external 
diasporas of caste. Older concepts such as Sanskritization (Srinivas 1952) do not 
adequately capture the fluidity of the phenomenon. Apart from a study of the factors 
that prompt passing behavior, research is also required to look into caste-passing 
specifically as an interactional strategy to negotiate stigmatization. Further, as the 
complex attitudes among the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar suggests, people who 
engage in passing take a pragmatic approach to it. While they may engage in passing 
as other castes in public, in more private arenas they engage in a vigorous critique of 
the same castes. Rich research could be conducted on the use of caste-passing as a 
complicated strategy of resistance as well as acquiescence to caste hierarchy and 
stigmatization. 
 
Finally, this dissertation has focused on a digital caste based group which was 
actively engaged in the caste based mobilization of the Thiyyas. Fieldwork, 
particularly in Malabar, did provide some insight into its impact on the offline 
mobilization of the Thiyyas. Nonetheless, explicit research is required on the 
intricacies of the impact of new media on offline mobilization of caste. As this study 
further indicates, such studies would also benefit from adopting a translocal approach 










Entry No Caste/ Community Resolution No. & Date 
1. Agasa 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 2. Ambalakkaran 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 3. Anglo Indian 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 4. Aremahrati 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 5. Arya 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 6. Bandari 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 7. Billava 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 8. Chakkala 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993  
9. 















Wynadan Chetties & 
Kalavara Chetties, Sadhu 
Chetties & 









Devadiga 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt. 
15/05/1995 12. Devanga 12011/68 93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 13. Dheevara (Araya, 
Arayavathi Mukkuvan or 
Mukaya, Mogaveera, Valan, 
Bovi Mukayar, Nulayan, 






















15. Ezhavathi 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 16. Ezhuthachan 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993  
17. 
Ganika 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt. 
15/05/1995 18. Gatti 12011/68 93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 19. Gowda 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 





Ishavan, Illuva, Illuvan, 






22. Jogi 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 23. Kaduppattan 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 24. Kaikolan 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 25. Kelasi(Kalasi Panicker) 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993  
26. 


















Karuvan, Kitaran, Kollan, 
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33. Krishnanvaka 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 34. Kerala Mudali 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 35. Kudumbi 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993  
36. 
Kusavan (Kulala, Kulala 










37. Latin Catholic 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 38. Madivala 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 





Other Muslims excluding 
(i)        Bohra 
(ii)       Cutchi Menmon 
(iii)      Navayat 
(iv)      Turukkan 
(v)       Dakhani Muslim 
12011/96/94-BCC  dt. 
09/03/1996 
40. Maravan 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 





Nadar (Hindu Nadar,  Nadar 
included in SIUC & Nadar belonging 
to Christian religious denominations 





43. Naikkan 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 44. Odan 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993  
45. 




46. Pandithar 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 47. Panniyar 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 





49. Peruvannan (Varanavar) 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 50. Pulluvan 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 







53. Sourashtra 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 54. Saliya 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 55. Senai Thalavar (Elavaniar) 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993  
56. 
SIUC (excluding Nadar 
Specified in Item No. 42 which is item 





57. Tholkolan 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 















Vanian (Vanika, Vanika 
Vaisya, Vanibha Chetty, Vaniya 
Chetty, 




62. Vaniar 12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 




Veerasaiva (Yogi & 
Yogeeswara). Poopandaram/ 



























Yadava (Kolaya, Ayar, 






Ganjam Reddi (in Malabar 
District  referred to in Sub-section (2) of 







Vishavan (in Malabar District as 
referred to in Sub-section (2) of 








Kammara (excluding Malabar 
District as referred to in Sub- 
section (2) of Section 5 of the 
States 
Reorganisation Act, 1956) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 
71. Malayekandi (excluding Malabar 
District as referred to in Sub- section 
(2) of Section 5 of the States 







Malabar District as referred to in Sub-
section (2) of Section 5 of the States 





Marati (excluding Kasargod 
Taluk of Malabar District) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C) dt. 
10/09/1993 
74. Thachar 12011/68/98-BCC dt. 
27/10/1999 75. Vettuva Navithan 12011/68/98-BCC dt. 
27/10/1999 76. Kongu Navithan 12011/68/98-BCC dt. 






Boyan (in Malabar District as referred 
to in Sub- -section (2) of Section 5 of 
the States Reorganisation Act,1956) 
12011/68/98-BCC dt. 
27/10/1999 












Kongu Vellala, Gounder including 
Vellala Gounder, Nattu Gounder, Pala 




















































Entry No. Caste/Community Resolution No. 
& date 1 
1 
Agamudayar including 
Thozhu or Thuluva Vellala 







Azhavar and Alavar 
(in Kanniyakumari district and Sheoncottah 
Taulk of Tirunelveli district ) 






12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 







(in Kanniyakumari district and Shencottah 
taluk of Tirunelveli district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
6 Archakari Vellala 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 7 Aryavathi 
(in Kanniyakumari district and Shencottah 
taluk of Tirunelveli district) 





Attur Kilnad Koravar (in Salem, South 
Arcot, 
Ramanathapuram Kamarajar and 
Pasumpon Muthuramadigam district) 




9 Attur Melnad Koravar (in Salem 
district) 









12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12 Bhatraju (other than Kshatriya Raju) 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 13 Billava 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 





15 Boyar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 16 Oddar (including 
Boya, 
Donga Boya, 




Nellorepet Oddar and 
Sooramari Oddar) 









(In North Arcot District) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
19 Chavalakarar 
(in Kanniyakumari  district and Shencottah 
taluk of Tirunelveli district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
20 Chettu or Chetty (including 
Kottar Chetty, Elur Chetty, Pathira Chetty 
Valayal Chetty 
Pudukkadai Chetty) 
(in Kanniyakumari  district and Shencottah 
taluk of Tirunelveli district) 




21 C.K. Koravar 
(in South Arcot district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
22 Converts to Christianity from 
Scheduled Castes, irrespective of the 
generation of conversion for the purpose of 
reservation of seats in Educational Institutions 
and for seats in Public Services 





23 C.S.I. Formerly S.I.U.C. in 
Kanniyakumari district and 
Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli district 





(in Thanjavur, Trichirapally, Pudkukottai and 
North Arcot district) 







(including Donga Dasari and Gudu 
Dasari) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 





12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
28 Dobba Koravar  (in Salem district) 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993  
29 
Dobbai Koracha (In Tiruchirappally 
and Pudukottai districts) 




Dommara (including Domb & 
Dommar) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
31 Donga Ur. Koracha 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 32 Dudekula 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 33 Enadi 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 34 Eravallar 
(except Kanniyakumari district 
and Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli district 
where the community is a Scheduled Tribe) 






(in Kanyakumari District and Shencottah 
taluk of Tirunelveli district) 






(in Kanniyakumari district and Shencottah 
taluk of Tirunelveli district) 









(in Kanniyakumari district and Shencottah 
taluk of Tirunelveli district) 





(In Thanjavur, Tiruchirapally 
Pudukottai and South Arcot districts) 










Gavarai (Kavarai) and 
Vadugar(Vaduvar) 
(other than  Kamma, Kapu, Balija and Reddi) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 




(including Gammala, Kalali and 
Anuppa Gounder) 




43 Hegde 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 





Ezhuvar and Illathar 





(In Thanjavur, Tiruchirapalli and 
Pudukottai districts) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
47 Isaivellalar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 48 Jambuvanodai 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 49 Jangam 2011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 50 Jhetty 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 51 Jogi (including Jogis) 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 




Kaikolar , Sengunthar 












(In Thanjavur, Tiruchirapally and 
Pudukottai districts) 




56 Kalari Kurup including Kalari 
Panieker (In Kanniyakumari district and 
Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli district) 




57 Kalingi 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 58 Kalinji Dabikoravar 
(In Thanjavur and Pudukottai districts) 





(including Easanattu Kallar Gandarvakkottai 
Kallar Koottappal Kallar Piramalai Kallar 
and Periasooriyur Kallar) 




60 Kalveli Gounder 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 61 Kambar 2011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
62 Kammalar or Viswakarma, 
Viswakammala 
(including Thattar, Porkollar, Kannar 
Karumar Kollar, Thacher, Kalthacher 
Kamsala and Viswabrahmin) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 







12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011 /21/ 95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 
64 Kannada Saineegar, 
Kannadiyar (throughout the State) and 
Dasapalanjika (Coimbatore, Erode and 
Nilgiris districts) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011 /21/ 95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 






(Seer Karuneegar, Sri Karuneegar, Sarattu 
Karuneegar, Kaikatti Karuneegar 
Mathu Vazhi Kanakkar Sozhi Kanakkar and 
Sunnambu Karuneegar) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 




12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt 




(in Chengalpattu, Pudukottai and 
Tiruchirapalli districts) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/ 21/ 95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 
69 Kerala Mudali 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 70 Kharvi 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 71 Khatri 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 72 Kongu Chettiar (in Coimbatore and 
Periyar district only) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
73 Kongu Vellalar (including Vellala 
Gounder 
Nattu Gounder, Narambukkatti 
Gounder, 
Tirumudi Vellalar, Thondu Vellalar, Pala 
Gounder, Poosari Gounder, Anuppa Vellala 
Gounder, Padaithalai Gounder, Chendalai 
Gounder, Pavalankatti Vellala Gounder, Pala 






74 Vellala Gounder, Sanku Vellala 
Gounder and Rathinagiri Gounder 
 
74 Koppala Velama 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt 






(in Chengalpattu, Ramanathapuram, 
Kamarajar,  Pasumpen Mutouramalingam, 
Pudukottai, Thanjavur, Tiruchirappalli, 
Tirunelveli, Madras ,Madurai and the Nilgiris 
districts) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 





(in Kanniyakumari district and Shencottah 
taluk of Tirunelveli district) 




Kudumbi (in Kanniyakumari district 
and Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
80 Kulala (including Kuyavar, Kumbarar 
and Velar) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011 / 88/98-BCC dt 
06/12/1999 
81 Kunchidigar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 82 Kunnuvar Mannadi 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 






Kurumba (where they are not 
Scheduled Tribes), Kurumba Gounder, 




85 Labbai, Rowthar and Marakayar 
(whether their spoken language is 
Tamil or Urdu) 




12011 / 88/98-BCC dt 
06/12/1999 
86 Lambadi 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993  
87 
Latin Catholic (in Kanniyakumari 
district and Shencottah taluk of 
Tirunelveli district) 





88 Jangama 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 89 Mahratta (non-Brahmin) (including 
Namdev Mahratta) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/ 21/ 95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 
90 Mahendra, Medara 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 91 Malayan, Malayar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 92 Male 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993  
93 
Maujagar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12015/9/ 2000 dt 
06/09/2001 94 Mapilla 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993  
95 
Maravar (including Karumaravar, 
Appanad Kondayamkottai Maravar and 
Sembanad Maravar) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/ 95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 
96 Maruthuvar, 
Navithar, Mangala, Velakkattalavar, 
Velakkattalanair and Pronopakari 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 






Sembadavar(including converts to 
Christianity) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/ 95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 
98 Monda Koravar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 99 Mooppan 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/ 95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 





Mukkuvar or Mukayar 
including converts to Christianity) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
102 Muthuraja 
Muthuracha Muttiriyar Muthiriyar 
Mutharaiyar 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
103 Mutlakampatti 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 






Shanar and Gramani, 
including Christian Nadar, Christian 
Shanar and Christian Gramani 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/ 95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 
105 Nagaram 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 106 Naikkar (in Kanniyakumari district 
and Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli district) 




107 Nanjil Mudali (in Kanniyakumari 
district and Shencottah taluk of 
Tirunelveli district) 




108 Narikoravar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 109 Nokkar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993  
110 
Odar (in Kanniyakumari district and 
Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
111 Odiya 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 112 Ovachar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 113 Pamulu 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 114 Panar (Except in Kanniyakumari 
district and Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli 
district where the community is a Scheduled 
Caste) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
115 Pannayar (including Kathikarar in 
Kanniyakumari district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
116 Pannirandam Chettiar or Uthama 
Chettiar 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
117 Paravar including converts to 
Christianity (except in Kanniya- kumari 
district and Shenocottah taluk of Tirunelveli 
district where the community is a Scheduled 
Caste) 





118 Parkavakulam (Suruthimar including 
those Suruthimar who call themselves as 
Moopanar, Nathamar including those 
Nathamar who call themselves as Nainar, 
Malayamar) 











Perumkollar (in Kanniyakumari 
district and Shencottah taluk of 
Tirunelveli district) 






Ponnai Koravar (in North Arcot 
district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
122 Poraya 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 123 Pulluvar or Pooluvar, Pooluva 
Gounder 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/44/99-BCC dt 
21.09.2000 124 Pusala 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993  
125 
Sadhu Chetty (including Telugu 
Chetty, Telugupatty Chetty, Twenty- four 
Manai Telugu Chetty) 




126 Sakkaravar or Kavathi (in 
Kanniyakumari district and Shencottah taluk 
of Tirunelveli district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
127 Sakkaraithamadai Koravar (in North 
Arcot district) 




128 Salem Melnad Koravar (in Madurai, 
Coimbatore Periyar, Pudukottai, 
Tiruchirappalli, Salem and North Arcot 
districts) 




129 Salem Uppu Koravar (in Salem 
district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 








Padmasaliyar Pattusaliyar Pattariyar and 
Adhaviyar 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
132 Saranga Palli Koravar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 133 Sathatha Srivaishnava (including 
Sathanai, 
Chattadi and Chattada Srivaishnava) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
134 Savalakkarar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 135 Senaithalaivar, 
Senaikudiyar and Illaivaniar 




136 Sourashtra (Patnulkarar) 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 137 Sozhia Chetty 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 138 Sozhia Vellalar (including 
Sozha Vellalar, Vetrilaikarar, Kodikalkarar 
and Keeraikarar 




139 Srisayar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 




141 Thogamalai Koravar or Kepmari (in 
Tiruchirappalli, and Pudukottai districts) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
142 Thogatta Veerakshatriya 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993  
143 
Tholkollar (in  Kanniyakumari district 
and Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
144 Tholuva Naicker and Vetalakara 
Naicker 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
145 Thondaman 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 146 Thoriyar, Badaga Thoraiyar of Nilgiris 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/68/98-BCC dt 
27/10/1999 147 Thottiya Naicker (including 
Rajakambalam, Gollavar, Sillavar, 
Thockalavar and Tholuva Naicker) 














149 Uppukoravar or 
Settipalli 
Koravar (in Thanjavur, Pudukottai, Madurai 
and  North Arcot districts) 




150 Urali Gounder, 
(throughout the state) and Orudya Gounder, 
or Oorudaya Gounder 
(in Madurai, Coimbatore, Periyar, 
Tiueechirapalli, Pudukottai and Salem 
districts) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
151 Vaduvarpatti Koravar (in Madurai, 
Ramanathauram, Pasumpon 
Muthuramalingam, Kamarajar, Tirunelveli, 
Tiruchirappalli and Pudukottai districts) 




152 Valaiyar (including Chettinad 
Valaiyar) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
12011/21/95-BCC dt 
15/05/1995 153 Vallambar 2011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 154 Valmiki 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993  
155 
Vaniyar, Vania Chettiar (including 
Gandla, Ganika, Telikula and 
Chekkalar) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
156 Vannar (Salavai Thozhilalar) 
including Agasa, Madivala, Ekali, Rajakula, 
Veluthadar and Rajaka (except in 
Kanniyakumari District and Shencottah Taluk 
in Tirunelveli District where the community 
is a Scheduled Caste) 









157 Vanniyakula Kshatriya (including 
Vanniya, Vanniyar, Vannia Gounder, 
Gounder or Kander, Padayachi, Palli and 
Agnikula Kshatriya) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
158 Varaganeri Koravar 
(in Tiruchira Palli and Pudukottai districts) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
159 Vayalpad or Nawalpeta Koracha 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 160 Veduvar/Vettaikkarar (throughout the 
state) 
and Vedar (except in Kanniyakumari district 
and Shencottah taluk of Tirunelveli district 
where the community is a Scheduled Caste) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
161 Veerasaiva (in Kanniyakumari district 
and Shenocottah taluk of Tirunelveli district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
162 Vellan Chettiar 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 163 Veluthodathu Nair (in Kanniyakumari 
district and Shencottah taluk of 
Tirunelveli district) 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
164 Vetta Koravar (in Salem district) 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 165 Vettuva Gounder, 
Punnan Vettuva Gounder 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 




166 Vokkaligar (including 
Vakkaligar, Okkaligar, Kappiliyar, Kappiliya, 
Okkaliya, Gowda, Okkaliya Gowda, 
Okkaliga Gowda, Okkaliya Gowder) 




12015/15/2008- BCC dt. 
16/06/2011 





168 Yadava (including Idaiyar, Telugu 
speaking Idaiyar known as Vaduga Ayar or 
Vaduga Idaiyar or Golla, Mond Golla and 
Asthanthra Golla) 




169 Yavana 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 170 Yerukula 12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 




172 Christian converts from any Hindu 
Backward Classes 
12011/68/93-BCC(C ) dt 
10/09/1993 
173 Battu Turkas 12011/68/98-BCC dt 
27/10/1999 174 Devagudi Talayari 12011/68/98-BCC dt 
27/10/1999 175 Podikara Vellalar 12011/88/98-BCC dt 
06/12/1999 176 Pulavar 12011/68/98-BCC dt 
27/10/1999 177 Nangudi Vellalar 12011/68/98-BCC dt 
27/10/1999 178 Kuga Vellalar 12011/88/98-BCC dt 
06/12/1999 179 Kallar Kula Thondaman 12011/44/99-BCC dt 






Appendix 2: Kerala government classification of OBCs - KPSC list of OBCs 
 
List of Scheduled Tribes in the Kerala State 
 
 ( As amended by the Scheduled Castes and Sceduled Tribes Order (Amendment Act) 
1976 and as amended by the Constitution (Sceduled castes) Orders (Second 
Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 61 of 2002) vide Part VIII- Kerala- Schedule I notified 
in the Gazette of India, dated 18 December, 2002) and (As amended by the Scheduled 
Castes and Sceduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act 2002 (Act 10 of 2003) vide 




2. Aranda (Arandan) 
3. Eravallan 
4. Hill Pulaya(Mala Pulayan, Kurumba Pulayan, Karavazhi Pulayan, Pamba Pulayan) 
5. Irular,Irulan 







13. Kurichchan (Kurichiyan) 
14. Kurumans (Mullu Kuruman, Mulla Kuruman, Mala Kuruman) 
15. Kurumbas (Kurumbar, Kurumban) 
16. Mahamalasar 
17. Malai Arayan (Mala Arayan) 
18. Malai Pandaran 
19. Malai Vedan (Mala Vedan) 
20. Malakkuravan 
21. Malasar 
22. Malayan, Nattu Malayan, Konga Malayan (Excluding the areas comprising the 
Kasaragod, Kannur, Wayanad and Kozhikode Districts) 
23. Mavilan 
24. Malayarayar 
25. Mannan (to be spelt in Malayalam script in parenthisis) 
26. Muthuvan,Mudugar,Muduvan 
27. Palleyan, Palliyan, Paliyar, Palliya 
28. Paniyan 
29. Ulladan, Ullatan 
30. Uraly 
31. Mala Vettuvan (in Kasaragod and Kannur Districts) 




33. Thachenadan, Thachenadan, Moopan 
34. Cholanaickan 
35. Malapanickar  
36. Vettakuruman 
  
List of Other Backward Classes in Kerala State 
 











10.Chetty/ Chetties (Kottar Chetties,Parakka Chetties,Elur Chetties,Attingal 
Chetties,Pudukkada Chetties,Iraniel Chetties, Sri Pandara Chetties, Telugu Chetties, 
Udiyankulangara Chetties, Peroorkada Chetties, Sadhu Chetties, 24 Mana Chetties, 
Wayanadan Chetties, Kalavara Chetties and 24 Mana Telugu Chetties) 
11. Devadiga 
12. Devanga 
13. Dheevara (Arayan,Valan, 
Nulayan,Mukkuvan,Arayavathi,Valinjiar,Paniakkal,Mukaya,Bovi ,Mukayar and 
Mukaveeran) 










24. Kolasari, Kalasi Panicker 
25. Kalari Kurup or Kalari Panicker 
26. Viswakaramas including Asari Chaptegra, 
Kallassary,Kalthachan,Kammala,Kamsala, Kannan,Karuvan,Kitaran,Kollan,Malayala 
Kammala, Moosari,Pandikammala,Pandithattan,Perumkolllan,Thachan,Thattan, 
Vilkurup,Villasan,Viswabrahmanan or Viswabrahmanar and Viswakarmala 
27. Kannadiyans  








33. Kerala Mudali 
34. Kudumbi 
35. Kusavan(Kulala,Kulala Nair,Andhra Nair or Anthuru Nair) 
36. Kumbarans 
37. Kuruba 





43. Muslim or Mappila 
44. Nadar (Hindu) 
45. Naikkans 
46. Odans 








55. Saliya, Chaliya (Chaliyan) 
56. Senai Thalavan (Elavaniar) 
57. S.I.U.C (Excluding Nadar) 
58. S.I.U.C  
59. Thachar 
60. Tholkollans  
61. Thottian  
62. Vaduvans,Vadugans,Vadukkars and Vaduka (Vadukans) 
63. Velaans (Velaan, Velaar) 
64. Vanian (Vanika,Vanika Vaisya,Vanibha Chetty,Vaniya Chettty,Ayiravar, 
Nagarathar and Vaniyan) 
65. Vaniar 
66. Vakkaliga 
67. Veerasaivas (Yogis and Yogeeswara, Poopandaram/ Malapandaram and Jangam) 
68. Veluthedathu Nair (Veluthedan and Vannathan) 
69. Vilakkithala Nair (Vilakithalavan) 
70. Yadavas (Kolaya, Ayar, Mayar, Maniyani and Iruman) 
71. Kongu Navithan, Vettuva Navithan and Aduthon 
72. Moopar or Kallan Mooppan or Kallan Mooppar. 
73.Kongu Vellala Gounder ( Vellala Gounder,Nattu Gounder,Pala Gounder, Poosari 





II In Malabar District 
1. Boyan 
2. Ganjan Reddis 
3. Visanavan 






IV Throughout the State except Kasaragod Taluk Malabar District 
 
1.Marati 
Explanation :- Malabar District shall mean the Malabar District referred to in 
sub-section (2) of section 5 of the State Reorganisation Act,1956. 
 
This list has been reproduced from the website of the Kerala Public Services 






Appendix 3: List of topics included in interviews 
 
The following is a rough list of questions covered in personal interviews with each 
respondent. This is not an exhaustive list. The order of questions varied with each 
respondent. The linguistic form of these questions also varied in different interviews. 
 
1. Tell me a little bit about yourself 
2. Tell me a little bit about yourself 
3. Do you think of yourself as a Thiyya? Has this changed over time? 
4. Tell me a little bit about Malabar. 
5. Do you identify yourself as a Malabari? Has this changed over time? 
6. What is Thiyya (are they Hindus, a caste or tribe, avarna or savarna) 
7. Why is this group called Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar? 
8. Do you think Malabar and being Thiyya are connected? 
9. Do you think Thiyyas need reservations? 
10. What do you think about the inclusion of Thiyyas in OBC list? 
11. Checking response to “Ezhavas = South = Seek” vs “Thiyyas = Malabar = 
Sacrifice” 
12. What do you think about Dr Shyamalan’s study? 
13. Do you think there is a connection between Sri Narayana Guru and the 
Thiyyas? 
14. Can you tell me a little bit about the SNDP? 
15. Can you tell me a little bit about the TMS/MTMS? 
16. What do you think of the caste census? 
17. What are some of the main challenges faced by the Thiyyas according to you? 
18. Checking response to post on colonization of land in Malabar - about 
Ezhavas, about Muslims, about Christians. 
19. Some members on the group shared that they had experienced people from 
other castes putting them down because they are Thiyyas. Have you faced or 
heard of something similar? 
20. Some members on the group mentioned that sometimes hesitated to let others 
know that they are Thiyyas. Have you faced or heard of something similar? 
21. When and how did you join Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar? 
22. What were some of your expectations when you joined Cyber Thiyyars of 
Malabar? 
23. What are some things (posts, discussions) that you would like to see more of 
on the group? 
24. What are some things (posts, discussions) that you would like to see less of on 
the group? 
25. Can you describe how you use the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar? How often do 
you check the group? 
26. Discussions about different photographs of kavus and temples shared on 
Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar. 





28. Discussions about different photographs of old Thiyyas houses shared on the 
group. 
29. On the group, there is an effort to list out important Thiyyas. What do you 
think of this activity? 
30. Some posts mention the secession of Malabar from Kerala. What do you think 
about such posts?  
31. Other posts mention that this secession should be accompanied by a 
combination with areas such as Nilgiris, Coorg etc because groups such as the 
Kodavas are similar to the Thiyyas. What do you think of this suggestion? 
32. How does it feel to be a Thiyya in Malabar? Is it different from how it feels to 
be a Thiyya outside Malabar? 
33. Some members shared that they do not like Thiyyas to be known as Ezhavas 
because it gets Thiyyas a “backward” tag. What do you think? 
34. For you, how are TMS/MTMS connected to Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar? 
35. Some members think more power to the Thiyyas will halp Malabar. What do 
you think? 
36. Some members posted that because Thiyyas are neglected Malabar is also 
neglected. What do you think? 
37. Some members posted that because Malabar is neglected Thiyyas also suffer. 
What do you think? 
38. Some members posted that “Malabar is the land of the Thiyyas”. What do you 
think about this post? 
39. Members have mentioned that Muslims are growing very powerful in Kannur 
and this is hurting the Thiyyas. What do you think? 
40. Discussions about the Thiyya Shmashanam posts. 
41. I have come across the term “Ezhavanization” on the group. Is this a term you 
use? What do you think this means? 
42. Does “Ezhavanization” affect Malabar in some way? 
43. On the group, being Thiyya seems to be strongly connected with belonging to 
Malabar. Do you personally think the connection is so strong, now that you 







Appendix 4a: List of codes generated 
 
 Imaginative geographies, 
 caste matters less in Malabar 
 Thiyyas Social and Network capital recog in Malabar 
 caste stigma in South Kerala 
 caste stigma in Malabar 
 caste stigma elsewhere in India or abroad  
 fate of thiyyas is fate of Malabar 
 fate of malabar is fate of Thiyyas 
 secession from Kerala 
 neglect from Govt of kerala 
 colonization of malabar land 
 substantialization of caste 
 logic of enumeration 
 what are thiyyas like 
 what is malabar like 
 function of representative organization 
 Thiyya identity separate  
 what is south kerala like 
 what are ezhavas like 
 what do upper castes think of us 
 interactions with castes not ezhava 
 interactions with other religions 
 thiyya awareness source 
 passing as other castes 
 SNDP 
 attitude to TMS 
 caste status of thiyyas 
 thiyyas relationship to Hinduism 
 reading thiyyas=sacr ezhavas=selfish 
 class interacts with caste status 
 internal differences within Malabar 
 internal differences in south kerala 
 reactions to OBC status of Thiyyas 
 attitude to reservations  
 connecting Malabar to thiyyas on FB 
 Ezhava advantage with South region 
 thiyya disadvantage with Malabar 
 backward vs OBC 
 thiyyas in malabar 
 migration of ezhavas into Malabar 




 outmigration of thiyyas from Malabar 
 critique of communism 
 cognitive map of Malabar 
 reaction to majority of thiyyas slipping in malabar 
 attitude to Thiyya shmashanam 
















In this map of Southern India, the British administered Madras Presidency is 
indicated in pink and the district of Malabar is outlined in red on the southwestern 
end. The Princely States of Travancore and Cochin are marked in yellow underneath 
the southern boundary of Malabar. 
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Malabar was reorganized to create 3 whole districts within the present-day Kerala, 
namely Kannur, Mallappuram, Wayanad, Kozhikode. In addition, some parts of 
Malabar district were included within the current day districts of Palakkad and 
Thrissur. Although the present day district of Kasaragod was not part of the British 
Malabar district, most members of the Cyber Thiyyars of Malabar tend to include this 
area when referring to Malabar. 
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